Current US-China
Relations
By
Henry C.K. Liu
Part VIII: GW Bush Policy on North Korea – a Path to War
Part VII: Clinton Policy
on North Korea - A Belated Path to Peace
Part VI: Korea under Park Chung Hee
Part V: Kim Il Sung and China
Part IV:
More Geopolitical Dynamics
of the Korea Proliferation Crisis
Part III: Geopolitical Dynamics
of the Korea
Proliferation Crisis
Part II: US Unilateralism
Part I: A Lame Duck-Greenhorn Dance
Part IX: The North
Korean Perspective
This article appeared in AToL on
January 11, 2007
To North Korea, having been linked by Bush to Iraq and Iran
as members of an “axis of evil” that did not merit bilateral
negotiation, the
implication from the stream-roller push toward the invasion of Iraq was
imminent US invasion of North Korea as well. The
only responsible response to imminent
threat to its national security
would be to develop nuclear capability as quickly as possible as a
deterrent
against imminent US
attack.
On May 12, 2003,
the North Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) issued a Detailed
Report on The history of the Denuclearization of the Korea Peninsula,
pointing out that “Due to the US
strong-arm policy of the nuclear crushing of the DPRK, a grave
situation in
which a nuclear war may break out is being created.” The
Report,
predictably ignored in the US press, pointed to the January 20, 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula adopted between the North and the South and to
the
fact that the North had since unceasingly made affirmative efforts to
implement
it. The Report accused the US
of frustrating North Korea’s
aspirations and efforts for denuclearization, endlessly making nuclear
threats
against the DPRK, and rupturing the process of the denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula.
The Report,
largely ignored by the US
press, outlined the background of the 1992
Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula which stipulates,
as a
basic provision, “that neither the South nor the North shall test,
manufacture,
produce, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons. The Joint
Declaration, in essence, proceeded
from the goal of fundamentally removing US nuclear weapons off the Korean
Peninsula.
The nuclear issue on the Korean
Peninsula
is strictly a product of the US
policy of turning South Korea
into a US
nuclear
base.”
The Report accused
the US
of
having first created a nuclear issue when it “deployed Honest John
nuclear
missiles for action in South Korea
in the latter half of the 1950’s. Moreover,
The US introduced neutron shells, the evil weapon of the 20th century,
in South Korea
in the first half of the 1980’s,
further highlighting the graveness of the nuclear issue.”
The Report further
accused the US of having “pursued the so-called NCND (No Confirm; No
Denial) policy
… yet has not bothered to conceal the fact that it deployed nuclear
weapons in
South Korea but used it as a means to threaten us [the North].”
The Report traced the history of the nuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula to May 14, 1957 when US Secretary of State John
Forster Dulles
during a news conference officially disclosed a plan to introduce
nuclear
weapons to South Korea, and on the same day, Defense Secretary Charles
E. Wilson
gave more detail to this plan and admitted that the types of nuclear
weapons
included “Honest John” nuclear missiles and various other types of
nuclear
weapons deployed in Europe, as reported by the Associated
Press.
On July 15, 1957,
US Army authorities officially announced that US
forces in South Korea
would start nuclear arming and that five combat units capable of waging
atomic
war would be deployed in South Korea,
according to Tongyang News Agency
reporting from Washington.
On February 3, 1958, US forces put on display two units of
each of the 280mm atomic cannon and Honest John nuclear missile, which
had been
deployed in South Korea, in an airfield of the US First Corps near
Uijongbu and
made them public to reporters, acs reported by Tongyang,
Reuters, and Haptong
News Agency.
On December 16, 1958,
the US
announced through the UN Command that the UN forces in South
Korea were equipped with Matador
missiles
capable of delivering nuclear warheads, according to Reuters
from Seoul.
During a news conference on 20
June 1975, US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
said: “I think you know that we have deployed tactical nuclear weapons
in South Korea,”
according to a report by Jiji press of Japan
from Washington.
According to a Haptong News Agency report filed from Washington
in June 1975, during a House of Representative hearing to examine the US
defense budget for 1976 held on 30 May 1975, it was officially revealed that
approximately 1,000 nuclear
weapons and 64 aircraft loaded with nuclear weapons had been deployed
in South Korea.
