US-CHINA: QUEST FOR PEACE
Part 7: The referendum question
By
Henry C K Liu
Part 1: Two nations, worlds apart
Part 2 Cold War links Korea, Taiwan
Part 3: Korea: Wrong war, wrong place, wrong enemy
Part 4: 38th Parallel leads straight to Taiwan
Part 5: History of the Taiwan time bomb
Part 6: Forget reunification - nothing to reunite
This article appeared in AToL on
January 31, 2004
In the unconstitutional 2000 local elections on Taiwan for
national offices, after losing the Guomindang, or GMD (in Taiwan known
as the Kuomintang, or KMT) nomination for president to then-vice
president Lien Chan, James Soong ran as an independent. The GMD
responded by expelling Soong and his supporters from the party. In the
final months leading up to the 2000 elections, the GMD, then under Lee
Teng-hui's leadership, sued Soong for theft, alleging that as party
secretary general, he stole millions in party funds in cash on behalf
of the family of the late president Jiang Jing-guo and hid the money in
the Chunghsing Bills Finance Co.
Initially leading in the polls, Soong narrowly lost the
election with 36.84 percent of the vote to Chen Shui-bian of the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), who also failed to score a
plurality, with only 39.3 percent of the votes cast. Lien came in a
distant third with only 23.1 percent. Were it not for the
winner-take-all system, a runoff between the two top candidates would
surely have put Soong in the winner's circle. It is widely believed
that Lee Teng-hui secretly supported Chen against all other candidates,
frustrating the popular will.
After losing the election, Soong and his supporters formed
the People's First Party (PFP), a spinoff from the GMD. The loss of PFP
splinter votes was a major factor in pushing the GMD to swing toward
seeking political accommodation with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
and in causing the subsequent expulsion of Lee Teng-hui. The struggle
between the GMD and the CCP has always been a party-to-party struggle
within one nation.
"Reunification" is a misnomer, since the country itself has
never been divided to begin with. So no reunification is needed, except
reunification between two political parties into a political coalition.
What is needed is a peaceful permanent political accommodation between
two political parties of different but reconcilable ideology. These two
parties had cooperated twice in the past until right-wing extremists
took control of the GMD.
For half a century, since the founding of the People's
Republic of China (PRC), a GMD Revolutionary Committee has been active
on the mainland. It was headed first by Song Qing-ling, the widow of
Sun Yat-sen and the oldest sister of Madame Jiang Jie-shi (Chiang
Kai-shek) and He Xiang-ning, the widow of Sun's top aide and leader of
the GMD left, Liao Zhong-kai. Liao's assassination by rightists in 1925
caused the first split between the Communists and the Nationalists, and
other top GMD members.
On the first anniversary of Liao's assassination, Liu
Shao-qi, who 33 years later would become president of the PRC in 1959,
wrote:
For to draw into the revolution the great
majority of the worker and peasant masses who will fight for it with
all their might, the revolution must reflect their vital interests. The
workers and peasants are not to be tricked into joining the revolution.
If we genuinely fight for their interests, continually help to improve
their conditions and earnestly work for their emancipation, we will
naturally win their enthusiastic participation in the revolution. With
their participation the success of the revolution will certainly not be
far off. Mr Liao [Zhong-kai] was the first person to implement a worker
and peasant policy. He took an active part in promoting the worker and
peasant movements and persevered despite many difficulties and much
calumny. Mr Liao had a true understanding of the process of China's
national revolution and of the workers' and peasants' part in it. Hence
his greatness and exemplary role for all Guomindang members!
All Chinese seek single Chinese state
The national goal of all Chinese is a single Chinese state
under a single government that regains all territorial integrity of
China. As Hong Kong and Macau are now again under the sovereignty of
China, the immediate outstanding issue is now Taiwan. The government of
the PRC under the leadership of CCP, and to varying degrees the GMD and
the PFP on Taiwan, all support peaceful political inter-party
accommodation toward national reconstruction. In Taiwan politics, this
group is known as the pan-blue coalition.
