World Trade Needs a
Global Cartel for Labor (OLEC)
Part II: Rising Wages
Solve All Problems
By
Henry C.K. Liu
Part I: Background and Theory
According to the current terms of global
trade under dollar
hegemony, the penalty for a non-dollar economy that uses dollar foreign
capital
is a low domestic standard of living to support a high return
denominated in
dollars on foreign capital. Since dollar
profits for foreign capital cannot be used in the local non-dollar
economy,
such profits must leave the domestic economy in one form or another,
either
through direct repatriation, or in economies with currency control,
through
central bank foreign exchange reserves. Thus there are no recycling
economic
benefits to the non-dollar domestic economy from dollar profits earned
by
foreign investment. Such is the pugnacious nature of foreign direct
investment
(FDI). Under finance globalization, the
unregulated
competition among non-dollar economies for dollar-denominated FDI
condemns
domestic living standards to negative growth.
The quest to profit from the lowest wages
through cross-border wage
arbitrage has been the driving force behind trade globalization,
reducing trade
from a process of gaining comparative advantage between trading
economies to
one of reinforcing absolute advantage for capital at the expense of
labor for
the benefit of global capital denominated in dollars.
Cross-border wage arbitrage can hardly be
classified as a proper division of labor in the Smithian sense, which
implies
rising wages through specialization.
Structural systemic low wages are
exploitation, not specialization of
labor. Such exploitation need to be resisted by the formation of a
global labor
cartel such as an Organization of Labor-intensive Exporting Countries
(OLEC).
Classical Economics -
Rationalization of the Industrial Revolution
By 1700, the tendency of the agricultural state and the craft
guilds to resist industrialization was weakening. In 1762, Matthew
Boulton
built a factory in England with over six hundred workers, and installed
a steam
engine to supplement power from two large waterwheels which ran a
variety of
lathes and polishing and grinding machines. In Staffordshire an
industry
developed to export low-price, good-quality pottery, using hand-made
chinaware
brought in from China by the East India Trading Company as models.
Josiah
Wedgewood (1730-1795) revolutionized the mass production and sale of
low-price
pottery, causing eating and drinking to be consequently more hygienic,
thus contributing
to a reduction of diseases and an increase in population. The textile
industry overcame
the production mismatch between spinners and looms as well as yarns and
weavers
with the introduction of a machine known as ''Crompton's mule,'' which
mass
produced quantities of fine strong yarn to keep weaver from idly
waiting for
yarns. Between 1780 and 1860 other textile processes were mechanized
with
automated looms, and when the power loom became efficient, low-wage
women
replaced men as weavers. By 1812 the cost of making cotton yarn had
dropped 90%,
and by 1800 the number of workers needed to turn wool into yarn had
been
reduced by 80%. And by 1840 the labor cost of making the best woolen
cloth had
fallen by at least half. The history of
industrialization is one of forcing wages down, until the advent of
labor unions.
The steam engine accelerated the industrial development of
Europe. In 1763 James watt, an instrument-maker for Glasgow University,
perfected
a true steam engine with a crank and flywheel to provide rotary motion
that
could be harvested for a great variety of production work. In 1774 the
industrialist Michael Boulton took Watt into partnership, and their
firm
produced some 500 engines before Watt's patent expired 26 years later
in 1800. The
steam engine liberated the factory from water power and its streamside
location
and relocated it to regions that produced coal, making coal producing
countries
industrial powers. A Watt engine drove Robert Fulton's experimental
steam
vessel Clermont up the Hudson from New York to Albany in 1807.
It was not until 1873 that a dynamo capable of prolonged
operation was developed, but as early as 1831 Michael Faraday
demonstrated how
electricity could be mechanically produced. Through the nineteenth
century the
use of electric power was limited by small productive capacity, short
transmission lines, and high cost. Up to 1900 the only cheap
electricity was
that produced by generators making use of falling water in the
mountains of
southeastern France and northern Italy. Hilly Italy, without coal
resources, with
a historical experience in handling water, soon had hydroelectricity in
every
village north of Rome. Electric current ran Italian textile looms and,
eventually, automobile factories. As early as 1890 Florence boasted the
world's
first electric streetcar. The coming of
the railroads greatly facilitated the industrialization of Europe. The
big
railway boom in Britain came in the years 1844 to 1847. The railway
builders
had to fight vested interests, canal stockholders, turnpike trusts, and
horse
breeders. By 1850, aided by cheap iron
and better machine tools, a network of railways had been built linking
inland
factories with exporting ports. After 1850 the state had to intervene
to
regulate what amounted to a monopoly of inland transport in Britain.
Alexander
Graham Bell in 1876 transmitted the human voice over a wire. At the end
of the
century the wireless telegraph became a standard safety device on
oceangoing
vessels. Radio did not come until 1920. The world continued to shrink
at a
great rate as new means of transport and communication speeded the pace
of
life.
The Industrial Revolution brought with it a sharp increase
in population and urbanization, as well as new social classes. England and Germany showed an annual growth
rate greater than 1% which would double the population every seventy
years. In
the United States the increase was greater than 3% which was readily
absorbed
by a practically uninhabited continent with abundant natural resources.
