The United
States as the World’s
Leading Currency
Manipulator
By
Henry C.K. Liu
This article appeared in AToL
on February 14, 2007
For decades, the US,
a self-professed evangelist for free trade, has been paranoid about
other
nations manipulating the exchange value of their currencies for trade
advantage
with counterproductive distortions in global free trade. Such
apprehension has even
been institutionalized into law.
Section 3004 of Public Law 100-418 (22 U.S.C. 5304)
requires, inter alia, the Secretary of the Treasury to analyze
twice-yearly the
exchange rate policies of foreign countries, in consultation with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and to consider whether countries
manipulate
the rate of exchange between their currency and the dollar for purposes
of
preventing effective balance of payments adjustment or gaining unfair
competitive advantage in international trade. Section 3004 further
requires
that if the Secretary considers such manipulation occurring in
countries, such
as Japan and China, that (1) have material global current account
surpluses;
and (2) have significant bilateral trade surpluses with the US, the
Secretary
of the Treasury shall take action to initiate negotiations with such
foreign
countries on an expedited basis, in the IMF or bilaterally, for the
purpose of ensuring
that such countries regularly and promptly adjust the rate of exchange
between
their currencies and the dollar to permit effective balance of payment
adjustments and to eliminate any unfair advantage.
Section 3005 (22 U.S.C. 5305) requires, inter alia, the
Secretary of the Treasury to provide each six months a report on
international
economic policy, including exchange rate policy. The reports are to
contain the
results of negotiations conducted pursuant to Section 3004. Each of
these
reports bears the title, Report to Congress on International Economic
and
Exchange Rate Policies.
Unfortunately, the underlying implication of the law assumes
erroneously that current account surpluses can be by themselves
evidence of
currency manipulation by the surplus countries. In fact, as trade
imbalances are the
structural effects of fundamentals in the terms of trade, attempts to
correct
them with exchange rate adjustments are by definition currency
manipulation, for they try to use exchange rates to mask dysfunctional
terms of trade as functional.
Exchange rate policies cannot be substitutes for structural
economic adjustments necessary for mutually beneficial trade between
two
economies. Nor can exchange rate policies be substitutes for sound
domestic
monetary or economic policy. When two economies of uneven stages
of
development trade, a trade surplus in favor of the less-developed
economy is
natural and just, until the less-developed economy catches up with the
more-developed one, otherwise it would be imperialistic exploitation,
not
trade.
A Protectionist
Nation in Free Trade Clothing
That the US, by its unilateral trade
policies, has really
been a nation of protectionists in free trader clothing is again
highlighted by
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affair hearing on
January
31, 2007, headed by its new chairman Senator Christopher J. Dodd
(Democrat-
Connecticut) whose party won control of the Congress in the 2006
mid-term
elections. The hearing was on the Treasury Department’s Report to
Congress on
International Economic and Exchange Rate Policy and the US-China
Strategic
Economic Dialogue. Hank Paulson, the 74th Treasury Secretary
of the nation
and the newly installed current Secretary in the Bush administration,
was the
lead witness.
The target of the hearing is China
which has replaced Japan
in recent years in the eyes of the US
as prime suspect of being the world’s leading currency manipulator. Yet as Stanford economist Ronald McKinnon
argues in an April 24, 2006
op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal, China’s
motivation for pegging the renminbi (RMB) is to secure monetary
stability
rather than achieve an undue mercantile advantage in world export
markets. He
points out that persistent Chinese trade surpluses and US
trade deficits reflect mismatches in saving in China
and the US,
an
imbalance that exchange rate changes can only mask but cannot correct. McKinnon concludes that “China
is not a currency manipulator and the yuan/dollar rate is best left
more or
less where it is.”
The twice-yearly high-level US-China Strategic Economic
Dialogue is a brain child of the new Treasury secretary.
The first meeting, headed on the US side by
Secretary Paulson, with the participation of Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Ben
Bernanke and several other cabinet secretaries, and on the China side
by State
Counselor Wu Yi, supported by Chinese counterparts of US officials, was
held in
Beijing last December, with the second meeting scheduled to take place
in
Washington in May.
The Senate Banking Committee, pursuant to statute, twice-yearly
receives exchange rate reports from the Treasury, taking testimony from
the sitting
Treasury Secretary, and exercises oversight on government exchange rate
policy
which has become of critical concern for US businesses and workers who
seek “a
level playing field” to compete in global markets. The Treasury Report
is the
only report to the Congress that directly addresses international
economics,
exchange rate policy, and currency manipulation by other national
governments.
