World Order,
Failed States and Terrorism
PART 3: The business of private security
By
Henry C K Liu
PART 1: The failed-state cancer
PART 2: The privatization wave
This article appeared in AToL
on March 3, 2005
The prime function of a sovereign state is the provision of security,
national and domestic. National security is concerned with protection
from external threats, while domestic security is concerned with
maintaining social order. For the United States, protected by two
oceans, the line separating external threats and homeland security had
been clearly delineated until September 11, 2001, after which direct
foreign threats on the US homeland became a reality. Current US policy
on the threat of terrorism focuses on preemptive wars on foreign soil
and preventive measures within its borders.
Notwithstanding the current high-profile concern with the "war on
terrorism", it is useful and necessary to remember that the central
political aim of terrorism is not to annihilate its usually
overwhelmingly powerful target, but merely to draw the world's
attention to what terrorists consider legitimate grievances imposed and
sustained by the targeted polity and hitherto ignored by the world.
Terrorism by definition is a limited reactive tactic in that it aims to
make its target cease and desist ongoing injurious strategic policies
and actions that have become routine and normal. Even state terrorism,
also known conventionally as war, does not aim to destroy an opponent
country, merely to eliminate its political resolve to resist the
invader's will. The political objective of the US "war on terrorism" is
to deny the legitimacy of the grievances to which terrorists aim to
draw attention and to present terrorist attacks as common criminal
acts. "Terrorists hate us because they hate freedom," proclaimed
President George W Bush. It is not a perspective that will reduce
threats to US security. The fallback tactic, then, is preemptive
strikes abroad and preventive measures at home.
Such an intransigent mindset grows out of the attitude that crime
should be fought with increased funding for the police rather than by
funding programs to eradicate poverty. Refusal to link terrorism to
injustice comes from the same mentality as refusal to link crime with
poverty. Increasingly, reflecting the proliferation of such a
mentality, the US seeks to meet increased national and domestic
security threats from terrorism by exploiting the efficiency that
allegedly can be milked from privatizing state functions. It is
ironically a march toward failed statehood in its acceptance of the
superior effectiveness of the private sector in performing state
functions. While security protection is outsourced to market
participants, little effort is devoted to promoting policies that can
reduce the need for security protection. Moreover, there is clear
evidence that the global proliferation of marketization of basic social
services, with its effect of denying needed services to the poor, adds
to the proliferation of security threats from terrorism.
Social order and social security
Social order is the main component of domestic security. Social
security is the foundation of social order. Henry J Aaron of the
Brookings Institution calls the US Social Security system "the great
monument of 20th-century liberalism". Privatization of social security
is not a solution; it is an oxymoron. It merely turns social security
into private security. Neo-liberal economics theory promotes as
scientific truth an ideology that is irrationally hostile to government
responsibility for social programs. Based on that ideology, neo-liberal
economists then construct a mechanical system of rationalization to
dismantle government and its social programs in the name of efficiency
through privatization. Privatization of social security is a road to
government abdication, the cause of failed statehood.
In 1935, the US Congress passed the Social Security Act as part of the
New Deal, in response to inevitable market failures under finance
capitalism. Social Security benefit payments not only helped recipients
who were too sick or too old to work, but such payments also
contributed to the stabilization of business cycles that regularly
wreaked havoc on the market economy. Social security was a government
program that helped keep markets operational by providing a baseline
level of demand with a social safety net. Starting in 1937, government
receipts into the Social Security trust funds have repeatedly
contributed to the reduction of the federal deficit in an era when
deficit financing was indispensable to demand management, with
substantial socio-economic benefits to the whole system.
The Social Security program, by its very name, is not an investment
program. It is a protection program. It is not even an insurance
program, because all participants receive benefits on retirement. Rates
of return on investment in a market economy are direct reflections of
risk levels. The concept of risk is inseparable from the prospect of
worst-case eventuality. The whole purpose of Social Security is to
eliminate market risk for those citizens least able to afford to risk
their well-being in retirement.
The fact that Social Security payments have gradually fallen into mere
supplemental support for the full financial needs of retirees does not
argue for encouraging workers to taking market risks with their
retirement. One-third of America's retired elderly receive 90% of their
income from Social Security payments, and two-thirds receive more than
50%. This argues for increasing government contribution to Social
Security costs, to be paid for by taxing unearned gains that sprang
either from private control of land and other natural resources, or
from the exercise of monopoly power in all its subtle forms, including
overreaching intellectual property rights.
How work is taxed
Journalist Jonathan Rowe and economist Clifford Cobb conducted a study
highlighting the forgotten history of US income tax by pointing out
that the payroll tax, which finances Social Security, is in essence a
regressive tax on work. It fell exclusively on wages and salaries of
working people on the first US$90,000 of annual income in 2004. The
payroll tax constitutes more than half of the federal taxes that the
average US taxpayer pays. But because of the ceiling on taxable payroll
income, those making more than $90,000 in 2004 paid no additional
payroll tax.
The Social Security tax rate today is double the top income-tax rate in
1913, when the income tax was first introduced. In payroll taxes alone,
low-income workers today are paying twice the rate that millionaires
paid in the original version of the tax that Congress first enacted.
