The Shape of US
Populism
By
Henry C.K. Liu
Part I: Legacy of
Free Market Capitalism
Part II: Long-term
Effects of the Civil War
Part
III: The Progrssive Era
Part IV: A Panic-Stricken
Federal Reserve
This article appeared in AToL
on April 2, 2006
The recent moves by the Fed in the months
following the
credit market seizure of August 2007 to inject liquidity into a failed
credit
market and to bail out distressed banks and brokerage houses caught
with
holding securities of dubious market value are looking more like fixes
for drug
addicts in advance stages of abuse. So far, many of the actions taken
by the
Fed to deal with the credit crisis have been self neutralizing, such as
pushing
down short-term interest rates to try to save wayward institutions
addicted to
fantastic returns from highly leveraged speculation, only to cause the
dollar
to free fall, thus causing dollar interest rates and commodity prices,
including
food and energy, to rise.
First,
four months after the August 2007 credit market seizure, the Fed
announced on December 12,
2007
the Term Auction Facility (TAF) program, under which the Fed will
auction term
funds to depository institutions against the wide variety of collateral
that
can be used to secure loans at the discount window. By allowing
the Fed
to inject term funds through a broader range of counterparties and
against a
broader range of collateral than open market operations, this facility
was
intended to help promote the efficient dissemination of liquidity when
the
unsecured interbank markets came under stress. Each TAF auction was to
be for a
fixed amount, with the rate determined by the auction process subject
to a
minimum bid rate. The first TAF auction of $20 billion was
scheduled for
December 17, with settlement on December 20; this auction provided
28-day term
funds, maturing January 17,
2008.
The second auction of up to $20 billion was scheduled for December 20,
with
settlement on December 27; this auction provided 35-day funds, maturing
January 31,
2008. The third and
fourth auctions were held on Mondays, January 14 and 28, with
settlement on the
following Thursdays. The amounts of those auctions were
determined in
January. The Fed would conduct additional auctions in subsequent
months,
depending in part on evolving market conditions.
Experience
gained under this temporary program was expected to be helpful in
assessing the potential usefulness of augmenting the Fed’s current
monetary
policy tools--open market operations and the primary credit
facility--with a
permanent facility for auctioning term discount window credit.
The Board
anticipated that it would seek public comment on any proposal for a
permanent
term auction facility. In other words, the Fed had no idea how the
market would
react to its TAF program.
At
the same time, the Fed Open Market Committee (FOMC) authorized
temporary
reciprocal currency arrangements (swap lines) with the European Central
Bank
(ECB) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB). These arrangements
provided
dollars in amounts of up to $20 billion and $4 billion to the ECB
and the
SNB, respectively, for use in their jurisdictions. The FOMC
approved
these swap lines for a period of up to six months.
On December
21, 2007, the Fed announced its intention to conduct
biweekly TAF
auctions for as long as necessary to address elevated pressures in
short-term
funding markets. The Board of Governors was to announce the sizes of
the
January 14 and January 28 TAF auctions at noon
on January 4.
On January
4, 2008,
the Fed announced it would conduct two auctions of 28-day credit
through its
TAF in January, increasing to $30 billion the auction to be held on
January 14
and $30 billion in the auction to be held on January 28.
On February 1, 2008, the Fed announced it
would conduct two
auctions of 28-day credit through its TAF in February, offering $30
billion in
an auction to be held on February 11 and $30 billion again in an
auction to be
held on February 25, making the total in February $60 billion. To
facilitate
participation by smaller institutions, the minimum bid size will be
reduced to
$5 million, from $10 million in the previous auctions.
On February
29, 2008, the Fed announced it would conduct two auctions of
28-day
credit through its TAF in March. It would offer $30 billion in an
auction
to be held on March 10 and $30 billion in an auction to be held on
March 24,
making the total for March $60 billion.
But on March
7, 2008,
the Fed announced two new initiatives to address continuing heightened
liquidity pressures in term funding markets. First, the amounts
outstanding in
the TAF will be increased to $100 billion from $30 billion. The
auctions
on March 10 and March 24 each would be increased to
$50 billion--an increase
of $20 billion from the amounts that were announced for these auctions
on
February 29. The Fed would increase these auction sizes further if
conditions
warrant. To provide increased certainty to market participants,
the Fed
would continue to conduct TAF auctions for at least the next six months
unless
evolving market conditions clearly indicate that such auctions are no
longer
necessary. The Fed was acknowledging that the credit market crisis was
not a
passing storm and that its previous TAF auctions did not produce the
intended
effect in the market.
