The Shape of US Populism

By
Henry C.K.  Liu

Part I: Legacy of Free Market Capitalism
Part II: Long-term Effects of the Civil War
Part III: The Progrssive Era


Part IV: A Panic-Stricken Federal Reserve


This article appeared in AToL on April 2, 2006



The recent moves by the Fed in the months following the credit market seizure of August 2007 to inject liquidity into a failed credit market and to bail out distressed banks and brokerage houses caught with holding securities of dubious market value are looking more like fixes for drug addicts in advance stages of abuse. So far, many of the actions taken by the Fed to deal with the credit crisis have been self neutralizing, such as pushing down short-term interest rates to try to save wayward institutions addicted to fantastic returns from highly leveraged speculation, only to cause the dollar to free fall, thus causing dollar interest rates and commodity prices, including food and energy, to rise.

First, four months after the August 2007 credit market seizure, the Fed announced on December 12, 2007 the Term Auction Facility (TAF) program, under which the Fed will auction term funds to depository institutions against the wide variety of collateral that can be used to secure loans at the discount window.  By allowing the Fed to inject term funds through a broader range of counterparties and against a broader range of collateral than open market operations, this facility was intended to help promote the efficient dissemination of liquidity when the unsecured interbank markets came under stress. Each TAF auction was to be for a fixed amount, with the rate determined by the auction process subject to a minimum bid rate.  The first TAF auction of $20 billion was scheduled for December 17, with settlement on December 20; this auction provided 28-day term funds, maturing January 17, 2008.  The second auction of up to $20 billion was scheduled for December 20, with settlement on December 27; this auction provided 35-day funds, maturing January 31, 2008.  The third and fourth auctions were held on Mondays, January 14 and 28, with settlement on the following Thursdays.  The amounts of those auctions were determined in January.  The Fed would conduct additional auctions in subsequent months, depending in part on evolving market conditions. 

Experience gained under this temporary program was expected to be helpful in assessing the potential usefulness of augmenting the Fed’s current monetary policy tools--open market operations and the primary credit facility--with a permanent facility for auctioning term discount window credit.  The Board anticipated that it would seek public comment on any proposal for a permanent term auction facility. In other words, the Fed had no idea how the market would react to its TAF program. 

At the same time, the Fed Open Market Committee (FOMC) authorized temporary reciprocal currency arrangements (swap lines) with the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB).  These arrangements provided dollars in amounts of up to $20 billion and $4 billion to the ECB and the SNB, respectively, for use in their jurisdictions.  The FOMC approved these swap lines for a period of up to six months.

On December 21, 2007, the Fed announced its intention to conduct biweekly TAF auctions for as long as necessary to address elevated pressures in short-term funding markets. The Board of Governors was to announce the sizes of the January 14 and January 28 TAF auctions at noon on January 4. 

On January 4, 2008, the Fed announced it would conduct two auctions of 28-day credit through its TAF in January, increasing to $30 billion the auction to be held on January 14 and $30 billion in the auction to be held on January 28.

On February 1, 2008, the Fed announced it would conduct two auctions of 28-day credit through its TAF in February, offering $30 billion in an auction to be held on February 11 and $30 billion again in an auction to be held on February 25, making the total in February $60 billion. To facilitate participation by smaller institutions, the minimum bid size will be reduced to $5 million, from $10 million in the previous auctions.

On February 29, 2008, the Fed announced it would conduct two auctions of 28-day credit through its TAF in March.  It would offer $30 billion in an auction to be held on March 10 and $30 billion in an auction to be held on March 24, making the total for March $60 billion.

But on March 7, 2008, the Fed announced two new initiatives to address continuing heightened liquidity pressures in term funding markets. First, the amounts outstanding in the TAF will be increased to $100 billion from $30 billion.  The auctions on March 10 and March 24 each would be increased to $50 billion--an increase of $20 billion from the amounts that were announced for these auctions on February 29. The Fed would increase these auction sizes further if conditions warrant.  To provide increased certainty to market participants, the Fed would continue to conduct TAF auctions for at least the next six months unless evolving market conditions clearly indicate that such auctions are no longer necessary. The Fed was acknowledging that the credit market crisis was not a passing storm and that its previous TAF auctions did not produce the intended effect in the market.