Obviously, fairness demands that the income ceiling for payroll tax
should be removed and the fixed rate reduced correspondingly. According
to the Social Security Administration's chief actuary, if the limit on
wages taxed for Social Security, currently $90,000, were lifted
altogether, the system would be kept fully solvent until 2077.
In the 1920s, corporate income tax yielded almost a third of US federal
revenues. Today, corporations pay just a little over one-ninth despite
widespread corporatization of almost every aspect of life. The New
Economy, a buzzword describing the effect of new, astronomically
high-growth industries that are on the cutting edge of technology and
are expected to be the driving force of new economic growth, consists
of industries such as the Internet dot-coms and biotech. "New Economy"
notwithstanding, a large share of corporate income is still derived
from ownership of land and other natural resources, from
intellectual-property monopoly and from financial manipulation. As of
1990, these comprised more than 40% of the total assets of almost a
third of Fortune 500 companies. So the decline of revenue share from
corporate tax has been part of the larger reversal of the basic concept
behind the original income tax. It is the key venue for the sharp
increase in the number of millionaires and billionaires in the US
economy while more and more workers fall below the poverty line to join
the rank of the working poor. It is obscene to accuse the poor of not
saving enough when they do not receive even a living wage. There is no
other way to reduce poverty except to give the chronic poor money and
the working poor more income.
Today, the US federal tax system is in essence a tax-on-work system. It
falls hardest upon income of workers and penalizes work activities that
an economy needs to encourage in order to remain healthy. Capital is
merely idle assets without the opportunity to generate wealth through
increasing the financial value of work provided by workers. Neo-liberal
economics ideology places wealth creation, as manifested in asset
appreciation, as the ultimate goal of economic activities. Yet there
are internal structural contradictions in the economics of wealth
creation through asset appreciation, which is achievable only by
causing asset value to rise faster than value of work as expressed
through income. When income from work rises faster than asset
appreciation, it is perceived by neo-liberal monetarists as inflation,
a wealth destroyer. Thus wealth can only be created through ownership
of assets the value of which rises faster than the value of work. But
in reality, when asset value rises faster than income from work, those
who do not own assets will fall behind into relative poverty. Thus
wealth creation through asset appreciation actually produces systemic
poverty. Real aggregate wealth, or the wealth of nations as Adam Smith
coined it, is created only from raising the value of work as expressed
through rising income from work done by the working population.
Neo-liberals betray Adam Smith, their ideology guru, by usurping
government's power to ensure labor of its fair share of market power,
by kicking government out of its regulatory role in maintaining a truly
free market, by keeping the value of work on par with the value of
assets.
There is no economic logic in reducing the monetary value of work by
placing a tax on it. Taxes should be derived exclusively from surplus
value, ie profits. When profit is taxed, it creates incentives for
management to allow wages to rise to avoid excess profit. Taxing
undervalued labor values as expressed in low income from work is
similar to taking food from the hungry and the undernourished. Not only
is it unjust, it is also uneconomic, since any arrangement that
increases poverty is bad economics. Falling value of work, a path to
systemic poverty, leads to perverse ways of creating wealth, through
finance manipulation to generate financial bubbles camouflaged as
economic growth. This ideology of taxing the wholesome (work) to feed
the insalubrious (manipulation) is aptly expressed by the chairman of
the US Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, when he proclaims that it is
better to create wealth by thinking than working, in defense of
neo-liberal globalization that ships underpaying US jobs overseas to
still more underpaid workers. Such economic growth produces no
additional real wealth, and in fact reduces global aggregate wealth by
universally reducing the value of work, leading to the unsustainable
phenomenon of consumption supported by debt, primarily because work is
universally underpaid. This system of tax on work burdens unfairly
those already struggling hardest to make ends meet because of a
systemic undervaluing of their work. When work is taxed and thinking is
not, wealth can only be created with financial bubbles because all who
are able will avoid work. Yet ultimately, work is what produces the
goods and services that wealth commands. Thinking not backed by
adequate work, coupled with overpaying thinking and underpaying work,
eventually leads to an erosion of the purchasing power of money.
Yet mainstream economic policy debate rarely acknowledges this
fundamental perversity. For all the partisan polemics and
chest-thumping about radical tax reform, there is little debate on why
the federal tax burden should mainly fall on workers. Conservatives
have a point in arguing for letting taxpayers keep more of what they
earn, but they adamantly oppose taxation on unearned gains arising from
the mere ownership of capital, land and other natural resources and
intellectual-property monopolies, the high value of which are all
derivatives of dysfunctionally low wages. The US capital-gain tax is a
revenue sieve with a hole large enough for truckloads of gold to pass
through undetected since much wealth nowadays is created by
manipulating debt, involving no capital at all.
Accounting for an ethical society
It is useful to realize that the problem with the US Social Security
system is not an economic issue. It is a political/ethical issue with a
financial dimension. The economics of Social Security remains
structurally sound. The problem is one of irrational and dishonest
financial accounting. It is an ethical verity that a civilized society
should assume responsibility for providing institutional guarantee for
its elderly citizens' financial needs after retirement, particularly if
retirement is made mandatory by the socio-economic system. In a sense,
Social Security is inseparable from US national security, because
social stability is a key component of national security. If Social
Security is viewed as part and partial of national security, then
privatization becomes as ridiculous a notion as privatizing the
Department of Defense - which, incidentally, is also occurring with
deliberate speed.