Only
the population of France remained static after the eighteenth century
which partly
explained the decline of France as a major modern power until it
embarked on a
policy of colonization. The general population increase was aided by a
greater
supply of low-cost food made available by the previous Agricultural
Revolution,
and by the growth of medical science and public health measures which
decreased
the death rate and added to the population base, with the rapid growth
of
cities.
The factory-owning bourgeoisie use the discontent of the
peasants to gain control of the government from the landed aristocrats.
Their rule
over a new working class created by the Industrial Revolution was
harsher than
that of the aristocrats over the peasants. Skilled artisans were
degraded to faceless
production laborers as machines began to mass produce the products
formerly made
by loving hand. Wages fell, working hours lengthened and working
conditions became
inhumane and unsafe. The industrial workers had helped to pass the
Reform Bill
of 1832, but they had not been enfranchised by it because of their
poverty, as
the control of government fell to the bourgeoisie.
Law of Rent is
Regressively Anti-labor
Classical economics grew out of the Industrial Revolution
which began first in Britain. It was
natural for it to be dominated by the opinions of British observers of
conditions created by early industrialization. British classical
economist David
Ricardo’s law of rent was seminally influenced by Malthusian concepts
on
population dynamics. Thomas Robert Malthus
(1766-1834), another British economist, sociologist and pioneer in
population
theory, asserted that population growth is difficult to check and would
quickly
outstrip economic growth and cause increasing misery all around. In his An
Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), Malthus contended that
poverty
is unavoidable without population control since natural population
increase is
geometric while the increase of the means of subsistence is
arithmetical. Thus famine and disease can
be viewed as
natural constraints on population and war as a political constraint,
all having
socio-economic causes rooted in overpopulation.
In 1803, Malthus admitted the preventive check
of “moral restraint”,
paving the way for neo-Malthusian birth control theories which
influenced other
classical economists, especially David Ricardo (1772-1823). Malthus
never
explained why urban centers of high population density became centers
of high
civilization and culture, and why prosperous nations with large
population
become great powers, such as Britain, Germany and the US, or China,
Russia and
the Ottoman Empire before the Industrial Revolution.
Accepting the Malthusian claim, Ricardo modified Smith’s
theory of economic growth by including diminishing returns on land.
Output
growth requires growth of factor inputs, which are goods and services
used in
the process of production, such as land, labor, capital and enterprise. But unlike labor, land as observed by
Ricardo is “variable in quality and fixed in supply.” This means
that as
economic growth proceeds, with improvement of the quality of land use
reaching
upper limits, more land must be brought into use to sustain growth. Yet
land
cannot be increased without geographical expansion through conquest,
which
leads economic growth in a capitalist regime inevitably to the age of
empire
and imperialism.
Ricardo was concerned not so much with the “nature and
causes” as with the distribution of wealth. This distribution has to be
made
between the classes concerned in the production of wealth, namely, the
landowner, the capitalist, and the laborer. In seeking to show the
conditions
which determine the share of each, Ricardo’s theory of rent is
fundamental
based on which economists develop the notion of economic rent which
will be
dealt with later in the article. He attributed his inspriation to
Malthus’s Inquiry
into the Nature and Progress of Rent and others. Rent, Ricardo
argued, does
not enter into the cost of production; it varies on different farms
according
to the fertility of the soil and the advantages of their situation. But
the
price of the produce is the same for all and is fixed by the conditions
of
production on the least favorable land which has to be cultivated to
meet the
demand; and this land pays no rent. Rent, therefore, is the price which
the
landowner is able to charge for the special advantages of his land; it
is the
difference between its return to a given amount of capital and labor
and the
similar return of the least advantageous land which has to be
cultivated.
Consequently, it rises as the margin of cultivation spreads to less
fertile
soils. Obviously, this doctrine leads to a strong argument in favor of
the free
importation of foreign goods, especially corn. It also breaks with the
economic
optimism of Adam Smith, who thought that the interest of the country
gentleman
harmonized with that of the mass of the people, for it shows that the
rent of
the landowner rises as the increasing need of the people compels them
to have
resort to inferior land for the production of their food.
Prior to the imperialistic age, there were two
self-neutralizing effects on economic growth: firstly, rising land
rent
cuts into profits of capitalists from one side; and secondly, rising
price of
wage goods cuts into capitalist profits from another as workers need
higher wages
for subsistence. This introduces a quicker limit to economic growth
than Smith
allowed, but Ricardo also claimed that this decline could be happily
checked by
technological improvements in mechanization and the specialization
brought on
by the growth of trade. However, Ricardo’s concept of trade for
comparative advantage is fundamentally different from trade for
absolute
advantage under the current age of globalization. Still,
the flaw in the Law of Rent is
Ricardo’s rejection that labor can also be variable in quality though
education
and fixed in supply through a global labor cartel.
Automation Creates
Unemployment Unless Wages Rise to Create Marginal Demand to Absorb
Marginal Productivity.