South Korea
has been turned into “the biggest US
nuclear [weapons] exhibition hall.”
The January 1981 edition of Defense Monitor, a
magazine published by the US Defense
Intelligence Center, notes that the nuclear shells introduced to South
Korea
included 80 warheads for Honest John missiles, 192 tactical nuclear
bombs for
fighter-bombers, 152 nuclear shells for 155 howitzers, and 56 nuclear
shells
for eight-inch howitzers. The US
even deployed for action in South Korea
56 neutron bombs which countries in Europe and
other regions
had refused to allow deployment within their borders and introduced
even a
large number of field portable nuclear backpack devices.
A US Defense Department announcement reported by Hanguk
Ilbo on July 15, 1985
that the US
deployed a nuclear missile battalion in South
Korea, becoming the first such
overseas base
outside of Europe.
In addition to listing the above US
provocations, the Report also
asserted that “turning South Korea
into a [US]
nuclear
base has rendered it into a direct and crucial threat to peace not only
on the Korean Peninsula,
but to Asia
and the rest of the world. The gravity of the nuclear threat to North
Korea was further increased by the
nuclear
weapons development maneuvers of South
Korea’s
Yusin regime [of former ROK President Park Chung Hee’s ‘Revitalizing
Reforms’]. In the early 1970s, the
Yusin regime invited
nuclear physicists from the US
and promoted the purchase of atomic reactors from many countries. In
1976, [the
Yusin regime] founded the Atomic Power Technology Corporation and the
Nuclear
Fuel Development Corporation. It
began
to build a large-scale research facility for developing atomic power
technology
in the central region [of South Korea] starting from 1977, as reported
in South
Korean monthly Wolgan Choson’s 1983
October edition.”
The Report further
asserted that in the beginning of 1978 when the Kori Atomic Power Plant
launched operations, South Korea
had already obtained the capability of annually extracting 139 to 167
Kilograms
of plutonium 239. Such an amount is enough to manufacture 23 to 28,
20-kilo-ton
nuclear bombs as reported in South Korean magazine International
Affairs No. 2 in 1985. In a paper entitled: Nuclear
Proliferation and US Diplomatic
Policy, made public on November
9, 1980, the US Brookings Institute noted that South
Korea and Japan
could possess nuclear weapons within the next ten years.
The Report
concluded that the aforementioned historical facts prove that the US
has long deployed nuclear weapons in South
Korea
and incessantly posed a nuclear threat to North
Korea by instigating South Korean
bellicose
elements.
The Report
asserted that even “perceiving the elimination of nuclear threat which
has long
been posed to us [North Korea]
as a crucial issue related to the survival of the nation, the
government of the
Republic [DPRK] has not suspended, for even a moment, the
denuclearization and
anti-nuclear struggle on the Korean peninsula.”
At the 12th session of the first DPRK Supreme People's
Assembly [SPA] in November 1956, an official position was announced
opposing
the introduction of atomic weapons to South
Korea. When
the US
attempted to unilaterally scrap paragraph 13d of the Armistice
Agreement and
orchestrated to bring atomic weapons to South
Korea, the government of the People’s
Republic
strongly called for suspending actions that aggravated tense situations
on the
Korean peninsula via its Foreign Ministry statement dated on May 30, 1957.
The first session of the second SPA in September 1957
reiterated that the articles of the Armistice Agreement would be
honored and
that armistice be transformed into solid peace, and demanded once again
that South Korea
not be allowed to become a US
nuclear base.
At the Military Armistice Commission’s 91st and 100th
meeting on December 19, 1958
and April 27, 1959,
respectively, North Korea
strongly protested the introduction by the US
of nuclear missiles to South Korea,
and asserted that all nuclear weapons such as illegally-brought-in
nuclear
missiles and atomic artillery be withdrawn and that US forces be
withdrawn.
Both in the 1960s and 1970s via meetings at the SPA, the North-South
Coordinating Committee, the Military Armistice Commission, and via
various
other opportunities, North Korean reiterated its position against South
Korea being turned into a
nuclear base.