It is opposed by supporters of Taiwan independence, such as
the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union, which are known as the
pan-green coalition. The CCP has proposed political accommodation with
the GMD, and the government of the PRC has proposed the reincorporation
of Taiwan with the mainland under a "one country, two systems" policy
similar to that for Hong Kong and Macau. This has little support in
Taiwan, however, even among so-called "reunification" supporters,
understandably so, because the situation of Taiwan is fundamentally
different from that of the two former European colonies.
Taiwan is already Chinese territory. The dispute is between
two political parties, not two governments or two countries. And unless
and until the GMD regains political control of Taiwan and restores the
Republic of China (ROC) government to its legitimate status as a
pretender government of China, there is no basis for any political
negotiation between the PRC and the current illegal and
unconstitutional Taiwan authorities. China has as much right to
re-establish Chinese control over Taiwan as US president Dwight
Eisenhower had the constitutional authority to send federal troops to
Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957 to enforce school desegregation ordered
by the US Supreme Court under the US constitution, let alone president
Abraham Lincoln's right to preserve the union from secession by
slave-holding southern states.
From the collapse in 1947 of negotiations to form a coalition
government in China until the mid-1970s, political accommodation was
not the main subject of discourse between the CCP and the GMD; each
formally envisaged a military takeover of one by the other in an
unfinished civil war. In 1979, with Deng Xiaoping as leader, the PRC
replaced the policy of liberating Taiwan by force with the policy of
peaceful political accommodation with the GMD on Taiwan.
Within the GMD, the possibility of militarily retaking the
mainland was finally recognized as an impossible dream in the 1970s,
particularly after the death of GMD leader Jiang Jie-shi. The prospect
of political accommodation between the two parties briefly looked
promising under Jiang Jing-guo, who had been a CCP member in his youth.
Unfortunately, US opposition prevented Jiang Jing-guo from
making any meaningful rapprochement with the PRC, despite repeated
overtures from the CCP. With the loosening of authoritarian rule in the
1980s and the shift in power within the GMD away from the mainlanders,
the GMD began to move away from the claim of being a government of
China.
Taiwan sets up new warlord regime
With a sizable standing military backed by the United States,
the Taiwan authorities in fact established a new warlord regime on
Taiwan, an anomaly that the GMD itself fought against, with the help of
the communists, in the historic Northern Expedition against warlordism
in 1926. In the 1990s, Lee Teng-hui as an illegitimate president of the
ROC unconstitutionally exacerbated the shift toward warlordism within
the GMD, leading to a separatist confrontation with the PRC and
factional splits within the GMD.
Until the mid-1990s, supporters on Taiwan of the concept of
one China were also bitterly opposed to communism. Since the mid-1990s
there has been a considerable warming of relations between the CCP and
the GMD, and between them the one China concept has never been an
issue. Closer ties with the mainland are undeniably in the interest of
Taiwan as a province of China.
After the elections of 2000, which unconstitutionally and
illegally brought the independence-leaning DPP to power, the GMD, faced
with factional defections to the PFP, expelled the traitorous Lee
Teng-hui. In 2001, Lee helped create the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU).
Lee's primary motivation was to stop the GMD from moving away from his
ideas of Taiwanese separatism and from shifting the party toward
peaceful political accommodation with the CCP. The government of the
PRC under the leadership of the CCP adopted policies of economic
incentive designed to encourage Taiwanese businesses to investing on
the mainland and to create a pro-accommodation bloc within the
Taiwanese electorate.