Nevertheless, in the third edition of his Principles,
Ricardo modified his position on mechanization (and by implication,
automation).
He observed that when machinery displaces labor, the labor "set free"
may not be reabsorbed elsewhere in the economy because capital is not
simultaneously "set free”, trapped in sunk investment in machinery. This creates downward pressure on wages and
lowers aggregate labor income, with the difference absorbed by the
long-term
investment and financing cost of capital goods. It is true that
capital
goods also require intellectual labor to produce, but the productive
lifespan
of capital goods is exponentially longer than their initial
intellectual labor
input, which also brings about rising need for long-term finance. This characteristic is altered in the age of
communication and information technology where technical obsolescence
has
accelerated the technological imperative. Yet this new ratio of
intellectual
labor input to enhance productivity has not translated into higher
wages even for
the intellectual worker. Much of the surplus value went to a handful of
intellectual property rights holders and their corporate metamorphoses,
creating new super-rich robber barons personified by the likes of Bill
Gates. Capital
goods need decades of reduced labor cost to pay for their capital input
and
financing cost in the form of interest payable throughout the course of
the
loan or lease term. Such interest
payments require additional reduced labor cost over the life of the
financing.
This has been the experience in China in the past two
decades of industrialization with foreign capital, paid for by export
earnings. Up to 70% of China’s export
trade is financed
by foreign capital and traded by foreign traders. China’s
outstanding foreign debt stood at $267.46 billion at the end of
September, 2005
up 8.07% or $19.97 billion from the end of 2004. The
State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), an arm of the central
bank,
said that the increase was due to a rise in short-term debt, and most
of that
was trade related. As of the end of
September,
outstanding short-term debt was $143.97 billion, up 16.86% from the end
of
2004. Medium- and long-term debt was down 0.65%, or $801 million, at
$123.49
billion. SAFE, concerned that some of
the inflow
is due to speculation that the nation's currency would appreciate,
issued new
rules in October 2005 tightening control over foreign debt in a bid to
curb
speculative inflows of funds from abroad. The
yuan was revalued 2.1% against the dollar on July 21, 2005. As of the end of September, 2005 short-term
obligations
accounted for 53.83% of all outstanding foreign debt, compared with
53.1% at
the end of June. The rise in foreign
debt is
unlikely to pose much of a problem as the nation's foreign exchange
reserves
have been climbing at a rapid pace, reaching $794.2 billion at the end
of
November, 2005. Some economists predict that reserves could exceed $1
trillion
by the end of 2006.
China's foreign debt total
at the end of September 2005 included
registered foreign debt of $189.46 billion, inclusive of outstanding
trade
credits of $78 billion. The total supply of tradable domestic
bonds in China
at the end of June 2003 was RMB 3.4 trillion (US$ 411 billion). Total
outstanding tradable debt now exceeds $600 billion (60% of GDP) against
foreign
exchange reserves of $800 billion. This leaves a net cushion of less
than $200
billion for all of China’s remaining debt obligations, hardly a picture
of
unqualified financial strength. Still, in July 2005 S&P upgraded
China’s
sovereign rating by one notch to A-minus, citing China’s aggressive
overhaul of
its financial sector and improved profitability. China is rated ‘A2’ by
Moody's
Investors Service and ‘A’ by Fitch Ratings.
The foreign exchange reserves build-up by the People’s Bank
of China (PBoC), China’s central bank, present a misleading picture
about the
financial benefits China receives from foreign trade.
The profit mostly goes to foreign capital,
while the PBoC’s dollar reserves have come from the sale of domestic
sovereign debt
to remove trade-surplus dollars from the Chinese economy in a process
known as
sterilization in monetary economics. China does not own these dollars
which
have been earned by foreign capital on Chinese soil paying low wages to
Chinese
workers. China merely exchanges its own sovereign debt instruments for
the foreign
dollar profits in its economy to buy US Treasuries to sustain the US
capital
account surplus.<>
In order to reabsorb the labor displaced by mechanization or
automation, the rate of capital accumulation must continuously
increase.
But with foreign direct investment, there is no mechanism for this to
happen domestically
since the profit belongs to foreign entities which will eventually
carry the
loot back to their own home bases. Globally, given the tendency for
profit and thus
savings to decline over time from overinvestment in relation to worker
purchasing power, a perpetual surplus of labor is the result.
The mismatch of the long functional life cycle of products
to their shorter financial life cycle leads to the irrational
phenomenon of
planned obsolescence in which products are planned to last not as good
engineering permits, but as their financial life allows, in order to
produce
recurring market demand artificially. In
a high tech-economy, which Ricardo did not have the opportunity to
observe in
his lifetime, fast technological obsolescence tends to require a higher
and
recurring level of mental labor input, rescuing high-tech workers from
the
effects of Ricardo’s Iron Law of Wages. Under
globalization, high-tech workers, while freed by technological
imperative from
the Iron Law of Wages, are re-enslaved by global wage arbitrage made
possible
through instant and low-cost data telecommunication and low shipping
cost of
greatly reduced physical output. Thus a
labor cartel is also needed in high-tech sectors to resist this new
enslavement.