Second, beginning immediately, the Fed
initiated a series of
term repurchase transactions that were expected to cumulate to $100
billion. These transactions would be conducted as 28-day term
repurchase
(repo) agreements in which primary dealers may elect to deliver as
collateral
any of the types of securities--Treasury, agency debt, or agency
mortgage-backed securities--that are eligible as collateral in
conventional
open market operations. As with the TAF auction sizes, the Fed
would
further increase the sizes of these term repo operations if future
conditions
should warrant. The Fed announced that it was in close consultation
with
foreign central bank counterparts concerning liquidity conditions in
markets.
See my September 29, 2005
AToL article: The
Repo Time
Bomb.
On March 20,
Bloomberg.com ran a report by Liz
Capo McCormick – Treasuries’
Scarcity Triggers Repo Market Failures:
Surging
demand for US Treasuries is
causing failures to deliver or receive government debt in the $6.3
trillion a
day market for borrowing and lending to climb to the highest level in
almost
four years.
Failures,
an indication of scarcity, surged to $1.795 trillion in the
week ended March 5, the highest since May 2004, and up from $374
billion the
prior week. They have averaged $493.4 billion a week this year,
compared with
$359.6 billion over the last five years and $168.8 billion back through
July
1990, according to data from the New York Fed.
Investors
seeking the safety of government debt amid the loss of
confidence in credit markets pushed rates on three-month bills today to
0.387
percent, the lowest level since 1954. Institutions worldwide have
reported $195
billion in writedowns and losses related to subprime mortgages and
collateralized debt obligations since the start of 2007, making firms
reluctant
to hold anything but Treasuries as collateral on loans.
‘It
shows you the kind of anxieties that are going on and the keen demand
for Treasuries,’ said Tony Crescenzi, chief bond market strategist at
Miller
Tabak & Co. in New York.
“The
rise in fails tells us about the inability of dealers to obtain
Treasury
collateral.”
In
a repurchase agreement, or repo, a customer provides cash to a dealer
in exchange for a bill, note or bond. The exchange is reversed the next
day,
with the customer receiving interest on the overnight loan. A Treasury
security
is termed on ‘special’ when it is in such demand that owners can borrow
cash
against it at interest rates lower than the general collateral rate.
The
Treasury Department cautioned dealers in January to guard against
failing to settle in the Treasury repo market as interest rates fall.
It cited
periods of such failures to receive or deliver securities, known as
`fails' in
the repo market, earlier in the decade when rates dropped.
The
difference between the rate for borrowing and lending non-specific
Treasury securities, or the general collateral rate, has averaged 63
basis
points below the central bank’s target rate for overnight loans this
year. The
spread has averaged about 8 basis points the past 10 years.
Overnight
general collateral repo rates have traded lower than the Fed's
target rate for overnight lending every day this year. The rate on
general
collateral repo closed today [March 20] at 0.9 percent, according to
data from
GovPX Inc., a unit of ICAP Plc, the world's largest inter-dealer
broker,
compared with 1.25 percent yesterday. Today’s rate is 135 basis points
below
the Fed's target rate for overnight lending of 2.25 percent.
A
spokesman for the New York Fed, declined to comment on the fails data.
Nakedcapitalism.com observes that a lot of
Treasuries are
now held by counterparty risk-averse investors who are not interested
in
lending them which could complicate the operation of the Fed’s new
facilities
designed to unfreeze the mortgage market. The Fed may be running into
its own
liquidity constraints as it depletes its Treasury holdings and cannot
add more
non-inflationary “sterilized” liquidity.
The scarcity of Treasuries for repos means that demand for repo
collaterals
will push up Treasury prices and push down yields. Three month Treasury
bills
traded at 0.56% on March 19, a 50-year low, and a stunning 0.39% the
following
day, a rate last seen in 1954, Since bill prices are used as the input
into other pricing models (most notably
the widely used Black-Scholes option pricing model), the distortions in
the
Treasure market have the potential to feed into other markets, such as
the
credit default swaps market.