Within Taiwan, supporters of peaceful political accommodation
with the CCP generally do not assert that the ROC should be the sole
Chinese government. On the other hand, the PRC government has declared
that under the principle of one China, all issues can be discussed,
including the appellation of the state and the selection of a new
national flag and national anthem. The GMD can even keep its separate
military on Taiwan. In addition, supporters of political accommodation
do not oppose localization or a Taiwanese identity, but rather see
Taiwanese identity as a component of a broad Chinese identity - not a
separate cultural identity. What supporters of peaceful political
accommodation do oppose is de-sinicization or the effort to create a
Taiwanese national identity in a separatist context.
Despite the factional rivalry between Lien, the GMD chairman
after 2000, and Soong, the new PFP chairman, the GMD and PFP have
pledged to cooperate in future elections in order to prevent splitting
the vote, since they basically share the same electorate. The GMD-PFP
alliance, known as the pan-blue coalition, has been stormy, but it has
been marginally successful thus far because of their realization that
united, they stand a better chance of winning in any election whose
voters are overwhelmingly Taiwanese natives.
Though losses in the 2001 legislative elections made the DPP
the largest single party in the Legislative Yuan, the pan-blue
coalition holds a narrow majority over the pan-green coalition. In
April 2003, after discussions between the GMD and the PFP, Soong
announced that he would run as a vice-presidential candidate under Lien
Chan in the 2004 elections. There are widespread rumors that Soong
agreed to take the vice-presidential post in exchange for a pledge by
Lien to give him significant power, including the premiership, in a
Lien government. Many GMD members are opposed to the linkage and
political rewards, as they consider Soong an opportunist and political
traitor.
Non-aggression pact a non-starter
The key difficulty lies in the GMD's acquiescence in
subjecting national offices to local elections. In his campaign, Soong
advocated a gradual union between Taiwan and the mainland by first
signing a non-aggression pact followed by the formation of a
cross-Strait union similar to the European Union. This proposal is a
non-starter, since the two sides are not separate countries with which
any union can be formed.
Soong's platform called for the characterization of relations
between the mainland and Taiwan as neither foreign nor domestic.
Although widely seen as the candidate most friendly to the mainland,
Soong took particular effort to counter the perception that he would
"sell out" Taiwan. His base of support includes strong supporters of
political accommodation with the CCP, rural voters who remain grateful
for the selective economic development undertaken during his
governorship, and urban middle-class voters who see him as a cleaner
alternative to the GMD old guard. Soong has been a staunch opponent of
Taiwan independence and has publicly attacked President Chen for
proposing a referendum on independence.
(The referendum scheduled for March does not specifically ask
about independence. Voters would be asked, among other things, whether
the PRC should be requested to redirect nearly 500 missiles currently
aimed at the ROC from the mainland, and if Beijing refuses, whether the
ROC should improve its own defensive missile capabilities.)
In January 1988, on the death of Jiang Jing-guo, Lee Teng-hui
succeeded him as president, but not without resistance. The hardline
faction of the GMD, headed by General Hau Pei-tsun, deeply distrustful
of Lee, threatened a coup. With the help of James Soong, who calmed
down the hardliners, Lee was allowed to assume the presidency
unobstructed. Lee consolidated his power by speaking of defending the
GMD party line, while emphasizing the global trends of reform. Lee and
his allies in the government used the pressure from the hardliners as a
tool to work for developing the underlying Taiwanese localization
movement. In December 1991, the original members of the Legislative
Yuan, elected in 1947 to represent mainland constituencies, were forced
to resign and new elections were held to apportion affirmatively more
seats to local legislators, bensheng ren. The elections forced
Hau from the premiership, a position he had been given in exchange for
ending his opposition to Lee.
The Taiwanese localization movement has its roots in the
home-rule groups founded during Japanese occupation, and they have
emphasized Taiwan as the center of political deliberation, as opposed
to China proper. During the two-generation Jiang dynastic rule, China
had been promoted on Taiwan as the focus of awareness around which a
Chinese national outlook could be instilled in a people who had once
considered themselves Japanese colonial subjects during 50 years of
occupation.