On December 20, 1974,
North Korea Foreign Ministry warned against South Korean
moves for nuclear weapons development. In the 1980s, the danger of
thermonuclear war on the Korean
Peninsula
increased due to the annual Team Spirit joint military exercise
involving nuclear
war scenarios. On March 16,
1981,
a joint statement with the Japanese Socialist Party was announced by
the DRRK on
establishing a denuclearized and peaceful Northeast Asian region.
On January 10, 1984,
the Central People’s Committee and the SPA Standing Committee held a
joint
meeting and adopted official letters that were sent to the US
administration and Congress and the South Korean authorities. The
letters
proposed a trilateral meeting including the South Korean authorities in
the
DPRK-US talks to discuss countermeasures for eradicating the danger of
nuclear
war and providing a turning point for peaceful resolution of DPRK-US
hostility.
At the third session of the seventh SPA on January 25, 1984, in order to stave off
growing danger of
nuclear war, an appeal was made to launch an international campaign to
withdraw
all nuclear weapons from South Korea
and turn the Korean Peninsula
into a denuclearized and peaceful region.
In a statement released on December
8, 1985, DPRK welcomed the US-Soviet agreement
on issues regarding the reduction of nuclear weapons and the prevention
of nuclear
war. The statement emphasized that
if
the US
truly
wants peace, it should withdraw its nuclear weapons from South
Korea and respond by turning the Korean
Peninsula
into a nuclear-free, peace
zone. Thus the nuclear issue involved not just nonproliferation in North
Korea, but also denuclearization in South
Korea and on a regional level, also in
US
bases in Japan.
The DPRK joined the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty) in
December of 1985 to facilitate denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula
in the context of
preserving national sovereignty. After becoming a signatory to the NPT,
the DPRK
government proposed additional initiatives for peace. In a June 23, 1986 statement, the
DPRK declared it
would not test, manufacture, store or bring in nuclear weapons and not
allow
any military bases, including nuclear bases, overseas. It also declared
it
would not allow foreign countries’ nuclear weapons to pass through its
territory, territorial air, and territorial waters.
In the statement, the DPRK indicated that if the US and
South Korea should request negotiations regarding DPRK proposal to turn
the
Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone, irrespective of form,
it
would respond to such demands promptly.
Through a July 13, 1987 Foreign Ministry statement, the DPRK
again clarified its stand regarding practical measures to establish a
nuclear-free,
peace zone on the Korean Peninsula and to firmly secure its status. In
the
statement, the DPRK demanded US
withdrawal of its nuclear weapons and promise of canceling operation
plans
regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Regarding Japan,
the DPRK suggested that it “not make its territory into another
country’s base
to sally forth, relay, and supply nuclear weapons to threaten the Korean
Peninsula.”
The DPRK also asked all
the states that possessed nuclear weapons to restrain themselves from
engaging
in any type of military actions that could stir up a nuclear war on the
Korean Peninsula
and its vicinity.
North Korea
also appealed to South Korea
to withdraw nuclear weapons, transport means, and all military bases,
including
nuclear bases, in its region and not bring in and store nuclear weapons
from
now on as well as not develop or possess nuclear weapons and to totally
prohibit other countries' nuclear weapons from passing through its
region.
A Joint Declaration
on denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula
was again reviewed and approved at the February 5, 1992 joint meeting of the DPRK
Central People's Committee and
the SPA Standing Committee. This was an epochal event that served as a
milestone in turning the Korean
Peninsula
into a nuclear weapon-free, peace zone as well as in realizing the
country's
reunification. As an additional practical measure, a proposal to ratify
the
safety accords between the DPRK and the IAEA was considered,
deliberated and
approved at the 16th session of the delegates to the 9th SPA Standing
Committee
on 18 February 1992 as well as at the third session of the 9th SPA that
was
held in April 1992 and came into effect on April 10, 1992.
On June 3 1992,
the Secretariat of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the
Fatherland disclosed and severely condemned US and South Korean
authorities for
aggravating tension on the Korean
Peninsula
and increasing the dangers of a nuclear threat while violating the
basic spirit
of the North-South Agreement and Joint
Declaration on denuclearization.
In a memorandum issued on September
12, 1997, the DPRK exposed US and South Korean
authorities maneuvering to reinforce nuclear weapons behind the screen
of talks.