Second, beginning immediately, the Fed initiated a series of term repurchase transactions that were expected to cumulate to $100 billion.  These transactions would be conducted as 28-day term repurchase (repo) agreements in which primary dealers may elect to deliver as collateral any of the types of securities--Treasury, agency debt, or agency mortgage-backed securities--that are eligible as collateral in conventional open market operations.  As with the TAF auction sizes, the Fed would further increase the sizes of these term repo operations if future conditions should warrant. The Fed announced that it was in close consultation with foreign central bank counterparts concerning liquidity conditions in markets. See my September 29, 2005 AToL article: The Repo Time Bomb.

On March 20, Bloomberg.com ran a report by Liz Capo McCormick – Treasuries’ Scarcity Triggers Repo Market Failures:

 

Surging demand for US Treasuries is causing failures to deliver or receive government debt in the $6.3 trillion a day market for borrowing and lending to climb to the highest level in almost four years.

Failures, an indication of scarcity, surged to $1.795 trillion in the week ended March 5, the highest since May 2004, and up from $374 billion the prior week. They have averaged $493.4 billion a week this year, compared with $359.6 billion over the last five years and $168.8 billion back through July 1990, according to data from the New York Fed.

Investors seeking the safety of government debt amid the loss of confidence in credit markets pushed rates on three-month bills today to 0.387 percent, the lowest level since 1954. Institutions worldwide have reported $195 billion in writedowns and losses related to subprime mortgages and collateralized debt obligations since the start of 2007, making firms reluctant to hold anything but Treasuries as collateral on loans.

‘It shows you the kind of anxieties that are going on and the keen demand for Treasuries,’ said Tony Crescenzi, chief bond market strategist at Miller Tabak & Co. in New York. “The rise in fails tells us about the inability of dealers to obtain Treasury collateral.”

In a repurchase agreement, or repo, a customer provides cash to a dealer in exchange for a bill, note or bond. The exchange is reversed the next day, with the customer receiving interest on the overnight loan. A Treasury security is termed on ‘special’ when it is in such demand that owners can borrow cash against it at interest rates lower than the general collateral rate.

The Treasury Department cautioned dealers in January to guard against failing to settle in the Treasury repo market as interest rates fall. It cited periods of such failures to receive or deliver securities, known as `fails' in the repo market, earlier in the decade when rates dropped.

The difference between the rate for borrowing and lending non-specific Treasury securities, or the general collateral rate, has averaged 63 basis points below the central bank’s target rate for overnight loans this year. The spread has averaged about 8 basis points the past 10 years.

Overnight general collateral repo rates have traded lower than the Fed's target rate for overnight lending every day this year. The rate on general collateral repo closed today [March 20] at 0.9 percent, according to data from GovPX Inc., a unit of ICAP Plc, the world's largest inter-dealer broker, compared with 1.25 percent yesterday. Today’s rate is 135 basis points below the Fed's target rate for overnight lending of 2.25 percent.

A spokesman for the New York Fed, declined to comment on the fails data.

Nakedcapitalism.com observes that a lot of Treasuries are now held by counterparty risk-averse investors who are not interested in lending them which could complicate the operation of the Fed’s new facilities designed to unfreeze the mortgage market. The Fed may be running into its own liquidity constraints as it depletes its Treasury holdings and cannot add more non-inflationary “sterilized” liquidity.

The scarcity of Treasuries for repos means that demand for repo collaterals will push up Treasury prices and push down yields. Three month Treasury bills traded at 0.56% on March 19, a 50-year low, and a stunning 0.39% the following day, a rate last seen in 1954, Since bill prices are used as the input into other pricing models (most notably the widely used Black-Scholes option pricing model), the distortions in the Treasure market have the potential to feed into other markets, such as the credit default swaps market.