On November 11, 1999, the 80th anniversary of the World War I
armistice, Milton Friedman, the leading guru of the Chicago School
monetarists, published an op-ed piece in The New York Times titled
"Social Security chimeras" in which he pointed out, correctly, that the
Social Security trust funds and projected shortfalls and all the sturm
und drang noise surrounding them are, in fact, mere accounting
issues. He pointed out that, in real economic terms, it doesn't matter
whether Americans save or not, whether there's a shortfall or not,
points that most economists understand and agree. It is merely an
accounting problem.
As Fed chairman Greenspan recently and repeatedly told Congress,
funding Social Security benefits with cash is not a problem. The
problem is maintaining the purchasing power of the cash. But the
purchasing power of money is a systemic monetary issue, and not an
accounting issue of any particular social program. Money enjoys more
purchasing power when more goods and service are produced by work and
work is created by strong demand for goods and services. What Greenspan
did not say was that such strong demand comes only from high wages and
full employment.
Friedman went on to argue that gradual, partial privatization of Social
Security is unnecessary, since gradualist solutions are premised on
attempts to "preserve" what amount to fictional balances anyway. But
then, following his subjective ideology rather than his objective
analytical mind, Friedman proposed what is in essence an ideological
solution, one that is antisocial, as are most of his ideological
positions in essence, crossing over from his respected role as a
competent economist to the dubious role of a bungling political
philosopher. Why not, he concluded, go all the way? Full, complete
privatization right now. Let every citizen swim or sink in the market,
where those not thoroughly initiated in its esoteric ways have as much
a chance of survival as babes in a forest of dangerous beasts. What
about today's Social Security recipients? Give them a check
representing the present value of their promised benefits and wash our
hands of them.
But Friedman did not explain why, if the shortfalls are mere accounting
problems (which they are), why Social Security has a problem in the
first place. Why not drop the whole argument and reaffirm our social
commitment to a decent public pension system for all citizens, along
with universal health care, the privatization of all of which is
ruining many families? This question is particularly pertinent in a
situation of underutilized overcapacity due to inadequate aggregate
demand.
Faith and inefficiency
There is a fallacy about the magic of privatization. It is based on an
unjustified faith in the market's unerring ability to generate wealth
and growth and, more important, in the market's ability to channel such
wealth fairly and to parties most in need for the good of the nation
and society. Increasingly, markets are transfer mechanisms of wealth
rather than creators of wealth, merely taking wealth from underpaid
workers and handing it over to overpaid speculators. The fact is that
markets have also been known to be generators of losses and economic
contraction, as demonstrated by the crashes of 1901 (45% drop), 1906
(48%), 1916 (40%), 1929 (47%), 1930 (86%), 1937 (49%), 1939 (40%), 1968
(46%), 1973 (46%), 1987 (23%) 1998 (36%) and 2000 (37%). The data
suggest that even exempting the big crash of 1929-30 in which the
market lost nearly 90% of its peak value, the average crash can
routinely lose 40% of its peak value. Such losses are often not borne
by speculators, who can profit in both rising and falling markets, but
mostly by the general investing public, whose portfolios are usually
not hedged against systemwide declines. And even in cycles of growth,
the market has a tendency to channel wealth to those who already have
substantial wealth and least need more. The average investor seldom
benefits fully even from a rising bull market.
In this era of instant electronic transactions and computerized program
trading, eliminating market "inefficiencies", more than risk
commensuration, produces most of the profits on Wall Street.
Theoretically, under free-market principles, it should be unnecessary
to have to choose the smart investment because all instruments are
"priced" the Hayekian way to make return on investment come out equal
in the long run, risk being always fairly compensated for with
commensurate returns. When they do not come out equal, the situations
are called market inefficiencies, which are in fact disjointed minor
market failures. So, by definition, all opportunities for profit reside
exclusively on correcting market inefficiencies and reducing risk by
socializing it. This is what justifies the existence and proliferation
of hedge funds and derivatives. They make the market more efficient and
are richly compensated for it.
With increasing sophistication and complexity of new marketable
financial instruments, be they securitized debt or equity or
derivatives, the astute and legally qualified risk takers have a
distinct advantage over the unaware and unqualified general public.
This advantage constitutes a massive, systemic transfer of wealth to
those who are rich enough to qualify for high-net-worth entrance
requirements of hedge funds and private equity markets to a game of
taking technical risks that are really not risky because of
sophisticated hedging, to reap enviable and often obscene gains of up
to 40% on investment. This systemic market transfer of wealth to the
rich is greater than any government social-entitlement transfer to the
poor. That is how millionaires are made into billionaires in the
market, not by luck, not by skill, but by membership in the private
club of the rich in what investment bankers call the private-equity
sector. It is a blatant institutionalization of the "rich get richer"
syndrome. It is the new feudalism.