Ricardo did not deal with the problem of uneven market
demand on different grades of labor created by mechanization, between
educated
scientists/engineers/managers/sales and uneducated factory workers. In the early years of industrialization,
educated professional and managerial personnel were part of management,
not
labor. With the emergence of large corporate entities, upgrades in
quality
caused labor as a category to expand to include high-skilled,
professional and
managerial workers. Until the introduction of universal education in
the
advanced economies, which is an industrial policy program to intervene
in the
labor market, unskilled or low-skilled laborers were so lowly paid that
they simply
could not afford education for their children, thus condemning them to
the
ranks of the unemployable for life through hereditary poverty. A shortage of educated workers developed along
with an oversupply of unskilled labor, exacerbating widening income
disparity. Mechanization absorbs the
highly-skilled in the design and engineering phase and displaces the
unskilled in
the production phase at unbalanced rates.
As income rise comes to depend on education level, the cost
of education increases and requires financing over longer periods of
schooling
and more sophisticated teaching and research facilities and
institutions,
further limiting low-income access. Competitive
scholarships to the poor but deserving caused a brain drain from the
working
poor, leaving them genetically inadequate to resist. Free universal
education
then is a critical component of economic democracy.
Privatization of education is the death knell
of free markets for labor. The US system
of funding public education with property taxes leads to
location-related
disparity of education opportunity. Just
as much of gasoline taxes are directly reserved for the Highway Trust
Fund
(18.3 cents per gallon federal gasoline tax and 24.3 cents per gallon
diesel
tax), a fixed portion of a progressive income tax structure should be
devoted
to a national education trust fund.
Those enjoying high income are benefiting from
their earlier educational
subsidies and should be asked to fund educational opportunities of
future
generations. A cartel for global labor
can retrieve universal free education for all to upgrade the quality of
labor.
Economic Rent and
Excess Profit
Ricardo correctly observed that rent is a result and not a
cause of price. Rent has
two different meanings for economists. The first is the commonplace
definition:
the income from hiring out an asset, such as money, land or other
durable
goods or labor. The second, known as economic rent, is a measure of
market
power: the difference between what a factor of production costs and how
much it
would need to be paid to remain in its current use.
A star entertainer may be paid $10 million a
year when he/she would be willing to perform for only $1 million under
different circumstances, so his economic rent is $9 million a year. In
a manner
of speaking, economic rent is a form of excess profit. US executives
enjoy the
world’s highest economic rent for management. Under
perfect competition, there would be no
sustainable economic rents of duration, as new entertainers are
attracted by a
high economic rent market and compete until economic rent falls to near
zero.
Reducing economic rent does not change production decisions,
so economic rent can be taxed to reduce income disparity without any
adverse
impact on the real economy. No baseball
star would take up washing dishes in a restaurant to protest high taxes
on his
economic rent. When chief executive
officers in large corporation get compensation packages in the range of
hundreds of million of dollars, much of that is economic rent for
exercising
market power over employees under the executives’ management. The CEO of Yahoo, Terry S. Semel was paid
$231 million in 2005. There is no economic logic in the obscene
disparity
between executive pay and worker wages, which has increased by more
than ten
folds in past decades in the US, particularly when increased earnings
are often
achieved by shrinking the company through massive layoffs.
It defies logic why a company laying off
employees should be considered a good investment, just as why a nation
with a
declining population should be considered a healthy nation. It is sheer insanity that a CEO should be
rewarded with millions in pay and perks for putting tens of thousands
of
workers in his/her company out of work.
The Iron Law of Wages
Fallacy
Upon these odd concepts natural only to unique conditions
associated with early industrialization and in the 19th
century
milieu of fascination with natural laws, Ricardo propounded his Iron
Law of
Wages, a blatantly anti-labor theory of value.
The Iron Law of Wages asserts that wages
naturally drift towards minimum
levels and cannot possibly rise above subsistence levels,
notwithstanding the
purpose of civilization being to modify the adverse effects of nature. Economics, as a dismal science, has too long
been accepting the malignant effects of human construct as natural
laws, rather
than treating exploitation, greed and injustice as flaws in the human
condition
that needs to be contained by a rational structure that rewards good
and penalizes
evil. To be logical is not always the equivalent of being rational. The
labor
theory of value maintains that in exchange, the value, though not the
market
price, of goods is measured by the amount of labor expended in their
production. The intrinsic value of labor
then is the starting point against which all other values are
constructed. When
the intrinsic value of labor is high in an economic system, the
resultant
society is good in the philosophical sense of the word. When the
intrinsic
value of labor is low, the resultant society is not good. When the
market price
differs from intrinsic value, it causes either inflation or deflation,
producing drags on economic growth. With the current international
financial
architecture of fiat currencies lorded over by dollar hegemony,
differential
between market price and intrinsic value is magnified, usually at the
expense
of those producing the goods, for the benefit of those in command of
market
power. Current Wall Street philosophical rationalization
notwithstanding, greed
is not good. Greed is not to be confused with merely benignly wanting
more; it
is “wanting more” to the point of blindly risking self destruction.