On March 11, 2008, the Fed announced that since the coordinated actions taken in December 2007, the G-10 central banks had continued to work together closely and to consult regularly on liquidity pressures in funding markets. Pressures in some of these markets had recently increased again. “We all continue to work together and will take appropriate steps to address those liquidity pressures. To that end, today the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve, and the Swiss National Bank are announcing specific measures.” 

On the same day, the Fed announced an expansion of its securities lending program to include a new Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), under which the Fed would lend up to $200 billion of Treasury securities to primary dealers secured for a term of 28 days (rather than overnight, as in the existing lending program) by a pledge of other securities, including federal agency debt, federal agency residential-mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and non-agency AAA/Aaa-rated private-label residential MBS.  The TSLF is intended to promote liquidity in the financing markets for Treasury and other collateral and thus to foster the functioning of financial markets more generally. 

In addition, the Federal Open Market Committee has authorized increases in its existing temporary reciprocal currency arrangements (swap lines) with the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB).  These arrangements will now provide dollars in amounts of up to $30 billion and $6 billion to the ECB and the SNB, respectively, representing increases of $10 billion and $2 billion.  The FOMC extended the term of these swap lines through September 30, 2008. The actions announced would supplement the measures announced by the Federal Reserve on March 7 to boost the size of the Term Auction Facility to $100 billion and to undertake a series of term repurchase transactions that will cumulate to $100 billion.

This program allows primary dealers to exchange a total of $200 billion MBS of uncertain market value for Treasuries for 28 days instead of the traditional overnight lending. Why $200 billion? Because the Fed knows that primary dealers are holding $139.7 billion agency securities and $60.2 billion private label securities. 

In The Wall Street Examiner, Lee Adler wrote in his article: Bandaid on a Ruptured Jugular:

Why do prime dealers (PDs) borrow securities from the Fed? To sell them short. The PDs are heavily short Treasuries at all times. They are heavily long all other debt securities simultaneously. The level of securities lending in recent months is unprecedented in all of human history, by an order of magnitude of 10.
The Fed is now responding to the pressure of the imminent collapse of the PDs and major banks worldwide, because not only are the PDs heavily short the stuff that is going up, Treasuries, they are heavily long the stuff that is going down, which is all other debt securities. This is the worst of all possible worlds and the Fed’s action is like putting a bandaid on a ruptured jugular vein.

Stealth Nationalization of the Financial Sector

Adler quotes Steve Randy Waldman of Interfluidity (What Happens 28 Days later?): “Since the Fed cannot retire loans made via TAF and its repo program without adding to those “elevated pressures”, the loans should be considered an equity infusion, because they’ll be repaid at the convenience of the borrower rather than on a schedule agreed with the lender.” What Waldman did not say was that the Fed had ventured into a broad nationalization of the prime dealers on Wall Street by being an equity investor.

Does the same argument apply to the new Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF)? On the face of it, it’s harder to view TSLF as an equity infusion, since the Fed is not handing out cash. But to firms holding illiquid securities that the Fed will accept as collateral, the program is equivalent to a not-so-efficient cash infusion, because the Treasuries the Fed lends are liquid and can be converted to cash easily in private markets, according to Waldman.

So, this new facility might well be a form of equity, if the Fed is willing to roll it over indefinitely and require payment only at the convenience of borrowers or when a normal market for them reappears. Waldman thinks what happens after 28 days is pretty clear. The swap will be rolled over and over and over until the mortgage-backed security market stabilizes. This could be a year from now, or perhaps ten. That may sound ridiculous but it is essentially what happened in Japan.  Waldman suggests that inquiring minds might ask what happens if the value of the MBS drops. Will the Fed issue a margin call or just look the other way? … One thing is for sure: The more liberal the Fed is in valuing the MBS the more likely a margin call situation arises. However Waldman strongly suspects the Fed will not disclose who is doing the swapping, in what size, or whether the swap ratio is 1:1 or not. So much for transparency.