Yet unlike the old feudal lords who provided order and security, or
inventors or captains of industry who actually performed some positive
economic function, these groups of the financially astute contribute
not at all to economic production, only to financial expansion, a
euphemism for finance-induced economic bubbles. The sad part is that in
the US, this market is attracting the best and brightest of the
nation's young minds, who are individually moral and ethical, but
collectively are pushed by the system into the role of terrifying
horsemen of financial apocalypse. They destroy because the name of the
game is "creative destruction" and the highest reward goes to the one
who destroys the most - jobs, companies, even whole industries. It is
as if firemen were to get a handsome bonus several hundredfold of their
salary every time they put out a fire, and if it were not illegal to
start a controlled fire, all firemen would double as controlled
arsonists. Controlled arson can be rationalized as economically
expansionist, as it leads to constant rebuilding when it is most
profitable, albeit not always where it is most needed by society. But
then Margaret Thatcher insisted that there is no such thing as society.
This is the equivalent of what Wall Street traders do, in equity,
debts, commodities, currencies, even weather derivatives. Whenever they
can, they purposely create market inefficiencies in order to capture
profit by removing the very "inefficiencies" they created. Citigroup,
the world's largest financial-services company, is being investigated
by German prosecutors and the Financial Services Authority for a
manipulative multibillion-euro trade in euro-zone government bonds last
August when it sold and then bought billions of euros' worth of debt in
quick succession, making millions of euros in profit. According to news
reports, a Citibank internal memo dated July 20 explained how the bank
could "very profitably" destabilize the market.
The current normal daily volatility of stock prices represents ongoing
examples of these manipulated inefficiencies. A whole science of
technical analysis of market movements has grown up around the
phenomenon. Others are less directly visible, such as the inverted
interest-rate curves reflecting abnormal lower rates for longer terms
that generally signals recessions ahead. It is a short-term
inefficiency in the credit market imposed by Federal Reserve
interest-rate policy. The Fed controls the supply of money but the
market determines the growth of debt. As yields stay low, investors are
pushed to seek higher yields by taking more risk, buying debts with low
credit ratings. Since 2003, the Fed has been raising the Fed Funds Rate
at a "measured pace", but the debt market has continued to expand, with
yields on both sovereign and corporate bonds declining. Low-rated bonds
now make up 20% of the outstanding supply of speculative bonds, more
than twice the 1998 level when the Asian financial crisis and the
Russian default abruptly ended the debt bubble. Consumer spending has
been largely supported not by income, but by home-equity loans,
particularly cash-out refinancing, at below-inflation interest rates.
The current Social Security proposals in the United States only
highlight these pervasive manipulations that have gone on for a decade.
Ironically, the Social Security privatization proposals are really
sub-optimization measures, because, like the debacle of Long Term
Capital Management (LTCM) that almost led to a massive collapse of the
market, which required Federal Reserve intervention to prevent, when
massive Social Security funds go into the equity market, it will be
deemed too big to fail even if the market turns against it. So there is
an anticipated implicit guarantee by the US Treasury/Federal Reserve
that with Social Security funds in it, the market will not be allowed
to crash, which is why Wall Street will embrace privatization proposals
with open arms. It is a game where profits are privatized, and losses
are socialized. In that sense, the US economy is already
half-socialistic: the loss half. The question is: when is it going to
socialize the profit half for balance?
The most significant factor of the booming war economy in the US during
World War II was that about 10 million able and productive men, 25% of
the workforce, were taken out of economically productive work and had
to be supported at a high level of military consumption. In fact,
another way of looking at it is that these soldiers were assigned the
job of consumption. The lesson is that by a deliberate collective
effort, an enormous expansion of production was effectuated through a
planned war economy of full employment for a reduced pool of workers.
Ironically, the new high-tech wars of today of minimizing manpower will
reduce even the economic bonus of war on employment and the
effectiveness of war as an anti-depression economic measure.
With a policy of full employment and rising wages, there is no reason
the US economy cannot support its expanding population of retirees at a
decent living level of consumption even with a shrinking pool of
workers. Changing demographics, while factual, is not the cause of the
problem in Social Security. Faulty ideology is. Young workers should be
reminded that it is their parents' retirement consumption that will
allow them to keep their own jobs with high pay.
Evolution of taxation
The first permanent US corporate income tax was enacted in 1909, four
years before the introduction of the modern version of the personal
income tax. The initial rate was 1% of net income. Both revenue and
rate increased steadily until 1943, when it peaked at 7.1% of gross
domestic product (GDP). But corporate income taxes have contributed a
declining portion of federal revenue over the past six decades. This
decline has been made up by the increasing share of revenue from
social-insurance contributions, primarily the Social Security payroll
tax. In 1943, corporate taxes comprised 39.8% of total federal
revenues; social-insurance contributions contributed 12.7%. By 1996,
the situation was nearly reversed; social-insurance contributions
provided 35.1% of federal revenues, while corporate income taxes
provided 11.8%. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced corporate income tax
from 46% to 34%, well below the 42% average rate of developed countries
in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. In the US,
state corporate tax rates made up most of the difference.