Given this China focus, Taiwan was seen as a temporary place
for mainlanders to reside while they waited for the re-conquest of the
mainland from communism. Taiwan was often relegated to a backwater
province of China in the GMD-supported history books. People were
discouraged from studying about Taiwan and old local customs were to be
overwhelmed by Chinese mainstream customs.
Lee supports Taiwan independence
By contrast, Lee Teng-hui sought to turn Taiwan into a
national center rather than an appendage of the mainland. Lee presided
over the democratization of Taiwanese society and government in the
late 1980s and early 1990s through the promotion of local chauvinism.
During his presidency, Lee was dogged by persistent suspicions that he
secretly supported Taiwan independence. These suspicions were proved
valid by Lee's behavior after his presidency, which eventually led to
his expulsion from the GMD. He subsequently became the spiritual leader
of the strongly pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union. Since leaving
office, Lee has actively campaigned on behalf of pan-green coalition
candidates and has actively opposed candidates of his former party. In
addition, Lee has publicly stated that he supports changing the name of
the country from the Republic of China to the Republic of Taiwan and
opposes increased economic ties with the mainland.
Elections for the president of the ROC on Taiwan are
scheduled for March 20. For the ruling DPP, backed by the pan-green
coalition, incumbent Chen Shui-bian will be the presidential candidate
and Annette Lu, also incumbent, the vice-presidential candidate. The
opposition pan-blue coalition will run a combined ticket - GMD chairman
Lien Chan as the presidential candidate and PFP chairman James Soong as
the vice-presidential candidate.
As with all elections, the contest will be to woo the
undecided. The main issues in the campaign are relations with the
mainland, political reform, and the economy. In addition, although they
tend not be noticed by the international press, local issues have been
important in the campaign, particularly because these issues influence
undecided voters. These issues vary from county to county but include
funding for irrigation projects, the location of new expressways, and
the redrawing of local administrative boundaries.
The DPP has been attempting to portray the Lien-Soong ticket
as one that would "sell out" Taiwan to PRC mainland interests, and it
has been emphasizing constitutional reform, proposing a new
constitution and holding a referendum on the future of Taiwan. This has
led to justifiable fears that Chen intends to use a new constitution
and a referendum to declare Taiwan independence, which would lead to a
military response from China. Worries about this have caused even the
United States at several points to ask for and receive assurances that
Chen has not abandoned the "Four Nos plus One Without" (si bu, yi
meiyou) pledge made in his inaugural speech on May 20, 2000,
concerning the political status of Taiwan.
< style="font-family: times new roman,times,serif;">The
pledge is an important part of cross-Strait relations. It states:
Provided that the PRC does not attack Taiwan, Chen's administration
would:
< style="font-family: times new roman,times,serif;">
Not declare Taiwan independence.
Not change the national title from "the Republic
of China" to "the Republic of Taiwan".
Not include the doctrine of special
state-to-state relations in the new constitution.
Not promote a referendum on unification or
independence.
<>
In addition, the "one without" was Chen's pledge not to abolish the
National Unification Council or the National Unification guidelines.
Four Nos plus One Without pledge
The "Four Nos plus
One Without" pledge has become an important basis of Taiwan-US
relations. Chen has had to reassure the United States on several
occasions that the pledge has not been abandoned. The US responded by
saying it "appreciates Chen's pledge and takes it very seriously".
In a televised
address on January 16, Chen reiterated his "Four Nos plus One Without"
pledge, but justified the forthcoming "peace referendum" on March 20 by
some rhetorical questions: "The People of Taiwan demand that the Taiwan
Strait issue be resolved through peaceful means. Should mainland China
refuse to withdraw the missiles it has targeted at Taiwan and openly to
renounce the use of force against us, would you agree that the
government should acquire more advanced anti-missile weapons to
strengthen Taiwan's self-defense capabilities?
"Would you agree that our government should engage in negotiation with
mainland China on the establishment of a 'peace and stability'
framework for cross-Strait interactions in order to build consensus and
for the welfare of the peoples on both sides?"