On March
11, 2008,
the Fed announced that since the coordinated actions taken in December
2007,
the G-10 central banks had continued to work together closely and to
consult
regularly on liquidity pressures in funding markets. Pressures in some
of these
markets had recently increased again. “We all continue to work together
and
will take appropriate steps to address those liquidity pressures. To
that end,
today the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central
Bank, the
Federal Reserve, and the Swiss National Bank are announcing specific
measures.”
On the same day, the Fed announced an expansion of
its
securities lending program to include a new Term Securities Lending
Facility
(TSLF), under which the Fed would lend up to $200 billion of Treasury
securities to primary dealers secured for a term of 28 days (rather
than
overnight, as in the existing lending program) by a pledge of other
securities,
including federal agency debt, federal agency
residential-mortgage-backed
securities (MBS), and non-agency AAA/Aaa-rated private-label
residential
MBS. The TSLF is intended to promote liquidity in the financing
markets
for Treasury and other collateral and thus to foster the functioning of
financial markets more generally.
In addition, the Federal Open Market Committee has
authorized increases in its existing temporary reciprocal currency
arrangements
(swap lines) with the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss
National Bank
(SNB). These arrangements will now provide dollars in amounts of
up to
$30 billion and $6 billion to the ECB and the SNB, respectively,
representing
increases of $10 billion and $2 billion. The FOMC extended the
term of
these swap lines through September
30, 2008. The actions announced would supplement the
measures announced
by the Federal Reserve on March 7 to boost the size of the Term Auction
Facility to $100 billion and to undertake a series of term repurchase
transactions that will cumulate to $100 billion.
This program allows primary dealers to exchange a
total of
$200 billion MBS of uncertain market value for Treasuries for 28 days
instead
of the traditional overnight lending. Why $200 billion? Because the Fed
knows
that primary dealers are holding $139.7 billion agency securities and
$60.2
billion private label securities.
In The Wall Street Examiner, Lee Adler wrote in his
article: Bandaid on a Ruptured Jugular:
Why
do prime dealers (PDs) borrow
securities from the Fed? To sell them short. The PDs are heavily short
Treasuries at all times. They are heavily long all other debt
securities
simultaneously. The level of securities lending in recent months is
unprecedented in all of human history, by an order of magnitude of 10.
The Fed is now responding to the pressure of the imminent collapse of
the PDs
and major banks worldwide, because not only are the PDs heavily short
the stuff
that is going up, Treasuries, they are heavily long the stuff that is
going
down, which is all other debt securities. This is the worst of all
possible
worlds and the Fed’s action is like putting a bandaid on a ruptured
jugular
vein.
Stealth Nationalization of the Financial Sector
Adler quotes Steve Randy
Waldman
of Interfluidity (What Happens 28 Days later?): “Since the Fed
cannot retire
loans made via TAF and its repo program without adding to those
“elevated
pressures”, the loans should be considered an equity infusion, because
they’ll
be repaid at the convenience of the borrower rather than on a schedule
agreed
with the lender.” What Waldman did not say was that the Fed had
ventured into a
broad nationalization of the prime dealers on Wall Street by being an
equity
investor.
Does the same argument apply to the new Term Securities Lending
Facility
(TSLF)? On the face of it, it’s harder to view TSLF as an equity
infusion,
since the Fed is not handing out cash. But to firms holding illiquid
securities
that the Fed will accept as collateral, the program is equivalent to a
not-so-efficient cash infusion, because the Treasuries the Fed lends
are liquid
and can be converted to cash easily in private markets, according to
Waldman.
So, this new facility might well be a form of equity, if the Fed is
willing to
roll it over indefinitely and require payment only at the convenience
of
borrowers or when a normal market for them reappears. Waldman thinks
what
happens after 28 days is pretty clear. The swap will be rolled over and
over
and over until the mortgage-backed security market stabilizes. This
could be a
year from now, or perhaps ten. That may sound ridiculous but it is
essentially
what happened in Japan.
Waldman suggests that inquiring minds might ask
what happens
if the value of the MBS drops. Will the Fed issue a margin call or just
look
the other way? … One thing is for sure: The more liberal the Fed is in
valuing
the MBS the more likely a margin call situation arises. However Waldman
strongly suspects the Fed will not disclose who is doing the swapping,
in what
size, or whether the swap ratio is 1:1 or not. So much for transparency.