The US economy grew faster than OECD economies, but the income of the
lower quartile in the US declined in the past six decades. US
prosperity had been paid for by making the poor poorer in the US and
around the world. The US corporate tax rate stayed at 34% until the
Clinton administration's first budget raised it to 35%. Meanwhile, with
neo-liberal globalization promoted by Third Way politicians such as
Bill Clinton and Tony Blair, tax competition among developed economies
was driving worldwide corporate tax rates toward a downward spiral in a
race toward the bottom, leaving the tax burden mainly on the working
poor everywhere. Together with the race-to-the-bottom effect on wages
from cross-border wage arbitrage, the global downward spiral of
corporate tax rates causes a decline in government revenue and distress
in government fiscal budgets, creating temptation for selling off
public assets in a massive wave.
By 1994, the United States' 35% corporate tax rate was above the
average OECD statutory rate of 29%. That meant that US-based
trans-nationals would keep their profits overseas and save 6% in tax
liabilities. In 1994, US corporate tax revenues amounted to just 2.5%
of US GDP, a sharp drop from its 7.1% peak in 1943. The Tax Reform Act
of 1986 eliminated many corporate tax preferences, including the
investment tax credit enacted during the administration of president
John Kennedy. However, preferential tax treatment is still provided for
expenditures on research and development.
But while the creation of intellectual property is financed by tax
deductions, the consuming public is not given any break on exorbitant
patent royalties. This injustice is most glaring in the US drug sector,
where high costs of drugs have driven many elderly patients into
financial distress, drugs that their own tax dollars helped create
earlier.
The payroll taxes that finance Social Security and Medicare are levied
at a flat rate. For Social Security, the tax is 12.4%, half of which is
remitted by workers and half by their employers. For Medicare hospital
insurance, the tax is 2.9% divided equally between workers and
employers. Workers earning more than the $90,000 threshold in 2005 will
pay no Social Security tax on amounts over that, but the ceiling does
not apply to the Medicare portion of the payroll tax.
The Social Security tax is highly regressive. Those earning $10 million
a year pay the same Social Security tax as workers earning up to
$90,000, and the rich receive a greater share of their income from
investment earnings that are not subject to the payroll tax. And the
person with a $10 million retirement nest egg receives the same benefit
payment as the person with no nest egg.
Arguments for and against progressive taxation generally focus on
income taxes, which can be easily manipulated to shift burdens among
households with different levels and types of income. Advocates of
progressive schedules argue that families should be taxed according to
their ability to pay. The ability-to-pay principle states that each
dollar paid in tax is a greater sacrifice for a poor family than a
wealthy one, so the wealthy should pay a higher percentage to equalize
the sacrifice. Moreover, a progressive income tax is needed to
counteract the effects of the other flat federal taxes that weigh more
heavily on the poor. The poor pay most of their taxes in payroll taxes,
thus income-tax reform has little real meaning to the poor.
Many economists also argue for progressive scheduling as a way to
counteract the increasingly structural inequality distribution of
income in the US economy. The share of income received by the top
quintile increased from 47% to 51% of all income in the US over the
1977-90 period, while the share going to everyone below declined.
One-fifth of the working population commanded more than half of the
income in the economy. Take-home wages have been declining as a share
of total personal income, to a historical low of only 55%, because the
cost of benefits, particularly health care, and payroll taxes have
taken larger shares of total income of workers. Higher-income families
also increased their real incomes substantially over this period, while
families in the bottom 40% of the income distribution saw their incomes
decline in real terms. In other words, those with the lowest incomes
not only received an increasingly small share of the total income
relative to the wealthy over this period, but the purchasing power of
their incomes declined as well.
According to the "ability-to-pay argument", the dramatic increase in
income inequality in the US in recent years indicates a need for more
progressive tax scheduling, because the rich have become more able to
pay relative to the poor. According to this argument, if "the problem
is flat wages, then the solution is not flat taxes". Compliance rates
are highest for wage and salary income, because these taxes are
withheld by employers and forwarded directly to the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). On the other hand, compliance rates for self-employment,
partnership, and sub-chapter S corporation income, which are not
subject to withholding or reporting requirements, are estimated to be
below 50% due to difficulty and complexity of audit. Because companies
can deduct interest payments, the US tax code is strongly skewed toward
encouraging firms to raise funds through the issuance of debt rather
than equity. The tax-paying general public is in effect subsidizing
corporate debt.
Another issue related to corporate taxation is the wide variation in
tax liability from industry to industry. The effective tax rates in the
oil, gas, and mineral-extraction industries, for example, are much
lower than the rate for corporate investments generally. The commercial
real-estate boom of the mid-1980s and subsequent bust was largely the
result of preferential tax treatment. One of the main causes of the
1987 crash as explained by tax economists was a threat by the House
Ways and Means Committee to eliminate the tax deduction for interest
expenses incurred in leverage buyouts. These tax variations can be
inefficient from a societal perspective, even though they were intended
to address specific needs, because the resources used to build unneeded
office space, drill dry holes in the ground, and merge companies to lay
off workers could have been used more productively. The Tax Reform Act
of 1986 eliminated some of the provisions that led to these types of
distortions, but many still remain.
For the three-year period from 1996-98, Alcoa, the chief executive
officer of which, Paul O'Neill, was secretary of the Treasury briefly
under President George W Bush, paid an effective tax rate of only 15.9%
on $1.7 billion in profits - less than half the statutory rate of 35%.
A US worker making up to $58,100 is taxed at 15%, after which the rates
rises progressively to 35% for income over $319,100.