“This may temporarily stop a further squeeze against dealers who are short treasuries and long MBS, but it is will not do much of anything to restore a bid in the MBS market. Nor will it cure the massive leverage problems at many of the primary dealers and banks,” writes Waldman.

Adler cites an interesting paragraph from a MarketWatch article: “Counting the currency swaps with the foreign central banks, the Fed has now committed more than half of its combined securities and loan portfolio of $832 billion,” Lou Crandall, chief economist for Wrightson ICAP noted. “The Fed won’t have run completely out of ammunition after these operations, but it is reaching deeper into its balance sheet than before.” 

“Bernanke’s intent is to buy the primary dealers time, but it really can’t work. Those securities will not be worth more tomorrow than they are today. For now, a MBS fire sale was averted, but it can’t be put off forever,” writes Adler.

On March 16, 2008, the Fed announced that the New York Fed has been granted the authority to establish a Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), intended to improve the ability of primary dealers to provide financing to participants in securitization markets and promote the orderly functioning of financial markets more generally. The PDCF will provide overnight funding to primary dealers in exchange for a specified range of collateral, including all collateral eligible for tri-party repurchase agreements arranged by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as well as all investment-grade corporate securities, municipal securities, mortgage-backed securities and asset-backed securities for which a price is available. The PDCF will remain in operation for a minimum period of six months and may be extended as conditions warrant to foster the functioning of financial markets.  The TAF program offers term funding to depository institutions via a bi-weekly auction, for fixed amounts of credit. The TSLF program is an auction for a fixed amount of lending of Treasury general collateral in exchange for Open-Market-Operation-eligible and AAA/Aaa rated private-label residential mortgage-backed securities. The PDCF program now allows eligible primary dealers to borrow at the existing Discount Rate for up to 120 days. 

Down the Slippery Slope

The moves into new province suggest that the Fed has changed its traditional role in the economy with the support of the White House and the Treasury. Former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker said in a public television interview the same evening that the Fed’s decision to lend money to Bear Stearns Cos. [via commercial bank JPMorgan-Chase] to keep the investment house from collapsing is unprecedented and “raises some real questions” about whether that was the appropriate role for the Fed. The wisdom of the decision depends on “how severe this crisis was and the Fed’s judgment about the threat of demise of Bear Stearns,” Volcker said. “That’s a judgment they had to make and an understandable judgment. It is absolutely not what you want for the longstanding regulatory support system.” The Fed’s action then was an open admission that a ominous systemic crisis of total melt down was a clear and present danger. 

Unlike the TAF which swaps cash for MBS and therefore requires sterilization so as not to push the fed funds rate below target, the TSLF is simply a swap of one instrument for another, albeit an inferior one. It is not printing, and it injects no cash into the system. To avoid the need to sterilize the liquidity injection, the Fed exchanged Treasuries in its procession for securities of dubious market value held by Bear Stearns.  Since Bear Stearns is not a banking holding company and does not own a bank, the Fed could only rescue it by providing the funds to JPMorgan Chase, a commercial bank that can access the Fed discount window for funds, to acquire Bear Stearns at a fire sale price of $2 a share, a ceiling dictated by the Fed to avoid the appearance of bailing out Bear Stearns shareholders, while other investors were bidding at $5.98. The shares had traded at $170 at its peak in January 2007 and at $67 two weeks before the rescue. The Fed will guarantee up to $30 billion of potential losses on Bear assets, later reduced to $29 billion with JPMorgan assuming the first billion losses. It was the Fed’s first rescue of a prime dealer broker since the Great Depression and its latest effort to soothe financial markets roiled by fallout from rising mortgage defaults. Latest reports have JPMorgan renegotiating the sale price at $10 per share to ward off shareholder attempts to block the Fed-sponsored deal.

So far, the three special facilities introduced by the Fed in quick succession have failed to stabilize the credit market:
The TAF (Term Auction Facility) failed to restore liquidity.
The TSLF (Term Securities Lending Facility) failed to restore liquidity.
The PDCF (Primary Dealer Credit Facility) can be expected to fail to save a rising number of distressed primary dealers.