Testimony from the Treasury Secretary to Congress, if requested, is
required by
law.
In his opening statement as Committee Chairman at the hearing, Senator
Dodd
expressed dissatisfaction with US
government policy for its “inability to secure opportunity and
prosperity for
working Americans.” Policies put in place by the Bush Administration
well before
the appointment of Secretary Paulson have turned record surpluses left
by the
Clinton Administration into record deficits, leading to
under-investment in
important national priorities, such as health care, schools,
infrastructure and
targeted tax relief for threatened businesses and struggling working
families
even as the nation fell deeper in debt, while producing growth only to
select economic
sectors such as financial services and prosperity only to the rich
segment of
the population. Median family income has
declined by nearly $1,300 over recent years as income disparity widens.
More
than 3 million manufacturing jobs have been lost since 2001, the
steepest and
most prolonged loss since the Great Depression. This is the first
economic
recovery in which manufacturing jobs lost have not returned. The
Senator decried
the fact that “for millions of Americans, the recession has not ended,
but goes
on and on” for more than seven years. The
statement was a fair summation of neo-populist sentiments against the
adverse
domestic effects of two decades of globalization.
Yet the Democrat senator is only half right. While US
workers have lost jobs, the US
economy has not really lost these jobs, only relocated them. The US
economy has merely expanded globally and moved jobs overseas to take
advantage
of low-wage workers in the employ of US
capital, in what economists call cross-border wage arbitrage. Economic
imperialism in the age of industrial capitalism provided employment at
the core
to produce exports to the colonies to earn gold for the home economy.
Neo-imperialism
in the age of finance capitalism relocates jobs to the periphery and
imports
products manufactured by low-wage labor paid for with fiat currency
(paper
money) issued at the core, the surplus of which can only be
reinvestment in the
issuing economy. Dollar hegemony emerged as the dollar, a fiat currency
since 1971
when President Nixon took it off gold, continues to assume to role of
prime
reserve currency for international trade, anchored by transactions in
key
commodities such as oil being denominated in dollars. US
neo-imperialism is intermediated financially by dollar hegemony.
A Selective Level
Playing Field
Cross-border wage arbitrage is a subset of financial
arbitrage in which investments are made in low-cost countries to
produce goods
for sale in high income countries. Interest rate arbitrage is another
subset in
which funds are borrowed in low-interest currencies to lend in
high-interest
currencies, a routine transaction known as “carry trade” in
international banking
parlance. The complaints about cross-border wage arbitrage by the US,
a clear beneficiary of global finance arbitrage, amount to blatant
selectivity
in its professed commitment for a “level playing filed.”
What Senator Dodd leaves unspoken is that the old slogan
“what’s good for General Motors is good for America”
has been made inoperative by US-engineered financial globalization. For
US
companies to compete and survive in global markets and to attract
global
capital, jobs need to be shifted to low-wage locations overseas to
reduce labor
cost. Instead of foreign governments, such as China’s,
being wrongly accused of manipulating the exchange value of their
currencies, US
big business should be recognized as the real culprit that manipulates
global
labor markets to gain unfair advantage over labor, both foreign and
domestic. This
is a problem that a labor-friendly US
government can readily solve, by passing labor regulations that reduce
financial incentives for companies to layoff workers and outsource jobs
to
implement financial machination, as has been done in Germany.
Outside of slavery, capital and labor have
a symbiotic relationship
similar to a marriage. In California,
a divorce is settled with equal split of property held in marriage plus
lifetime alimony sufficient to maintain the non-income-producing spouse
in
his/her accustomed life style in marriage until remarriage. What is
needed is a
global level playing field between capital and labor where the closing
of
plants to reduce labor cost is subject to terms similar to an equitable
divorce
settlement to provide unemployed workers equitable compensation and
living income until re-employed.
National Security
Trumps Free Trade
Senator Dodd also raised nationalistic concerns by pointing
out that more than one million jobs outsourced have been in critical
defense-related industries, dislocating the US
manufacturing base and jeopardizing US
capacity to produce items vitally needed for US
national security. He gave the example of plants producing special
magnets used
in smart bombs relocating from Indiana
to China
which
could expose the US
military to interruption of critically needed supply in the event of
war. The
Senator calls for significant changes in trade regulations “to
adequately
secure America’s
future both economically and militarily.” This is of course a call for
national
security trumping free trade.