On interest, the rent for money, Ricardo had little to say.
He observed that money, by which he meant specie money based on gold
which
Britain does not produce and must import, not fiat money which any
sovereign
government could produce at will if freed from dollar hegemony, “is
subject to
incessant variations from its being a commodity obtained from a foreign
country, from its being the general medium of exchange between all
civilized
countries, and from its being also distributed among those countries in
proportions which are ever changing with every improvement in commerce
and
machinery, and with every increasing difficulty of obtaining food and
necessaries for an increasing population.
In stating the principles which regulate
exchangeable value and price,
we should carefully distinguish between those variations which belong
to the
commodity itself, and those which are occasioned by a variation in the
medium
in which value is estimated, or price expressed.” After
the collapse in 1971 of the Bretton
Woods regime of gold-backed dollar, fixed exchange rates and restricted
cross-border
flow of funds, the resultant international financial architecture of
fiat
currencies based on the dollar as the head of the snake of fiat
currencies, has
made impossible such distinction between intrinsic variation of
commodities and
variation in the medium of exchange.
This has created a disconnection between price
and value in
international trade, in favor of the dollar economy at the expense of
all
non-dollar economies.
Natural Price and
Market Price of Labor
Ricardo asserted that a rise in wages due to inflation
produces no real effect on profits as prices of products also rise. This is known in modern times as cost of
living increases of wages or inflation indexation.
A rise in real wages ahead of inflation has a
direct effect in lowering profits unless the economy is plagued with
overcapacity which rarely happened if at all during the early decades
of
industrialization that Ricardo observed. Labor,
when purchased and sold as a commodity,
may increase or diminish quantitatively in supply and has a natural
price and a
market price. The natural price of labor, according to Ricardo, is that
price
which is necessary to enable laborers to subsist and “to perpetuate
their race
without either increase or diminution.”
But there is nothing “natural” about Ricardo’s
natural price of labor.
What Ricardo called natural was actually merely a pervasive artificial
socio-political regime. In that regime,
as then existed in Britain, population grew naturally without
intervention and
the growth tended to be concentrated on the laboring poor who had the
least
capacity to intervene on their fate in society.
Ricardo’s natural price of labor depends on
the price of the food,
necessities, and conveniences required for the support of the laborer
and his often
large family. But in a functional
economy in a civilized society, the natural price of labor should be
based on
society’s concept of a good and decent life, which includes ample
leisure to
cultivate body and spirit, opportunity for advancement, occupational
safety,
health care and insurance, free education, affordable housing and
retirement
benefits. Subsistence has taken on
different, more equitable and humane meanings since the early days of
the
Industrial Revolution.
Ricardo granted that with technological and social progress,
the natural price of labor always has a tendency to rise, while the
natural
price of commodities, excepting raw material and labor, has a tendency
to fall
because of innovation that improves productivity. The
market price of labor is supposed to be determined
by supply and demand. Unemployment then
is a condition that depresses the market price of labor by increasing
the
supply of labor to saturate demand.
Companies increase short-term profit by laying
off workers,
notwithstanding that an increase in unemployment shrinks aggregate
demand that
eventually reduces corporation profits. When the market price of labor
exceeds
its natural price, the condition of the laborer is flourishing and
happy. But Ricardo reasoned that high
wages give rise
to population growth, increasing the supply of labor to cause wages to
again
fall to their natural price, and indeed from overreaction sometimes
fall below
it. So goes the argument for population
control for the good of the laboring class, or as Ricardo put it, “the
laboring
race” since the characteristics and economic role of workers were
largely
hereditary due to social immobility. The Christian Church, having for
most of
its history allied itself with establishment interests, opposes birth
control
for more than religious and moral reasons in the industrial age, when a
surplus
of workers was always good for business. Actual data contradicts this
theory. Birth rates in advanced
economies where wages are high actually fall as middle class families
discover
the financial advantage of not having too many children and the low
income
families also find having many children a financial burden,
particularly after
the introduction of child labor laws.
When the market price of labor is below its natural price,
the condition of laborers is wretched and poverty results.
It is only after their privations have
reduced population increase, or the demand for labor has increased
through
economic growth, that the market price of labor will rise to its
natural price,
and that the laborer will have the moderate comforts which the natural
rate of
wages will afford. Ricardo argued that
notwithstanding the tendency of wages to conform to their natural rate,
their
market rate may be constantly above it in an improving and progressive
society
for an indefinite period. Thus, with
every improvement of society, with every increase in capital, the
market wages
of labor will rise; but the sustainability of their rise will depend on
whether
the natural price of labor has also risen; and this again will depend
on the
rise in the natural price of those necessities on which the wages of
labor are
expended. As population increases, these
necessities will be constantly rising in price, because more labor will
be
necessary to produce them and more people are consuming them.