Clearly the bond market does not believe the TAF, the TSLF, or the PDCF, all liquidity actions, are going to solve the insolvency problem facing over-leveraged institutions.

Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke is increasingly perceived by the market as running out of room to pump money into the financial markets and to cut interest rates to rescue the faltering economy. To providing liquidity to the market, the Fed has already committed as much as 60% of the $709 billion in Treasury securities on its balance sheet. It has opened the door of moral hazard to more bailouts with the decision to become a lender of last resort for Bear Stearns, one of the biggest Wall Street dealers.

The Fed is now forced to responding to the pressure of the imminent collapse of distressed primary dealers and major banks worldwide. Primary dealers have routinely heavily shorted Treasuries that are now going up in price, and heavily longed all sort of other debt instruments that are now going down in price. The normal formula for easy profit has become the worst of all possible worlds for primary dealers in times of market distress.  Moreover, the high leverage will magnify the losses as it did profits during good times. Also structured finance has generated derivatives that are based on hundreds of trillions of dollars in notional value, causing every slight move in interest rate to produce payment obligations in hundred of billion of dollars among institutions whose capital structures are woefully inadequate. 

Legal Challenges

Inner City Press/Community on the Move, a housing and fair lending activist group, has challenged the legality of the Fed’s quick approval of refinancing for Bear Stearns via JPMorgan Chase, questioning the Fed’s authority to approve the deal involving a non-bank institution. 

In a complaint filed with the Fed a day after the Fed action, Inner City Press labeled the central bank’s brokering of the Bear Stearns deal as “entirely illegal” and anticompetitive, and questioned whether the required number of Fed Board governors had voted for it.

Bernanke took advantage of little-used parts of Fed law, added in the 1930s and last utilized in the 1960s, that allow it to lend to corporations and private partnerships with a special board vote. Such votes require approval from five Fed governors. The seven-member Fed board currently has two vacancies, and one governor, Randall Kroszner, is serving past the Jan. 31 expiration of his term. 

Inner City Press questioned the legality of the Fed approving the Bear Stearns deal without public notice, on the grounds Bear Stearns “is not a banking holding company and it does not own a bank.” It was the Fed’s first rescue of a broker dealer since the Great Depression and its latest effort to soothe financial markets roiled by fallout from rising mortgage defaults. The Federal Reserve bypassed its own normal emergency-lending policies to let securities firms borrow at the same interest rate at the discount window as commercial banks as the central bank sought to stave off a financial-market meltdown. Guidelines revised in 2002 say the Fed should charge non- banks more than the highest rate that commercial banks pay. Instead, Fed Chairman Bernanke and his colleagues, in emergency votes on March 16, invoked broader authority in the Federal Reserve Act to give Wall Street prime dealers the same rate as banks. Backstopping securities firms, coupled with action to keep Bear Stearns Cos. afloat before its sale to JPMorgan Chase represent the central bank’s first lifelines to institutions other than banks since the Great Depression.

Under a regulatory regime dating back to the New Deal of the 1930s, the Fed oversees commercial banks, but investment banks are primarily regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission which in recent decades has become a captured regulator that resembles an asylum run by the inmates. 

Senior Fed staffers said the arrangement allows JP Morgan Chase to borrow from the Fed’s discount window and put up collateral of uncertain value from Bear Stearns to back up the loans. JP Morgan, a bank, has access to the discount window to obtain direct loans from the Fed, but Bear Stearns, an investment house, does not. While JP Morgan is serving as a conduit for the loans, the Fed and not JP Morgan will bear the risk if the loans are not repaid, officials said. When God sins, the entire theological structure rots.

Bernanke raced to unveil the new steps before the Tokyo Stock Exchange opened on March 17. The weekend action, timed to complement JPMorgan’s rescue of Bear Stearns, included a cut in the discount rate and the opening of borrowing to the primary dealers in Treasury securities, not all of which are banks. The changes were the Fed’s most aggressive response to date to the 8-month-old credit crisis that has spread to the entire US economy and around the world. See my March 17, 2007 AToL article: Why the Subprime Bust Will Spread, which was written five months before the August credit crisis, at a time when establishment officials and gurus were assuring the public that the subprime mortgage problem was well contained. 