Through the Foreign Ministry’s memoranda and the bills of indictments
issued by
the Korean Anti-Nuclear Peace Committee and the Korean Democratic Lawyers
Association on March 15, 1993,
April 20,
1994, January 7,
1999
and February 28 2003,
the DPRK called attention to the danger of a nuclear war flaring up on
the Korean Peninsula
as a result of US and
South Korean simulated nuclear war exercise and the biased behavior in
some
quarters of the IAEA Secretariat. The
DPRK proposed constructive and substantial proposals to settle these
matters.
The DPRK allowed the IAEA delegation to visit North
Korea from May 11 to 16, 1992 to inspect all
nuclear facilities that
they demanded and objects that they suspected. The
DPRK submitted to the IAEA the initial
inventory report on nuclear material and nuclear facility-designing
information
as required by Articles 42 and 62 of the nuclear safety accords between
the
DPRK and the IAEA on May 4,
1992.
The DPRK actively cooperated in the work of the ad-hoc inspection team
six times
from May of 1992 to early February of 1993. The DPRK accepted US
demand for an inspection of Kumch'ang-ni in 1998 under the pretext of a
so-called intelligence data collection. As part of a program to achieve
denuclearization on the Korean
Peninsula,
North Korea
froze the graphite-moderated reactors and relevant facilities,
sacrificing a
self-reliant nuclear power industry, and made a decision to switch the
existing
graphite-moderated reactor system to a light-water reactor system.
The DPRK-US Joint Statement was adopted between the DPRK and
the US
on June 11, 1993
and the DPRK-US Agreed Framework, which promised
to essentially settle the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, was
adopted on October 21,
1994. After
the Bush administration came into office in January 2001, the DPRK
repeatedly
proposed holding direct talks between the DPRK and the US and firmly
insisted
on settling the nuclear issue by concluding a nonaggression treaty so
as to by
all means prevent the rupture of the process of denuclearization of the
Korean
Peninsula even as US maneuvers to abrogate the DPRK-US Agreed Framework
and
scrap the North-South Joint Declaration
on denuclearization intensified.
North Korean claims that the historical facts show that the DPRK
has worked for denuclearization on the Korean
Peninsula
for decades, while the US
systematically to scrap the North-South
Joint Declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula
and has hindered denuclearization
since.
According to a May 5 2003 AFP report, the US in early
1994 prepared a surgical strike against
DPRK peaceful nuclear facilities, a fact since confirmed by President
Clinton
and others in his administration. On top of nuclear weapons already
stockpiled
and deployed in South Korea,
the US
deployed
internationally-banned depleted uranium bombs in Iraq
in 1991, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan
in 2002 and Iraq
in 2003.
Bush Administration
Nullified the Agreed Framework
Upon entering the White
House, Bush served notice on
nullifying the DPRK-US Agreed Framework,
as report in New Korea Times on June 23, 2001. The
May 17, 2001 edition of Tong-a Ilbo reported that US
National
Security Advisor Rice submitted a strategic report entitled Global
Trends 2015 in which she
officially rejected the Joint Declaration
of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by putting emphasis on
raising
tension against North Korea to bring South Korea into the proposed
missile
defense system.
On June 6, 2001 Bush announced a statement on North Korean
policy, the main contents of which were improvements to the
implementation of
the Geneva Agreement with regard to nuclear activities, including those
conducted in the past; regulations on verification of missile
development
projects, and reduction of conventional weapons.
The June 8, 2001
edition of Tong-a Ilbo assessed Bush’s
Statement on North Korean Policy as the virtual declaration of
confrontation
policy against the DPRK, implying that force could be employed in the
event
that DPRK did not accept the US
demands such as approval of nuclear inspections, suspension of missile
launches
and reduction of conventional weapons. The Bush administration’s
extreme,
hostile policy toward the DPRK became overtly manifested when he
designated North Korea
as part of the “axis of evil” in his State
of the Union address on January
30 2002.
The Korea-Taiwan Link
in US-China Relations
Related to this hostile policy on North Korea,
US Center for
Strategic and International Studies [CSIS] director Kurt Campbell, a
former Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and the Pacific, as a
member of
the National Security Council Staff, made vociferous remarks in an
interview
with Asahi Shimbun on 12 November 2002 that the ultimate goal of US
policy
toward the DPRK was destruction of its regime, not normalization of
relations.