The outsourcing question
Despite widespread perception of massive job loss to low-wage
economies, there are no official figures on the total number of US jobs
that have gone overseas. Domestic plant closures to be relocated
overseas are no longer reported in the media as they are no longer
news. Last May, the Labor Department made its first-ever report on the
portion of "mass layoffs" attributable to "overseas relocation" of
factories, which showed that only 2.5% of major layoffs in the first
three months of 2004 were a result of outsourcing abroad. That survey
only covered companies that laid off 50 or more workers at one time for
30 days or longer, and so admittedly may not be representative of all
companies and all job loss.
Veteran Democratic economist Charles Schultze, senior fellow emeritus
at the Brookings Institution, former budget director under president
Lyndon Johnson in the 1960s, and former chairman of president Jimmy
Carter's Council of Economic Advisers in the late 1970s, noticing that
imports relative to the GDP had leveled off since 2000, concluded that
"there is nothing in the data to suggest that large increases in ...
offshoring could have played a major role in explaining America's job
performance in recent years", and that offshoring has had a relatively
modest impact on unemployment when compared with all the other economic
factors that create and destroy jobs in the normal cycles in the US
economy. But Schultze failed to point out that US GDP growth is caused
in no small way by a persistent capital account surplus that is
financing the massive US trade deficit. In other words, the US economy
is creating new jobs to replace those lost to overseas outsourcing by
borrowing from the low-wage workers overseas.
There is clear evidence that the US is trading low-paying jobs that it
ships overseas for new higher-paying jobs at home. This explains the
widening income disparity in the US economy and in the world economy.
Offshore outsourcing has contributed to the stagnant wages and
declining benefits in the US labor market.
Ben Bernanke, chairman of the economics department at Princeton
University and also a governor of the Federal Reserve, estimated that
over the past decade the US economy lost an overall total of about 15
million jobs each year for all kinds of reasons, while creating an
average of about 17 million new jobs each year. Of that 15 million
annual gross job loss, the portion due to outsourcing is less than 1%.
Bernanke cited a 2003 study by the Wall Street firm of Goldman, Sachs
& Co that estimated outsourcing abroad had averaged between 100,000
and 167,000 jobs per year since 2000. And he said offshoring would
remain a minor factor even if the figure grew larger. Of course the
study did not mention that by 2000, most of the manufacturing jobs that
could be relocated overseas had been relocated, with the US having lost
in essence the entire manufacturing sector.
When companies move some jobs abroad, the savings from low wages
stimulate job creation at home. Matthew Slaughter, a Dartmouth
economist, looked at foreign and domestic job growth in multinational
corporations from 1991 to 2001 and found foreign affiliates of US
companies added 2.9 million workers to their payrolls overseas, but at
the same time those companies added 5.5 million US employees at home to
their payrolls. And a study supervised by Lawrence Klein, a Nobel
laureate and professor emeritus at the University of Pennsylvania's
Wharton School of Business, and released by the private economic
consulting firm Global Insight last March, looked at outsourcing in the
information-technology (IT) sector and found that outsourcing generated
a net gain of 90,000 jobs during 2003, in both IT and non-IT sectors.
Notwithstanding such findings, the question of why US unemployment
stays so high remains unanswered. There are few job seekers in the
United States who will challenge the general feeling that the job
market has become increasingly gloomy, with wages low and benefits
meager if offered at all. Still, the Klein study found that the cost
savings of IT outsourcing lowered inflation throughout the US economy,
increased consumer spending, and "contributed significantly" to the
overall growth of US GDP. It claimed that by 2008, "real GDP is
expected to be $124 billion higher than it would be in an environment
in which offshore IT... outsourcing does not occur". Klein seemed
uninterested in which segment of the population would get the projected
additional GDP growth - surely not the workers whose jobs had been
outsourced.
Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry pointed out correctly
during his unsuccessful 2004 campaign that the US tax code creates an
incentive for US companies to move jobs overseas. He tried
unconvincingly to pin the fault on Bush. But tax experts know that the
incentive has been there for decades, embedded even in the first
version of the corporate income tax. The incentive exists because the
US has been taxing corporations at rates higher than most other
countries. This was possible before trade and finance globalization,
when the huge US market could only be tapped by operations within US
borders. Companies that wanted access to the huge US domestic market
had no choice but to pay high US corporate taxes. The fault of
tax-induced job loss lies with globalization, which the Clinton
administration did much to promote. It allows trans-national companies
to locate in low-tax regimes around the globe.
The Institute for International Economics reported that the effective
rate for US corporations was more than 30% in 2002, while Britain's
corporate rate was 18.2%, Mexico's 15.1%, China's 11.3%, and
Indonesia's a minuscule 0.2%. In tax havens such as Hong Kong, the
concept of residence has no applicability to Hong Kong tax law. Only
Hong Kong source income is subject to Hong Kong tax. For this reason,
Hong Kong is a suitable base from which to administer an offshore
company without tax consequence provided that the company does not do
business with other Hong Kong residents. This is one of the reasons the
use of offshore companies by Hong Kong residents has proliferated to
such a great extent. Offshore companies can conveniently have Hong
Kong-based directors, a Hong Kong bank account and a Hong Kong office
address without being brought into the Hong Kong tax net.