The “temporary” facilities for 28 days have been extended on increasingly larger scale. If they had a chance at being temporary the scale should be getting smaller and not larger. The Fed is putting in jeopardy its credibility by pretending that the “temporary facilities” might end or be phased out at the end of some future 28-day period when it knew in advance that was not possible. Each rollover increases stress in the precarious financial system as market participants become dependent on more Fed intervention to provide temporary adrenaline to unjustified market exuberance.

The Fed on March 16 cut the discount rate by 25 basis points to 3.25%. Two days later, on March 18, the Fed slashed its Fed funds rate target 75 basis points to 2.25% and the discount rate to 2.50%. US interest rate has now fallen to negative rate levels, meaning it is now below inflation rate. 

Another day later, Government Sponsored Enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac received permission from regulators to pump as much as $200 billion of liquidity into the beleaguered US mortgage market without having to add compensatory capital.  For weeks earlier, rumors had been rife about these two GSEs facing insolvency. Jonathan R. Laing of Barron’s characterized their shares as “worthless”. At year end 2007, the company owned in its portfolio or had packaged and guaranteed some $2.8 trillion of mortgages or 23% of all US residential mortgage debt outstanding. The company lost $2.6 billion in 2007 as a surge of red ink in the final two quarters more than wiped out a nicely profitable first half.

Shortage of Borrowers 

Still, even with all the liquidity the Fed has injected into the market, few are borrowing except to roll over maturing debts, as new profitable investments have become hard to find.  Oil companies are flushed with cash from windfall profits but they do not seem to be able to find worthwhile investments to put the cash to use. Exxon reported a record $39.5 billion annual windfall profits for 2007 from high oil prices, exceeding the gross domestic product of nearly two thirds of the 183 nations of the world, but the company failed to announce any plans for expansion.

The fear is that until prices in the $12 trillion US residential housing market stops falling and the pace of foreclosures ebbs instead of rises, the pain for banks and non-bank institutions, let alone home owners, will continue to get stronger to threaten a much deeper and broader economic recession. The hope is that lower mortgage rates would enable home owners to cut their borrowing costs as they opt for better terms and help cushion the pain of falling home prices. But lower short-term rates cause the dollar to fall and long-term rates to rise. Moreover, mortgage defaults are no longer caused exclusively by high interest rate resets. Many borrowers have no incentive to keep making payments on mortgages on properties with market values lower than the outstanding value of the mortgage. Is the Fed in a position to pump $4 trillion into the housing market to stabilize inflated home prices? 

New, Stronger Fixes Every Few Days

Every few days, a new, stronger fix needs to be administered by the Fed to sustain a euphoric high in the market that will dissipate a few days later, with the inevitable result of a fatal overdose down the road. All that produces is a secular bear market, where every rebound is smaller than the previous fall, until the debt bubble fully deflates. The bottom line in the current financial crisis is no longer one of credit crunch, but of massive insolvency in the financial market that will spread to the general economy, which no amount of Fed liquidity injection can cure short of hyperinflation. Further, there is no guarantee that even accepting hyperinflation will save the economy from protracted stagnation. The history of central banking shows that central bank policies can cause problems more easily than they can solve problems they created earlier. Economic distress from monetary dysfunction cannot be solved by merely printing money, which central banks consider their divine right. 

Central banks of the G7 economies are reportedly actively engaged in discussions about the feasibility of using public funds for mass purchases of mortgage-backed securities as a possible solution to the credit crisis. This is essentially an option to nationalize the credit market after wholesale deregulation has turned free market capitalism into failed market capitalism.