“This may temporarily stop a further squeeze against dealers who are
short
treasuries and long MBS, but it is will not do much of anything to
restore a
bid in the MBS market. Nor will it cure the massive leverage problems
at many
of the primary dealers and banks,” writes Waldman.
Adler cites an interesting paragraph from a MarketWatch article: “Counting the currency swaps with the foreign
central banks, the Fed has now committed more than half of its combined
securities and loan portfolio of $832 billion,” Lou Crandall, chief
economist
for Wrightson ICAP noted. “The Fed won’t have run completely out of
ammunition
after these operations, but it is reaching deeper into its balance
sheet than
before.”
“Bernanke’s intent is to buy the primary dealers
time, but
it really can’t work. Those securities will not be worth more tomorrow
than
they are today. For now, a MBS fire sale was averted, but it can’t be
put off
forever,” writes Adler.
On March
16, 2008,
the Fed announced that the New York Fed has been granted the authority
to
establish a Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), intended to improve
the
ability of primary dealers to provide financing to participants in
securitization
markets and promote the orderly functioning of financial markets more
generally. The PDCF will provide overnight funding to primary dealers
in
exchange for a specified range of collateral, including all collateral
eligible
for tri-party repurchase agreements arranged by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, as
well as all investment-grade corporate
securities, municipal securities, mortgage-backed securities and
asset-backed
securities for which a price is available. The PDCF will remain in
operation for
a minimum period of six months and may be extended as conditions
warrant to
foster the functioning of financial markets. The TAF
program offers term funding to depository
institutions via a bi-weekly auction, for fixed amounts of credit. The
TSLF
program is an auction for a fixed amount of lending of Treasury general
collateral in exchange for Open-Market-Operation-eligible and AAA/Aaa
rated
private-label residential mortgage-backed securities. The PDCF program
now
allows eligible primary dealers to borrow at the existing Discount Rate
for up
to 120 days.
Down the Slippery
Slope
The moves into new province suggest that the Fed
has changed
its traditional role in the economy with the support of the White House
and the
Treasury. Former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker said in a public television
interview the same evening that the Fed’s decision to lend money to
Bear
Stearns Cos. [via commercial bank JPMorgan-Chase] to keep the
investment house
from collapsing is unprecedented and “raises some real questions” about
whether
that was the appropriate role for the Fed. The wisdom of the decision
depends
on “how severe this crisis was and the Fed’s judgment about the threat
of
demise of Bear Stearns,” Volcker said. “That’s a judgment they had to
make and
an understandable judgment. It is absolutely not what you want for the
longstanding regulatory support system.” The Fed’s action then was an
open
admission that a ominous systemic crisis of total melt down was a clear
and
present danger.
Unlike the TAF which swaps cash for MBS and
therefore
requires sterilization so as not to push the fed funds rate below
target, the
TSLF is simply a swap of one instrument for another, albeit an inferior
one. It
is not printing, and it injects no cash into the system. To avoid the
need to
sterilize the liquidity injection, the Fed exchanged Treasuries in its
procession for securities of dubious market value held by Bear Stearns. Since Bear Stearns is not a banking holding
company and does not own a bank, the Fed could only rescue it by
providing the
funds to JPMorgan Chase, a commercial bank that can access the Fed
discount
window for funds, to acquire Bear Stearns at a fire sale price of $2 a
share, a
ceiling dictated by the Fed to avoid the appearance of bailing out Bear
Stearns
shareholders, while other investors were bidding at $5.98. The shares
had
traded at $170 at its peak in January 2007 and at $67 two weeks before
the
rescue. The Fed will guarantee up to $30 billion of potential losses on
Bear
assets, later reduced to $29 billion with JPMorgan assuming the first
billion
losses. It was the Fed’s first rescue of a prime dealer broker since
the Great Depression and its latest
effort to soothe
financial markets roiled by fallout from rising mortgage defaults.
Latest
reports have JPMorgan renegotiating the sale price at $10 per share to
ward off
shareholder attempts to block the Fed-sponsored deal.
So far, the three special facilities introduced by
the Fed
in quick succession have failed to stabilize the credit market:
The TAF (Term Auction Facility) failed to restore liquidity.
The TSLF (Term Securities Lending Facility) failed to
restore liquidity.
The PDCF (Primary Dealer Credit Facility) can be expected to
fail to save a rising number of distressed primary dealers.