If the money wages of labor should fall, while every
commodity on which the wages of labor are expended rise, workers would
be
doubly affected, and would soon be totally deprived of subsistence. Instead of the money wages of labor falling,
they would rise; but they would not rise sufficiently to enable the
laborer to
purchase as many comforts and necessaries as he did before the rise in
the
price of those commodities. Ricardo
concluded that these are the iron laws by which wages are regulated,
and by
which the happiness of far the greatest part of every community is
governed. Labor then has a self
interest in assuring the profitability of employers.
This has been a self-regulating attitude
since adopted by the labor union movement, putting labor at a constant
disadvantage in contract negotiations.
Employee ownership is usually offered only
when company profit falls
toward or below zero.
Capital Needs Labor
More Than Labor Needs Capital
Yet the real natural law is that capital needs labor more
than labor needs capital. Without
capital, labor can still produce, albeit less efficiently, but without
labor,
capital cannot exist and remains only as idle assets.
Money does not invest in the desert, even oil
fields need workers. The reason money market funds pay rent for the
money in
the form of interest is that the money is lent to some entity that
invests in
enhancing labor productivity. The holding of idle assets can only be
profitable
under conditions of inflation in which price appreciation exceeds the
real and
opportunity cost of holding. But inflation in neoclassical economics is
defined
primarily as wage-pushed. Thus even idle assets need rising wages to
keep its
value. The market price of labor should always be such as to eliminate
economic
rent (excess profit) for capital. Labor
has the power to eliminate economic rent on capital, for capital has
nowhere
else to go besides investing to increase labor productivity. At this point of confrontation, government,
controlled by capital, usually steps in to break up strikes for higher
wages,
to make owners of capital rich at the expense of labor, by making
society pay
the hidden price of a lower level of national wealth.
Ricardo argued that like all other contracts, wages should
be left to the fair and free competition of the market, and should
never be
interfered with by government. He saw
the clear and direct tendency of the welfare laws and labor regulations
as in
direct opposition to these obvious principles: it is not, as social
legislation
benevolently intended, to amend the condition of the poor, but to
deteriorate
the condition of both poor and rich; instead of making the poor rich,
they are
calculated to make the rich poor, thus forfeiting savings and
investment needed
for economic growth. And while the
welfare laws are in force, the maintenance of the poor would
progressively
increase till it has absorbed all the net revenue of the nation. “This pernicious tendency of these laws is no
longer a mystery, since it has been fully developed by the able hand of
Mr.
Malthus; and every friend to the poor must ardently wish for their
abolition,”
Ricardo wrote. While this observation is
narrowly rational, Ricardo did not point out that the way to get out of
the
welfare trap is through full employment with living and rising wages.
In Ricardo’s view, poverty is not the result of the rich
getting more than the poor, but the result of economic underdevelopment
due to
lack of savings. This has been the
position adopted by most market liberals.
Yet it is a fantasy to claim the existence of
a free market for labor or
that unemployment can provide savings for the unemployed.
The labor market remains the most politically
regulated commodity market in the international political economy where
disparity of mobility between capital and labor is extreme. At the height of the high-tech bubble, Alan
Greenspan, chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board, testified before
Congress
that if low-wage workers overseas cannot move to fill jobs in the
developed
economies due to immigration constraints, the jobs will have to migrate
to the
workers in the developing economies to avoid inflation.
The new Iron Law of Wages now operates in the
globalized economy on cross-border wage arbitrage to produce low prices
for
consumer products in the high-wage economies that fewer and fewer
consumers can
afford because of rising job loss in high-wage economies.
Countries like China and India are trading in
their progressive socialist programs for Dickensian industrial hell
while
advanced economies like the US have become voluntary victims of
home-grown
economic imperialism that comes with dollar hegemony.
There was never a more ripe time to revive
labor
solidarity as now. The most promising
solution appears to be a global cartel for labor in the form of OLEC.
A Global Cartel for
Labor Is Needed to Reverse Anti-labor Terms of Global Trade
The year of US independence, 1776, was a year of grand
treatises in economics and politics. Adam Smith published his Wealth
of Nations, the Abbé de Condillac his Commerce et le
Gouvernement,
Jeremy Bentham his Fragments on Government
and Tom Paine his Common
Sense. British mercantilism had led
to a rebellion by the colonists in North America to establish a
home-grown
liberal republican government dedicated to laissez-faire, a
statist
policy against monopolistic mercantilism and in opposition to British
“free-to-exploit” trade in the name of free trade.
Today, job protection by governments should
not be mistaken as trade protectionism. As long as a world order of
nation
states exists, economic nationalism must be the basis of international
trade. Trade must enhance national
wealth for all participating nations, not merely to enrich global
transnational
capital at the expense of universal economic democracy.
National wealth is directly dependent on high
wages. In a global economy, the decline
in wealth in some nations will cause the decline in wealth in all
nations. Terms
of trade that depress wages are economically regressive, and should be
reordered by a global cartel for labor.