Most other countries of the world operate a residency-based tax system,
and care therefore needs to be taken to ensure that the offshore
company does not establish a permanent place of business within those
countries or is managed and controlled from those countries. For
example, an offshore company that had UK-based directors or that
established a place of business within the United Kingdom might become
liable to UK tax on its worldwide income. A Hong Kong company does not
have to state its registered office address or place of incorporation
on its letterhead. This would give the non-Hong Kong offshore company
the added respectability of a Hong Kong persona combined with the added
flexibility and ease of administration of an offshore company. There is
a capital duty of 0.6% and an annual fee of HK$75 (just under US$10).
There are no double tax treaties and no restrictions on dealings in
currencies. Bearer shares are not permitted, registration takes three
weeks, but shelf corporations are readily available.
The United States taxes US-based company earnings in other countries
only when profits are brought back to the US. That means profits that
remain overseas, perhaps invested in new factories in low-tax regimes,
never get taxed at the higher US rates. And that's been true through
both Democratic and Republican administrations. To fix the tax problem,
Kerry came up with a proposal to tax businesses on their foreign income
right away. Corporations would still get a credit for any taxes paid to
other countries, as they do now, but would no longer be able to defer
the US taxes indefinitely. At the same time, Kerry would have cut the
corporate tax rate by 1.75 percentage points, to a top corporate rate
of 33.25%. He also would have offered a one-year "tax holiday" to
businesses that repatriated earnings that had been parked overseas for
years, avoiding all US taxes. And he proposed a tax credit to companies
when their US hiring exceeded previous levels. But Kerry did not win
the election.
The Bush administration proposes giving US-based multinationals a
larger tax credit on their overseas income. Democrats argue that this
would only increase the incentive to move jobs overseas; the Bush
administration argues that it would help US firms compete globally with
foreign firms that avoid US taxes altogether. Yet companies argue that
the main reasons they locate plants in other countries are lower wages
and proximity to foreign markets, not taxes.
High US corporate tax rates discourage US companies from repatriating
foreign-earned profits and reinvesting them into the US economy. A
study produced by economists at JPMorgan Securities Inc estimates that
the promise of a temporary window of a 5.25% corporate tax rate on
overseas earnings could prompt US companies to bring home as much as
$300 billion in foreign-earned profits, now sitting offshore. Thus a
more equitable tax regime domestically, ie making corporations pay
their fair share of taxes, harms the US economy as a whole. In other
words, globalization forces the US economy to be a less equitable
system. To put it another way, domestic income disparity is explained
as a necessary condition for national survival in a competitive
international arena.
If allowed by the absence of government regulations, trade tends to
shift resources to industries where worker productivity relative to
wages is greatest and return on investment highest. The same goes for
technology. In the past, the limited and temporary dislocation caused
by import competition had been outweighed by lasting long-term benefits
that competition creates because superior imports forced complacent
domestic industries to shape up, as evident by the US auto industry in
the 1980s. Also, a substantial majority of US non-farm workers, about
85%, are employed in service industries, construction, and government,
sectors where import competition was minimal and restriction on
immigration and tradition of unionization foiled effective wage wars
among competing workers. To such workers, imports were unambiguous
blessings that spurred domestic innovation, expanded consumer choice,
and lowered consumer prices.
Even in the more tradable sector of manufacturing, import penetration
was low in most industries where domestic assembly was necessary. By
1994, however, 2.2 million US workers worked in manufacturing
industries with an import penetration of 30% or more, most in the
assembly of imported parts. Even so, workers in trade-sensitive
manufacturing industries accounted for only 12% of total manufacturing
workers and less than 2% of total non-farm workers. Technological
change and other non-trade factors account for most of the workers
displaced from their jobs each year. In the three-year period from 1995
through 1997, three-quarters of the 8 million US workers displaced from
their jobs were in sectors that by their nature are relatively
insulated from import competition. Only 23% were in manufacturing, and
2% in mining and agriculture.
But while the figures seem insignificant in national terms, job loss
was significantly concentrated in terms of location to affect economic
stability drastically in several regions, such as the rust belt in the
Midwest and miracle growth areas such as Silicon Valley. Surging
imports created demands in freight transportation, but hourly wages
fell 0.8% nationwide. Retail jobs increased but weekly wages in the
retail sector ($376), already 30% less than the national average, fell
more than 11% in 2004, while corporate profit rose by 20%.
But outsourcing is a new and fast-growing phenomenon and is rapidly
changing the dynamics of growth. With instant and low-cost
communication, non-import-related service jobs are being lost at
alarming rates in the name of a quest for productivity relative to
wages. US customers of domestic sales now place their orders with US
companies through employees halfway across the world for goods produced
in low-wage economies and often shipped directly from foreign soil. In
other words, jobs were going to offshore workers only because their
wages were lower, not because they were better workers. That is
rational only if the economic objective is to increase productivity
relative to wage levels. What if the economic objective is to increase
wages? The market will never by itself allow wages to increase unless
government policy forces it to do so. And each government cannot do so
within its own borders under a globalized regime of racing to the
bottom with regard to wage competition. Thus a global contagion of
failed statehood is in full swing in which governments are forced to
abdicate their responsibility to protect the wage level and job
security of their citizens, lest jobs would move to another country.