Clearly
the bond market does not believe the TAF, the TSLF, or the PDCF, all
liquidity actions, are going to solve the insolvency problem facing
over-leveraged institutions.
Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke is increasingly
perceived by
the market as running out of room to pump money into the financial
markets and
to cut interest rates to rescue the faltering economy. To providing
liquidity
to the market, the Fed has already committed as much as 60% of the $709
billion
in Treasury securities on its balance sheet. It has opened the door of
moral
hazard to more bailouts with the decision to become a lender of last
resort for
Bear Stearns, one of the biggest Wall Street dealers.
The Fed is now forced to responding to the pressure of the imminent
collapse of
distressed primary dealers and major banks worldwide. Primary dealers
have
routinely heavily shorted Treasuries that are now going up in price,
and
heavily longed all sort of other debt instruments that are now going
down in
price. The normal formula for easy profit has become the worst of all
possible
worlds for primary dealers in times of market distress.
Moreover, the high leverage will magnify the
losses as it did profits during good times. Also structured finance has
generated derivatives that are based on hundreds of trillions of
dollars in
notional value, causing every slight move in interest rate to produce
payment
obligations in hundred of billion of dollars among institutions whose
capital
structures are woefully inadequate.
Legal Challenges
Inner City Press/Community on the Move, a housing
and fair
lending activist group, has challenged the legality of the Fed’s quick
approval
of refinancing for Bear Stearns via JPMorgan Chase, questioning the
Fed’s
authority to approve the deal involving a non-bank institution.
In a complaint filed with the Fed a day after the
Fed
action, Inner City Press labeled the central bank’s brokering of the
Bear
Stearns deal as “entirely illegal” and anticompetitive, and questioned
whether
the required number of Fed Board governors had voted for it.
Bernanke took advantage of little-used parts of Fed law, added in the
1930s and
last utilized in the 1960s, that allow it to lend to corporations and
private
partnerships with a special board vote. Such votes require approval
from five
Fed governors. The seven-member Fed board currently has two vacancies,
and one
governor, Randall Kroszner, is serving past the Jan. 31 expiration of
his term.
Inner City Press questioned the legality of the Fed
approving the Bear Stearns deal without public notice, on the grounds
Bear
Stearns “is not a banking holding company and it does not own a bank.”
It was
the Fed’s first rescue of a broker dealer since the Great Depression
and its
latest effort to soothe financial markets roiled by fallout from rising
mortgage
defaults. The Federal Reserve bypassed its own normal emergency-lending
policies to let securities firms borrow at the same interest rate at
the
discount window as commercial banks as the central bank sought to stave
off a
financial-market meltdown. Guidelines revised in 2002 say the Fed
should charge
non- banks more than the highest rate that commercial banks pay.
Instead, Fed
Chairman Bernanke and his colleagues, in emergency votes on March 16,
invoked
broader authority in the Federal Reserve Act to give Wall Street prime
dealers
the same rate as banks. Backstopping securities firms, coupled with
action to
keep Bear Stearns Cos. afloat before its sale to JPMorgan Chase
represent the
central bank’s first lifelines to institutions other than banks since
the Great
Depression.
Under a regulatory regime dating back to the New
Deal of the
1930s, the Fed oversees commercial banks, but investment banks are
primarily
regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission which in recent
decades has
become a captured regulator that resembles an asylum run by the inmates.
Senior Fed staffers said the arrangement allows JP
Morgan
Chase to borrow from the Fed’s discount window and put up collateral of
uncertain value from Bear Stearns to back up the loans. JP Morgan, a
bank, has
access to the discount window to obtain direct loans from the Fed, but
Bear
Stearns, an investment house, does not. While JP Morgan is serving as a
conduit
for the loans, the Fed and not JP Morgan will bear the risk if the
loans are
not repaid, officials said. When God sins, the entire theological
structure
rots.
Bernanke raced to unveil the new steps before the
Tokyo
Stock Exchange opened on March 17. The weekend action, timed to
complement
JPMorgan’s rescue of Bear Stearns, included a cut in the discount rate
and the
opening of borrowing to the primary dealers in Treasury securities, not
all of
which are banks. The changes were the Fed’s most aggressive response to
date to
the 8-month-old credit crisis that has spread to the entire US
economy and around the world. See my March 17, 2007 AToL article: Why the Subprime Bust Will Spread,
which was
written five months before the August credit crisis, at a time when
establishment
officials and gurus were assuring the public that the subprime mortgage
problem
was well contained.