The policy debate has shifted from one on fixing an appropriate interest rate policy to the need for aggressive intervention in a matter of weeks as the crisis spread from the subprime mortgage sector to engulf the entire financial system, as evidenced by the sudden collapse of Bear Stearns, a major investment bank, that threatens to touch off widespread counterparty defaults. Panic appears to have taken over at the highest levels in the inner sanctum of the central banking world. 

Discord among Central Banks 

The Bank of England reportedly is most enthusiastic to explore the idea, as it has a long history of nationalization, the latest example being its takeover the Northern Rock Bank, a bug mortgage lender. The Federal Reserve is open in principle to the possibility that intervention in the MBS market might be justified in certain scenarios, but only as a last resort. The European Central Bank appears least enthusiastic, with the German central bank adamantly opposed to such heretical proposition. 

Jean-Claude Trichet, the ECB president, while avoiding immediate critical comment on the Bank of England’s rescue of Northern Rock, said: “What is important is that we must not let the mistakes made by some impose a high cost on those who have made no mistakes.”

Neoliberal market fundamentalists continue to argue that new international bank capital rules requiring assets values to be marked to market rather than marked to models have exacerbated the credit squeeze, despite the now proven fact that flawed marked-to-model evaluation had been responsible for the current crisis. <> 

US policymakers are more inclined to boost support for the mortgage markets indirectly through the expanding the role of the Federal Housing Administration, which provides mortgage insurance on loans made by FHA-approved lenders, and by easing regulatory restraints by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. OFHEO stated that the required capital surplus for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will be reduced from 30% to 20%, immediately freeing up $200-$300 billion for the Government-Sponsored Enterprises [GSEs] to buy mortgages. <> 

This new initiative and the release of the portfolio caps announced in February, should allow the GSEs to purchase or guarantee about $2 trillion in mortgages this year. This capacity will permit them to do more in the jumbo temporary conforming market, subprime refinancing and loan modifications areas.

To support growth and further restore market liquidity, OFHEO announced that it would begin to permit a significant portion of the GSEs’ 30 percent OFHEO-directed capital surplus to be invested in mortgages and MBS. As a key part of this initiative, both companies announced that they will begin the process to raise significant capital. Both companies also said they would maintain overall capital levels well in excess of requirements while the mortgage market recovers in order to ensure market confidence and fulfill their public mission.

OFHEO announced that Fannie Mae is in full compliance with its Consent Order and that Freddie Mac has one remaining requirement relating to the separation of the Chairman and CEO positions. OFHEO expects to lift these Consent Orders in the near term. In view of this progress, the public purpose of the two companies, and ongoing market conditions, OFHEO concludes that it is appropriate to reduce immediately the existing 30 percent OFHEO-directed capital requirement to a 20 percent level, and will consider further reductions in the future.   However, like the Fed taking on more risk to bail out the mortgage market, the GSEs will do the same, increasing the amount of mortgages they will hold for each dollar of capital on its books.

Swinging Back Towards Re-regulation


As Congress and the Bush administration struggle to contain the housing and credit crises and prevent more Wall Street firms from collapsing as Bear Stearns did, Edmund Andrews and Stephen Labaton of the New York Times report that a split is forming over how to strengthen oversight of financial institutions after decades of deregulation that had led to the meltdown in credit markets to expose weaknesses in the nation’s tangled web of federal and state regulators, which failed to anticipate the effect of so many new players in the industry.

In the Democrat-controlled Congress, key committee chairmen, such as Massachusetts Representative Barry Frank of the House Financial Services Committee, New York Senator Charles Schumer of the Joint Economic Committee and Connecticut Senator Christopher Dodd of the Senate Banking Committee, are drafting separate bills that would create a powerful new regulator or simply confer new powers on the Federal Reserve to oversee practices across the entire array of commercial banks, Wall Street firms, hedge funds and nonbank financial companies.

Sheila C. Bair, chairwoman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which insures deposits at banks and thrift institutions and is one of several federal bank regulatory agencies, said: “Capital levels are the most important tool we have at the FDIC, and investment banks have lower capital levels than commercial banks.”