Sovereign governments have become comprador governments.
A two-year study by the United Nations' labor organization produced a
report that identified globalization as creating a growing divide
between rich and poor countries, as well as a growing divide within
every country. The report found that the current trading regime,
including the World Trade Organization, is failing to speed the growth
of global gross national product (GGNP), which is lagging behind the
economic performance of previous decades. Titled "A Fair
Globalization", the study was commissioned by the International Labor
Organization and prepared by 20 officials and experts, including Joseph
E Stiglitz, the newly reformed US economist who won the 2001 Nobel
Prize in economics (see Globalizing poverty, IMF style, November
16, 2002). The report found that 188 million willing and able workers
are unemployed worldwide, or 6.2% of the labor force; that the gap
between rich and poor nations has widened, with countries representing
14% of the world's population accounting for half the world's trade and
foreign investment; and that women have been harmed more than men by
globalization in the developing world. The report also said that
women's traditional livelihoods as subsistence farmers or small
producers have been undermined by foreign subsidized agriculture or
foreign imports but, as women, they face cultural barriers when looking
for alternative occupations. These are the economic manifestation of
failed statehood.
The gap between rich and poor has grown wider in rich countries as
well, such as Britain, Canada and the United States. The United States
posted the greatest gap between rich and poor, with the top 1% earning
17% of the gross income, "a level last seen in the 1920s". The report
says that globalization has also affected the rate of taxes collected
by countries. In the world's 30 wealthiest nations, the average level
of corporate tax fell from 37.6% in 1996 to 30.8% in 2003. These rich
nations may be rich but they are nevertheless infested with
failed-state syndrome with their widening wealth disparity. The report
argues that globalization is at a turning point and international
institutions need to address social inequities as well as other
consequences of open borders, which render sovereign states powerless
to protect their citizens from economic and financial exploitation,
both foreign and domestic.
During the seven years from 1995 through 2002, US manufacturing
employment fell by 11%. Globally, manufacturing jobs fell by 11%. China
lost 15% of its manufacturing jobs, and Brazil lost 20%. Globally,
manufacturing output rose by 30% during the same period. Technological
progress was the primary cause of the decrease in manufacturing jobs.
Yet wages have not risen to reflect the rise in productivity. Most of
the saving in wages for the same amount of production went to financing
the cost of capital goods and higher return on capital. US workers are
targeting the wrong enemy when they complain about Third World workers
taking their jobs. The real enemies are their own pension funds, whose
quest for high returns has kept global wages low and shipped US jobs
overseas, and their government's failed statehood.
That same principle applies when outsourcing serves as the engine for
not-so-creative destruction. Daniel W Drezner, assistant professor of
political science at the University of Chicago, defending outsourcing
in "The outsourcing bogeyman" (Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004), reports
that for every dollar spent on outsourcing to India, the US economy
reaps between $1.12 and $1.14 in financial benefits. US firms save
money on wages and become more profitable, benefiting shareholders and
increasing returns on investment. In the process, some US workers are
reallocated to more competitive, mostly better-paying jobs, albeit
seldom the same workers who were unfortunate enough to have lost their
jobs. They are left as collateral damage of creative destruction
concentrated in pockets of poverty in the land of milk and honey.
On February 9, 2004, US presidential chief economic adviser N Gregory
Mankiw, who resigned just last month to return to his faculty post at
Harvard, released the annual Economic Report of the President, praising
offshoring of US service jobs as a "good thing". He told reporters that
"outsourcing is just a new way of doing international trade".
Government may try to protect you from incoming missiles, but don't
expect government to protect your job.
Globalization and instability
In the era of financial globalization, nations are faced with the
problem of protecting their economies from financial threats. The
recurring financial crises around the world in recent decades clearly
demonstrated that most governments have failed in this critical state
responsibility. The economic benefits associated with the unregulated
transfer of financial assets, such as cash, stocks and bonds, across
national borders are frequently not worth the risks, as has been amply
demonstrated in many countries whose economies have been ravaged by
external financial forces. Cross-border capital flows have become an
increasingly significant part of the globalized economy over recent
decades. The US depends on it to finance its huge and growing trade
deficit. More than $2.5 trillion of capital flowed around the world in
2004, with more than $1 trillion flowing into just the US. Different
types of capital flows, such as foreign direct investment, portfolio
investment, and bank lending, are driven by different investor
motivations and country characteristics, but one objective stands out
more than any other: capital seeks highest return through lowest wages.
The United States is not only losing jobs to lower-wage economies, the
inflow of capital also forces stagnant US wages to fall in relation to
rising asset values.
Countries that permit free capital flows must choose between the
stability provided by fixed exchange rates and the flexibility afforded
by an independent monetary policy to stimulate economic growth. In
countries with weak financial and legal institutions, poorly regulated
banking systems or high levels of corruption, capital inflows may not
be channeled to their most productive uses. One approach to limiting
the risks from excessive capital flows when legal and financial
institutions are inadequate is to restrict foreign capital inflows.
Even in the US, which claims to have a sound banking system, massive
capital inflow has caused overinvestment in telecommunication, Internet
start-ups and real estate.
Next: Failed statehood,
militarism and mercenaries |