The “temporary” facilities for 28 days have been
extended on
increasingly larger scale. If they had a chance at being temporary the
scale
should be getting smaller and not larger. The Fed is putting in
jeopardy its
credibility by pretending that the “temporary facilities” might end or
be
phased out at the end of some future 28-day period when it knew in
advance that
was not possible. Each rollover increases stress in the precarious
financial
system as market participants become dependent on more Fed intervention
to
provide temporary adrenaline to unjustified market exuberance.
The Fed on March 16 cut the discount rate by 25
basis points
to 3.25%. Two days later, on March 18, the Fed slashed its Fed funds
rate
target 75 basis points to 2.25% and the discount rate to 2.50%. US
interest rate has now fallen to negative rate levels, meaning it is now
below
inflation rate.
Another day later, Government Sponsored Enterprises
Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac received permission from regulators to pump as much
as $200
billion of liquidity into the beleaguered US
mortgage market without having to add compensatory capital. For weeks earlier, rumors had been rife about
these two GSEs facing insolvency. Jonathan R. Laing of Barron’s
characterized their shares as “worthless”. At year end 2007, the
company owned
in its portfolio or had packaged and guaranteed some $2.8 trillion of
mortgages
or 23% of all US
residential mortgage debt outstanding. The company lost $2.6 billion in
2007 as
a surge of red ink in the final two quarters more than wiped out a
nicely
profitable first half.
Shortage of Borrowers
Still, even with all the liquidity the Fed has
injected into
the market, few are borrowing except to roll over maturing debts, as
new
profitable investments have become hard to find. Oil
companies are flushed with cash from
windfall profits but they do not seem to be able to find worthwhile
investments
to put the cash to use. Exxon reported a record $39.5 billion annual
windfall
profits for 2007 from high oil prices, exceeding the gross domestic
product of
nearly two thirds of the 183 nations of the world, but the company
failed to
announce any plans for expansion.
The fear is that until prices in the $12 trillion
US
residential housing market stops falling and the pace of foreclosures
ebbs
instead of rises, the pain for banks and non-bank institutions, let
alone home
owners, will continue to get stronger to threaten a much deeper and
broader
economic recession. The hope is that lower mortgage rates would enable
home
owners to cut their borrowing costs as they opt for better terms and
help
cushion the pain of falling home prices. But lower short-term rates
cause the
dollar to fall and long-term rates to rise. Moreover, mortgage defaults
are no
longer caused exclusively by high interest rate resets. Many borrowers
have no
incentive to keep making payments on mortgages on properties with
market values
lower than the outstanding value of the mortgage. Is the Fed in a
position to
pump $4 trillion into the housing market to stabilize inflated home
prices?
New, Stronger Fixes
Every Few Days
Every few days, a new, stronger fix needs to be
administered
by the Fed to sustain a euphoric high in the market that will dissipate
a few
days later, with the inevitable result of a fatal overdose down the
road. All
that produces is a secular bear market, where every rebound is smaller
than the
previous fall, until the debt bubble fully deflates. The bottom line in
the
current financial crisis is no longer one of credit crunch, but of
massive
insolvency in the financial market that will spread to the general
economy,
which no amount of Fed liquidity injection can cure short of
hyperinflation. Further,
there is no guarantee that even accepting hyperinflation will save the
economy
from protracted stagnation. The history of central banking shows that
central
bank policies can cause problems more easily than they can solve
problems they
created earlier. Economic distress from monetary dysfunction cannot be
solved
by merely printing money, which central banks consider their divine
right.
Central banks of the G7 economies are reportedly
actively
engaged in discussions about the feasibility of using public funds for
mass
purchases of mortgage-backed securities as a possible solution to the
credit
crisis. This is essentially an option to nationalize the credit market
after
wholesale deregulation has turned free market capitalism into failed
market
capitalism.
The policy debate has shifted from one on fixing an
appropriate interest rate policy to the need for aggressive
intervention in a
matter of weeks as the crisis spread from the subprime mortgage sector
to
engulf the entire financial system, as evidenced by the sudden collapse
of Bear
Stearns, a major investment bank, that threatens to touch off
widespread
counterparty defaults. Panic appears to have taken over at the highest
levels
in the inner sanctum of the central banking world.