Campbell also
went on record to interpret the Bush administration’s policy on China
as a clear change from so-called “strategic ambiguity,” to a new policy
of
“dual clarity”, one of “no military coercion, no
independence.” This
means any Chinese military action against Taiwan
will clearly encounter US
force. The Bush administration changed long-standing US
policy on Taiwan
as defined in the three US-China Joint Communiqués signed by
three previous
presidents in subtle ways silently and behind the scenes. The US
operates with the unrealistic aim that a status quo on Taiwan
would not deter improvement in US-China relations which the US
needs for achieving its global objectives. From China’s
perspective, until the US
stop interfering on Taiwan,
which China
considers an internal affair, no sustainable improvement in US-China
relations
can be institutionalized, including the Korean problem on which the
actively seeks Chinese help in solving.
US Policy of Regime
Change for North Korea
The Bush administration publicly asserted a policy of regime
change for North Korea
and characterized as “provocative” North
Korea
response to repeated provocation by the US
to derail the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula
and to “suffocate” North Korea
with sanctions. The October 2002
edition of the South Korean magazine, T'ongil
Hanguk, reported that the US
has conducted a nuclear bombing exercise against a model of North
Korean
targets at a US Air Force base in North Carolina
since 1998 and that this kind of exercise has been conducted on an
extended scale
after the Bush administration took office. According to a South Korean
KBS
broadcast on March 15, 2002, the Bush administration ordered that a
nuclear
attack plan be established against North Korea and the US Defense
Department (DOD)
prepared a report on nuclear posture against North Korea that was
submitted to
the US Congress that called for US use of nuclear weapons in case of a
contingency on the Korean Peninsula and that small tactical nuclear
weapons be
used for destroying underground facilities and to this end the US
should withdraw
from the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
The DOD Report claims that a US presidential special envoy who
visited Pyanyang in early October 2002 told North Korean officials the
Bush
administration adopted a policy in March 2002 to mount a nuclear
preemptive
strike against seven countries including North Korea, in violation of
the NPT principles
in which nuclear weapon countries are not allowed to threaten other
countries
with the use of nuclear weapons or attack with nuclear weapons, or
create a
state of emergency that endangers the fundamental interests of
non-nuclear
states; and plan nuclear wars. The US
abrogated the DPRK-US Joint Statement of 2000 and the DPRK-US Agreed
Framework of
1994, contrary to the basic spirit of the NPT, threatened a nuclear
preemptive
attack on North Korea,
a non-nuclear state. The policy ruptured the process of the
denuclearization of
the Korean peninsula. The denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula
would be a mere fantasy
unless the US
abandoned
its hostile policy toward the DPRK.
The most crucial issue in the denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula is to remove the dangers of a nuclear war.
However, the US
has turned South Korea
into the biggest forward nuclear base in the Far East
and a strategic nuclear weapons depot; constantly conducted nuclear war
exercises for northward aggression; and destroyed the basic spirit of
the joint
declaration of denuclearization. The US
has mapped out and implemented detailed operation plans for northward
aggression. The nine-day war plan, five-day war plan, Operation Plan
5027 of the 1980’s and
Operation Plan 5027-98 of the 1990’s and the recently disclosed
contingency
plans were all nuclear war plans that involved nuclear attacks on North
Korea. What the US
aims for is not denuclearization in the Korea
peninsula but the one-sided nuclear disarmament of North
Korea. The
US
mobilized a total of 16,000 military aircrafts in aerial war exercises
of
various codenames in South Korea
for one month in January 1992, an average of approximately 500 military
aircraft a day in war exercises, when the North-South joint declaration
of
denuclearization was adopted. Typical of the military exercises in the
first
half of the 1990's was the Team Spirit 93 joint military exercise,
mobilizing 200,000
troops, B-1 strategic bombers, F-117 Stealth bombers, Patriot
interceptor
missiles, and aircraft carrier groups in provocative exercises for
northward
aggression aimed at preemptive nuclear strikes against North
Korea. The US
staged more than 10,000 war exercise for northward aggression from the
ceasefire in 1953 to 1999, counting only large nuclear war exercise
involving a
total of 20 million troops.