The Treasury Department of the outgoing Republican administration is rushing to complete its own blueprint for overhauling what is now an alphabet soup of federal and state regulators that often compete against each other and protect their particular slices of the industry as if they were constituents. It will unveil its own blueprint for regulatory overhaul in the next few weeks.  Paulson has acknowledged that the problems exposed by the housing crisis were diffuse and complex and could not be solved with a single action. “There is no silver bullet,” he kept repeating. But he suggested that he did not want to take any drastic regulatory steps while the financial markets remained in turmoil. “The objective here is to get the balance right,” Mr. Paulson said. “Regulation needs to catch up with innovation and help restore investor confidence but not go so far as to create new problems, make our markets less efficient or cut off credit to those who need it.” This attitude has been behind Greenspan’s Fed policy on regulating financial innovations for the past two decades.

Ideological Divide Allows Only Cosmetic Changes


But the two political parties strongly disagree along ideological lines about whether, after decades of freewheeling encouragement of exotic new instruments like derivatives and new players like hedge funds, the pendulum should swing back to tighter control. Wall Street firms have also been major contributors to both political parties, and they are certain to oppose tough new restrictions. Given the philosophical differences about the value of government regulations, it is unlikely that a Democratic Congress and the Republican Bush administration would agree on more than cosmetic changes.

Except for the Federal Reserve, all federal bank-regulating agencies receive funding from fees paid by member institutions. These agencies have competed with each other to woo institutions with lighter regulation.

“If we don’t tread very carefully on restructuring a very complex financial system, we might stifle the necessary animal instincts of a free market,” said Mark A. Bloomfield, president of the American Council for Capital Formation, a business advocacy group. “Every day, the cries of populism grow stronger and could trample good economic policy.” This warning against populism has also come from the host of the Larry Kudlow Show in recent weeks as a threat against free market capitalism.

For neoliberal market fundamentalists, the fear is not of an economic depression, but the populism that may follow it.

Rights of Labor


The 1912 Democratic platform repeated the declarations of the platform of 1908:

Questions of judicial practice have arisen especially in connection with industrial disputes. We believe that the parties to all judicial proceedings should be treated with rigid impartiality, and that injunctions should not be issued in any case in which an injunction would not issue if no industrial dispute were involved.

The expanding organization of industry makes it essential that there should be no abridgement of the right of the wage earners and producers to organize for the protection of wages and the improvement of labor conditions, to the end that such labor organizations and their members should not be regarded as illegal combinations in restraint of trade.


The 1912 platform pledge the enactment of a law creating a department of labor, represented separately in the President’s cabinet. In 1913, the Labor Department was created by President Wilson in his first year in office. The Clayton Act of 1913 exempted unions from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The Keating-Owen Act of 1916 banned child labor but was annulled by a conservative Supreme Court in 1918. The Federal Employees Compensation Act established the Office of Workers Compensation Programs in 1916.  The International Labor Organization (ILO) held its first meeting in 1919 in Washington, chaired by Secretary William B. Wilson, a second generation coal miner and a former child laborer.

Civil Liberty


After the 1917 October Revolution in Russia, more than four thousand alleged Communists were arrested in the US for deportation under the Anarchist Exclusion Act of 1918 in the first anti-communist witch hunt. The Department of Labor (DOL) refused to deport the bulk of those arrested and Secretary Wilson was threatened with impeachment for taking that position despite the fact that the DOL under his leadership helped indispensably in winning the war by mobilizing an effective workforce for defense production.  The War on Terrorism is extracting a heavy toll on US domestic civil liberty.

Conservation


The 1912 Democratic platform declared:

“… the Democrat belief in the conservation and the development, for the use of all the people, of the natural resources of the country. Our forests, our sources of water supply, our arable and our mineral lands, our navigable streams, and all the other material resources with which our country has been so lavishly endowed, constitute the foundation of our national wealth. Such additional legislation as may be necessary to prevent their being wasted or absorbed by special or privileged interests should be enacted and the policy of their conservation should be rigidly adhered to.”


The platform called for immediate action by C