Discord among Central
Banks
The Bank of England reportedly is most enthusiastic
to
explore the idea, as it has a long history of nationalization, the
latest
example being its takeover the Northern Rock Bank, a bug mortgage
lender. The
Federal Reserve is open in principle to the possibility that
intervention in
the MBS market might be justified in certain scenarios, but only as a
last
resort. The European Central Bank appears least enthusiastic, with the
German
central bank adamantly opposed to such heretical proposition.
Jean-Claude Trichet, the ECB president, while
avoiding
immediate critical comment on the Bank of England’s rescue of Northern
Rock,
said: “What is important is that we must not let the mistakes made by
some
impose a high cost on those who have made no mistakes.”
Neoliberal market fundamentalists
continue to argue that new
international bank capital rules requiring assets values to be marked
to market
rather than marked to models have exacerbated the credit squeeze,
despite the
now proven fact that flawed marked-to-model evaluation had been
responsible for
the current crisis. <>
US policymakers are more inclined to boost
support for the
mortgage markets indirectly through the expanding the role of the
Federal
Housing Administration, which provides mortgage insurance on loans made
by
FHA-approved lenders, and
by easing regulatory restraints by the Office
of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) on Fannie Mae
and
Freddie Mac. OFHEO stated that the required capital surplus for Fannie
Mae and
Freddie Mac will be reduced from 30% to 20%, immediately freeing up
$200-$300
billion for the Government-Sponsored Enterprises [GSEs] to buy
mortgages. <>
This new initiative and the release of the
portfolio caps
announced in February, should allow the GSEs to purchase or guarantee
about $2
trillion in mortgages this year. This capacity will permit them to do
more in
the jumbo temporary conforming market, subprime refinancing and loan
modifications areas.
To support growth and further restore market liquidity, OFHEO announced
that it
would begin to permit a significant portion of the GSEs’ 30 percent
OFHEO-directed capital surplus to be invested in mortgages and MBS. As
a key
part of this initiative, both companies announced that they will begin
the
process to raise significant capital. Both companies also said they
would
maintain overall capital levels well in excess of requirements while
the
mortgage market recovers in order to ensure market confidence and
fulfill their
public mission.
OFHEO announced that Fannie Mae is in full compliance with its Consent
Order
and that Freddie Mac has one remaining requirement relating to the
separation
of the Chairman and CEO positions. OFHEO expects to lift these Consent
Orders
in the near term. In view of this progress, the public purpose of the
two
companies, and ongoing market conditions, OFHEO concludes that it is
appropriate to reduce immediately the existing 30 percent
OFHEO-directed
capital requirement to a 20 percent level, and will consider further
reductions
in the future. However, like
the Fed taking on more risk to bail
out the
mortgage market, the GSEs will do the same, increasing the amount of
mortgages
they will hold for each dollar of capital on its books.
Swinging Back Towards
Re-regulation
As Congress and the Bush administration
struggle to contain
the housing and credit crises and prevent more Wall Street firms from
collapsing as Bear Stearns did, Edmund Andrews and Stephen Labaton of
the New
York Times report that a split is forming over how to strengthen
oversight of
financial institutions after decades of deregulation that had led to
the
meltdown in credit markets to expose weaknesses in the nation’s tangled
web of
federal and state regulators, which failed to anticipate the effect of
so many
new players in the industry.
In the Democrat-controlled Congress, key
committee chairmen,
such as Massachusetts Representative Barry Frank of the House Financial
Services Committee, New York Senator Charles Schumer of the Joint
Economic
Committee and Connecticut Senator Christopher Dodd of the Senate
Banking
Committee, are drafting separate bills that would create a powerful new
regulator or simply confer new powers on the Federal Reserve to oversee
practices across the entire array of commercial banks, Wall Street
firms, hedge
funds and nonbank financial companies.
Sheila C. Bair, chairwoman of the Federal
Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), which insures deposits at banks and thrift
institutions and
is one of several federal bank regulatory agencies, said: “Capital
levels are
the most important tool we have at the FDIC, and investment banks have
lower
capital levels than commercial banks.”