Markets are not natural phenomena. As Karl
Polanyi (1886-1964) pointed out,
markets are recent developments in human history. Capitalism
is a historical anomaly because
while previous economic arrangements were "embedded" in social
relations, in capitalism, the situation is reversed - social relations
are
defined by economic arrangements. In
human history, rules of reciprocity, redistribution and communal
obligations
were far more frequent than market arrangements. Furthermore, not only
does
capitalism not exhibit historical humanistic values, its ascendancy
actually
destroys such values irreversibly.
Free markets are an oxymoron. Government is fundamentally
involved in markets through the very creation and enforcement of
property
rights, an artificial socio-political concept without which markets
cannot
exit. Government regulation is also
indispensable in preventing the natural emergence of monopolies in
unregulated
markets. Free markets for labor do not
exist because of a disparity of market power between employers and
employees. Workers must work to earn
current income to feed their families daily. Subsistent wage means
workers have
no savings to get them through rainy days.
Entrepreneurs can delay investing their
capital until the market price
of labor is right. Hunger quickly destroys
labor’s market power and lowers the market price of labor to near or
even below
subsistence levels. Thus the prevalent
monopoly of capital needs to be countered by a cartel for labor.
Problems with the
Iron Law of Wages
Notwithstanding the disparity of bargaining power between
capital and labor which prompted Marx to call on workers in 1848 with a
battle
cry of “nothing to loose but your chains,” there are two other problems
with
Ricardo’s Iron Law of Wages. The first is something Henry Ford figured
out a
century after Ricardo. Ford realized that workers who were paid at
subsistence
levels could not afford to buy the cars they made in his factories.
Ford worked
out a wage-price ratio under which his workers would have enough money
after
basic living expenses to buy and finance the cars they produced. In the new industrial democracy, Ford was
able to sell many more cars than his competitors who eventually went
bankrupt
selling only to the very rich. By paying his workers well, Ford became
super
rich, more than his competitor who sold only to the rich.
The more workers he hired, the more cars he
sold. Before globalization, US auto
giants helped build the world's most affluent middle class by paying
wages far
above subsistence levels and by providing generous vacation, health and
pension
plans. Auto sector wage pattern spurred other sectors to raise
compensation
levels creating continuous rises in consumer demand.
This happy approach to high wage income has been reversed in
past decades by the likes of Wal-Mart, with $256 billion in annual
sales and 20
million shoppers visiting its stores world-wide each day. Wal-Mart is
now doing
just the opposite of what Henry Ford did. Wal-Mart profits from its
regressively low wages and meager employee benefits: paying its US
retail
workers less than $18,000 a year on average (below the 2005 US poverty
line of
$22,610 for families with three children) and its outsourced supplier
workers
overseas less than $4 a day, or $1,000 a year.
Wal-Mart workers cannot afford the low-price
goods sold in Wal-Mart
stores. Wal-Mart takes away the good shirt off the US worker’s back
plus
his/her health insurance by outsourcing his/her job and sells back to
him/her a
lower-price shirt made overseas without the health insurance.
Population growth can be translated into growth markets with
rising wages. That formula had been the
fountainhead of the rapid growth of national wealth in the US. Demand management had been generally accepted
as indispensable in market economies since the New Deal when US
President
Franklin D. Roosevelt adopted Keynesianism after the 1929 stock market
crash. An aging population coupled with
a fall in births rate will drain demand from the economy and contract
the
national wealth. The process is
exacerbated by the need to maintain structural unemployment and low
wages to
preserve the value of money.
The second problem with Ricardo’s Iron Law of Wages is that it
fails to recognize that the working population is the fundamental asset
from
which a nation derives its wealth. By
adopting policies based on an economic theory that structurally keeps
wages at
their lowest levels, a nation condemns itself to the lowest possible
level of
national wealth. Post-1978 Chinese
reform policies, by using low wages as the main competitive factor of
production, supported by lax regulation against environmental abuse, is
a
classic example of policy-induced below-par generation of national
wealth,
despite its high GDP growth rate and rising labor productivity.
Say’s Law of Markets (Supply
Creates Its Own Demand) Valid Only Under Full Employment
Supply-side economists have in recent decade promoted the
arguments of Say’s Law. In 1803,
Jean-Baptiste Say (1767-1832) published his Treatise on Political
Economy
in which he outlined his famous Law of Markets. Say's Law claims
that
total demand in an economy cannot exceed or fall below total supply, or
as
James Mill (1773-1876) elegantly restated it, “supply creates its own
demand.”
In Say’s language, “products are paid for with products” or “a
glut can
take place only when there are too many means of production applied to
one kind
of product and not enough to another.”
Yet, as post-Keynesian economist Paul Davison
has pointed out
insightfully, Say’s Law only applies under conditions of full
employment, a
condition that cannot exist under supply-side theory of using
unemployment as a
necessary device to keep down wages, the increase of which is defined
as the
main cause of inflation. If aggregate
effective demand is sufficient to make it profitable for employers to
hire all
the available workers - even if they have to pay more than subsistence
wages,
they will gladly do that, to expand the size of the market. The message
of
Keynesian economics is that in a full employment economy, workers and
entrepreneurs are not adversaries.