In March 2002, the Bush team staged the largest-ever nuclear
war exercise against North Korea, a combination of RSOI (Reception,
Staging,
Onward Movement and Integration), a
ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) simulation-driven command post
exercise
(CPX) conducted annually, and Foal Eagle, one of a series of four major
Combined Forces Command annual exercises, involving 700,000 troops,
more than
three times as many as the 200,000 involved in the Team Spirit joint
military
exercise staged annually between 1976-1993. Team Spirit continued to be
scheduled after 1994 but was cancelled each year as an incentive for North
Korea to abandon its nuclear program.
Ulchi
Focus Lens, scheduled annually in August, is a computer-based war game
exercise
with field activities as a preparation for war with North
Korea with tanks crossing the Han
River and chemical weapon deployment. Foal Eagle, using
real
troops and actual assets in live training environment exercises usually
follows
RSOI in April simulating large movement of troops as war with North
Korea becomes imminent, with Ulchi
Focus
Lens simulating the first days of engagement.
The Nimitz class nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS Carl
Vinson with 85 aircraft and an air wing crew of 2,480 and a ship crew
of 3,200,
and its Carrier Strike Group which had participated in the joint
military
exercise, remained in seas near the Korean peninsula after. In a news
conference with foreign correspondents on April 7, 2002, the commander of Carrier Group
Three in
charge of the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson openly stated that forces
under his
command are watching North Korea.
US
nuclear war
exercise aggravated the dangers of a nuclear war on the Korean
peninsula to
rupture the process of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
US Military Strategy
after the Cold War<>
After the end of the Cold War, the US as the sole remaining
superpower shifted its foreign policy of containing communism to assume
the
role of world policeman for moral imperialism to enhance “democracy” in
order
to surround itself with a network of friendly states, by augmenting its
already
unmatched conventional military power superiority with the development
of regional and theater nuclear missile
defense
systems that would allow the US to launch first strikes against states
it disapproves
without fear of counter strikes.
After the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks on the US
homeland, the US, far from acknowledging US belligerent unilateral
foreign
policy as the root of anti-US terrorism, divided the world into good
and evil states
on subjective ideological standards and self-centered geopolitical
agenda to
forced the rest of the world to yield to global US imperium. In the name of combating global terrorism, it
perpetrates aggression through a policy of regime change against
governments
that it does not approve on ideological grounds or that it views as
unfriendly.
North Korea
accuses the US
of state terrorism, citing as evidence US
invasion of Afghanistan
to expel the Taliban regime under the pretext of apprehending Osama bin
Ladin
in October, 2001. While bin Ladin is still at large, ten of thousands
of innocent
Afghan civilians have been killed and the country devastated by US
weapons of
mass destruction, such as BLU 82 fuel evaporator bombs which are the
worst
conventional bomb after the tactical nuclear bomb. On March 20, 2002, the US
launched a war of aggression against the sovereign nation of Iraq
to topple a legitimate regime headed by Saddam Hussein under the
pretext of removing
weapons of mass destruction which could not be found after the war. In
both
these wars, the US
used cluster bombs and depleted uranium shells forbidden by the
international
treaty, and indiscriminately tested deadly new weapons that cause
massive
collateral damage. The imposition of democracy via militarism has so
far
wrought only unnecessary civilian deaths in a backward slide of nation
dismantling.
North Korea
also accuses the US
of cynically exploiting nuclear nonproliferation as pretext for waging
wars
against countries it unilaterally and arbitrarily deems evil. The war in Iraq shows the world the danger of
accepting disarmament through so-called inspections by international
agencies,
for it does not prevent US aggression but rather, it invites war by the
US,
notwithstanding world public opinion against the war, opposition form
most
other big powers, or the absence of UN mandate or approval.
To North Korea,
the bloody lesson of the war in Iraq
for the world is that only when a country has an effective nuclear
deterrent
force can it prevent aggressive war from the US
and defend its independence and national security. To North
Korea, the US
is wholly responsible for the escalating confrontation between the DPRK
and the US
over the
nuclear issue and for fostering a nuclear war crisis.
Next: The Changing South Korea
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