The Treasury Department of the outgoing
Republican
administration is rushing to complete its own blueprint for overhauling
what is
now an alphabet soup of federal and state regulators that often compete
against
each other and protect their particular slices of the industry as if
they were
constituents. It will unveil its own blueprint for regulatory overhaul
in the
next few weeks. Paulson has acknowledged
that the problems exposed by the housing crisis were diffuse and
complex and
could not be solved with a single action. “There is no silver bullet,”
he kept
repeating. But he suggested that he did not want to take any drastic
regulatory
steps while the financial markets remained in turmoil. “The objective
here is
to get the balance right,” Mr. Paulson said. “Regulation needs to catch
up with
innovation and help restore investor confidence but not go so far as to
create
new problems, make our markets less efficient or cut off credit to
those who
need it.” This attitude has been behind Greenspan’s Fed policy on
regulating
financial innovations for the past two decades.
Ideological Divide
Allows Only Cosmetic Changes
But the two political parties strongly
disagree along
ideological lines about whether, after decades of freewheeling
encouragement of
exotic new instruments like derivatives and new players like hedge
funds, the
pendulum should swing back to tighter control. Wall Street firms have
also been
major contributors to both political parties, and they are certain to
oppose
tough new restrictions. Given the philosophical differences about the
value of
government regulations, it is unlikely that a Democratic Congress and
the
Republican Bush administration would agree on more than cosmetic
changes.
Except for the Federal Reserve, all federal
bank-regulating
agencies receive funding from fees paid by member institutions. These
agencies
have competed with each other to woo institutions with lighter
regulation.
“If we don’t tread very carefully on
restructuring a very
complex financial system, we might stifle the necessary animal
instincts of a
free market,” said Mark A. Bloomfield, president of the American
Council for
Capital Formation, a business advocacy group. “Every day, the cries of
populism
grow stronger and could trample good economic policy.” This warning
against
populism has also come from the host of the Larry Kudlow Show in recent
weeks
as a threat against free market capitalism.
For neoliberal market fundamentalists, the
fear is not of an
economic depression, but the populism that may follow it.
Rights of Labor
The 1912 Democratic platform repeated the
declarations of
the platform of 1908:
Questions
of judicial practice have arisen
especially in connection with industrial disputes. We believe that the
parties
to all judicial proceedings should be treated with rigid impartiality,
and that
injunctions should not be issued in any case in which an injunction
would not
issue if no industrial dispute were involved.
The
expanding organization of industry
makes it essential that there should be no abridgement of the right of
the wage
earners and producers to organize for the protection of wages and the
improvement of labor conditions, to the end that such labor
organizations and
their members should not be regarded as illegal combinations in
restraint of
trade.
The 1912 platform pledge the enactment of a law creating a
department of labor, represented separately in the President’s cabinet.
In
1913, the Labor Department was created by President Wilson in his first
year in
office. The Clayton Act of 1913 exempted unions from the Sherman
Anti-Trust
Act. The Keating-Owen Act of 1916 banned child labor but was annulled
by a
conservative Supreme Court in 1918. The Federal Employees Compensation
Act
established the Office of Workers Compensation Programs in 1916. The
International Labor Organization (ILO) held its first meeting in 1919
in Washington,
chaired by Secretary William B. Wilson, a second generation coal miner
and a
former child laborer.
Civil Liberty
After the 1917 October Revolution in Russia,
more than four
thousand alleged Communists were arrested in the US for deportation
under the
Anarchist Exclusion Act of 1918 in the first anti-communist witch hunt.
The
Department of Labor (DOL) refused to deport the bulk of those arrested
and
Secretary Wilson was threatened with impeachment for taking that
position
despite the fact that the DOL under his leadership helped indispensably
in winning
the war by mobilizing an effective workforce for defense
production. The War on Terrorism is extracting a
heavy toll on US
domestic civil liberty.
Conservation
The 1912 Democratic platform declared:
“…
the Democrat belief in the
conservation and the development, for the use of all the people, of the
natural
resources of the country. Our forests, our sources of water supply, our
arable
and our mineral lands, our navigable streams, and all the other
material
resources with which our country has been so lavishly endowed,
constitute the
foundation of our national wealth. Such additional legislation as may
be
necessary to prevent their being wasted or absorbed by special or
privileged
interests should be enacted and the policy of their conservation should
be
rigidly adhered to.”
The platform called for immediate action by C |