Monetarists use tight money to keep
unemployment at as high a level as
politically acceptable to control inflation, that is to say, to protect
the
value of money at the expense of worker income. This approach leads
inevitably
to overcapacity, for while a general glut of goods may be theoretically
impossible, a general glut of savings is now a reality. The flood of
corporate
profit is having difficulty finding new reinvestment opportunities
because
wages are too low to sustain needed consumer demand.
Born in Lyons to a family of textile merchants of Huguenot
extraction, Say, after spending two years in England apprenticed to a
merchant, took a job in 1787 at an insurance company in Paris run
by Étienne Clavière (1735-1793)
who later
to become Minister of Finance. An ardent republican, Say
supported the
French Revolution and served as a volunteer in the 1792 military
campaign to
repulse the allied armies aiming to restore the Monarchy. Say was
also
influenced by Adam Smith and became a laissez-faire economist,
known in
France as the ideologues, who sought
to re-launch the spirit of Enlightenment liberalism in republican
France,
pursuing classical economics while rationalizing the role of utility
and
demand. They also avoided classicalist pessimism on the Iron Law
of Wages,
the unavoidable rise of rents, the wage-profit trade-off, inevitable
unemployment caused by labor-saving mechanization, general gluts, etc.,
preferring instead to emphasize the happier harmonies between unequal
economic
classes and the infallibility self-regulating markets.
Politically, that
meant upholding a radical laissez-faire line, washing it of its
statist
component. Ideologues were
French counterparts of the British Manchester School but with more
vigorous
theory and a good deal of optimism. Karl Marx (1803-1883) would
later deride
them as the “vulgar” economists.
The rise of Napoleon Bonaparte, who sought to create an
imperial war economy buffeted by economic super-national protectionism
and
regulation within the Continental System, led to official suppression
of the
global vision of the Ideologues. Yet, the radical laissez-faire
notions expounded in Say’s 1803 Treatise caught the attention
of the
revolutionary in Napoleon. Summoning Say to a private audience,
Napoleon
demanded that Say rewrite parts of the Treatise to conform to
the
Napoleonic imperial war economy, built on super-national protectionism
and
regulation within the French empire, to which Say respectfully
refused.
Napoleon then banned the Treatise and had Say ousted from the
powerful Tribunate in 1804. Declining
the offer of another post as
compensation, Say moved to Pas-de-Calais and set up a cotton factory at
Auchy-les-Hesdins. Defying his own theory, Say grew fabulously
rich
supplying cloth not to the market but to meet the war demand for
uniforms by
the Grande Armee,
protected
by a protectionist Napoleonic Continental System from formidable
British
competition. In 1812, Say sold his factory at great profit
and
returned to Paris to live as a war speculator with his capital. After 1815, the restored Bourbon rulers, eager
to please the victorious British who restored them, showered the
remnants of
the Ideologues with honors and
recognition, initiating in France the long British tradition of close
alliance
between liberalism and the establishment, along the line of Charles
Dickens,
who having critically exposed the everyday evils of industrial
capitalism, went
on to condemn the French Revolution for being excessively inhumane.
Dysfunctional Economic
Theories on Unemployment
Phillips Curve
The “Phillips curve” purports to show that the annual
percentage rate of inflation consistently increases whenever the
percentage
rate of unemployment decreases. The observation originated in 1958 when
A.W.
Phillips documented a relationship between unemployment rates and
changes in
wage rates in the United Kingdom, again before globalization. Other
economists
liked the idea, but not the details, and replaced wages with prices,
predicting
that the unemployment rate would be negatively correlated with the
annual
inflation rate, being that inflation is defined as primarily
wage-pushed. This
re-invented relationship was confirmed by US economic data for the
1950’s and
60’s, but was contradicted by U.S. data for later years.
The U.S. economy achieved combinations of growth and
inflation in recent years that many economists thought were no longer
attainable. With the unemployment rate below most estimates of the
NAIRU (Non
Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment) and falling for the few
years
before 2000, many Phillips curve-based forecasts predicted that
inflation
should be rising. However, inflation has generally remained stable or
even
declined because of globalization (cheap imports). Many observers have
attributed this anomalous behavior to special factors, such as large
declines
in import prices associated with the 1997 Asian financial crisis and
the
appreciation of the dollar by default.
Important among those imports was crude oil, whose price
fell from roughly $23 per barrel in the fourth quarter of 1996 to just
over $10
at the end of 1998. Oil is now over $60 and most analyst anticipate it
to stay
above that level for the foreseeable future
Since energy prices are a component of many
Phillips curve models--the
principal tool used by economists to explain inflation--answers to
these
questions could be read directly from model estimates. However, the
Phillips
curve literature has largely ignored a substantial and growing body of
evidence
that oil prices have asymmetric and nonlinear effects on real activity,
as well
as that structural instabilities exist in those relationships. Since
around
1980, oil price changes seem to affect inflation mostly through their
direct
share in a price index, with little or no pass-through into core
measures. By
contrast, before 1980 oil shocks contributed substantially to core
inflation.
The econometric evidence for this result is highly significant |