The Lien-Soong
ticket attempts to portray Chen as someone who lets politics get in the
way of improving the Taiwanese economy, which depends on integration
with the mainland. It focuses on Chen's inability to deal with the
prolonged recession.
The PRC in
mid-November 2003 issued several very sharp warnings at high levels
that it would not stand by if Taiwan declared independence. This was
widely seen as a response to US reverses in its promise gradually to
disengage from Taiwan, as stipulated by the Three Communiqués
that define US-China relations. In early November, Chen Shui-bian took
an unofficial trip to the United States in which he was much more on
public view than in previous visits. This trip increased his popularity
on Taiwan to the point where most polls indicated that he was even or
slightly ahead of the Lien-Soong ticket. His US trip in early 2003 also
alarmed the PRC in that it appeared to convince them that the US would
do less to constrain Chen Shui-bian than it had earlier indicated.
Another referendum
could ask about independence
Chen's rise in the
polls caused the opposition to change its campaign strategy. To counter
Chen's platform for a new constitution by 2008, the opposition
campaigned for a major constitutional change by 2004. In addition, the
opposition ended its obstruction of a referendum bill, thus permitting
referendums. The vetting of the referendum bill prompted Beijing to
issue sharp warnings about passage of a referendum bill - which at some
point would also permit a popular vote on sovereignty. The bill that
was passed on November 27 did not contain restrictions on the content
of referendums, but it did include very high hurdles for referendums on
constitutional issues.
In addition, the
bill contained a provision for a defensive referendum to be called if
the sovereignty of the ROC were under threat. On November 29, Chen
announced that given that the PRC had missiles aimed at Taiwan, he had
the power under the defensive-referendum clause to order a referendum
on sovereignty - although he did not do so. This statement was very
strongly criticized both by Beijing and by the pan-blue opposition
coalition. But instead, Chen proposed a referendum to ask the PRC to
remove missiles aimed at Taiwan.
During Chinese Premier Wen Jaibao's visit last November, US President
George W Bush gave a clear statement that it "opposes" any form of
referendum that would unilaterally change the status quo of Taiwan. The
United States fears that Chen will put Washington in the unwelcome
position of having to show its hand in its policy of ambiguity adopted
in recent decades - if Chen's game of pushing the independence envelope
should trigger a PRC military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. That
conflict would involve the US.
The US has an
implied obligation to help Taiwan defend itself, as stated somewhat
ambiguously in the Taiwan Relations Act, a US domestic law that
infringes on the internal affairs of China in the name of defending
democracy. Yet democracy on Taiwan is not the issue. The issue is
Taiwan independence. The US is unwilling to confront China in East Asia
especially while it is bogged down in an Iraq quagmire, with no end in
sight. Also the issue of Pyongyang's nuclear proliferation hangs in the
balance. Despite vocal US reservations, however, Chen continues to
insist that a referendum will be held on March 20, as well as the
presidential vote.
Former US secretary
of state Henry Kissinger, chief architect of US-China rapprochement
under president Richard Nixon, published an essay titled "The way to
avoid confrontation" regarding US policy toward China and Taiwan in the
October 25, 1999, edition of Japan's Yomiuri Shimbun. In sum, the idea
is to avoid a crisis of Sino-US confrontation and defer China's
"reunification" with Taiwan by getting Taiwan to agree that Taiwan is
part of China.
Kissinger wrote:
"Relations between the United States and China this year [1999] have
come under the greatest strain since bilateral diplomatic ties were
re-established in 1971 ... In this atmosphere Taiwan's sudden and
unilateral challenge to the existing political understandings in the
Taiwan Strait ... is interpreted in Beijing as the culmination of a US
plot to divide China. Chinese warnings of a possible military response
have taken on a severity reminiscent of the prelude to the Chinese
intervention in the Korean War in 1950."
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