The military required not just exotic special magnets. It
required also mundane “dual-use” items such as uniform and boots which
are
mostly made in China
now. Still, such conditions are the results of US
“free trade” policy, not created unilaterally by China.
Economic nationalism is alive and well in the home of free trade in
sectors
that are threatened by free trade.
Exchange Rates are
determined by Exchange Rate Policies, not by markets
Reflecting popular misconception, the Senate Banking Committee focused
its
hearing on exchange rate policy with a flawed assumption that
market-determined
exchange rates would solve the problem of US
trade deficits. Yet market exchange rates are determined by government
interest
rate policies. And the very concept of a
government exchange rate policy is fundamentally opposed to the concept
of free
markets.
For the global marketplace to be truly free and fair, all currencies
must be equally subject to the impartial discipline of market forces.
Yet
despite neo-liberal rhetoric, no government today or even in history,
particularly the US
government, leaves the exchange rate of its currency to market forces.
In
reality, market forces anticipate and respond to government tax and
trade
policies as well as central bank deliberations on interest rate moves.
The differences among the exchange rate policies of
different governments reflect the differences in each country’s
economic, financial
and monetary conditions as well as political ideology, social structure
and
societal values, but all governments manipulate the currency market to
sustain
the exchange rates of their currencies at levels best suited to their
separate national
needs.
The US
maintains an Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) which
is money
available to the US Treasury primarily for participating in the
foreign-exchange market to maintain currency stability. It holds US
dollars,
foreign currencies and IMF special drawing rights to intervene in the
foreign exchange
market to influence exchange rates, outside the domain of the central
bank,
without affecting the domestic money supply.
History of Exchange
Rates and Currency Stabilization
After WWII, as the US
emerged as the only country the industrial sector of which had been
left not
only undamaged but actually strengthened by war, the dollar by default
became
the uncontested world reserve currency for international trade.
As early
as April 1942, the so-called White plan, named after Harry Dexter
White, US
Treasury Undersecretary and a student of free trade advocate Professor
Frank W.
Taussig of Harvard, proposed a United Nations Stabilization Fund and a
Bank for
Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated Nations. The advantages of stable exchange
rates that
the automatic classical gold standard had provided while it lasted from
1876 to
1914, had proved to be not so automatic after WWI. Classical gold
standard was
causing deflation around that world that translated into a worldwide
depression
while mercantilism, the quest by nations for gold through exporting,
was
causing protectionist reaction in all countries.
The idea of the need for international cooperation in trade and for a
new “gold
exchange standard” which would make wider use of gold by supplementing
it with
an anchor currency that would be readily convertible into gold had been
developed in the 1920 international conference in Genoa, Italy, but the
participating governments failed to reach agreement on account not all
were
ready to accept British sterling hegemony. This idea was incorporated
two and a
half decades later into the Bretton Woods regime with a gold-backed
dollar
replacing the British pound. The challenge was to devise an operative
international finance architecture out of fiat currencies anchored to a
gold-backed dollar to accommodate post-war international trade.
One crucial difference between the US
plan by White and the British plan by John Maynard Keynes was that the
Stabilization
Fund (SF) proposed by the US
was to be based on a mixed bag of national currencies, while the
Clearing Union
(CU) proposed by Britain
was to operate with a new international currency to be known as bancor.
The CU also had less strict rules than did the SF for its use by
countries with
balance-of-payments deficits. Unlike now whereas the US is the
world’s
largest debtor nation, the US then, as the world only creditor nation,
was
concerned about the potential financial exposure of the US to bad
credit
worldwide and about preserving the rights of creditor countries with
balance-of-payments surpluses. The US
team voiced serious reservations about the British/Keynes plan, which
had
liberal liquidity provisions and ready access to liquidity for
countries with
temporary trade deficits that would encourage moral hazard. Britain
anticipated huge war-time deficits as revenue from many parts of the British
Empire was suddenly interrupted.
The IMF, dominated by US voting power, closely followed the
US/White plan for a contributory fund, although it was slightly larger,
at $8.8
billion ($77 billion in 2004 dollar or $463 billion in relative share
of GDP),
of which the USA put in $2.75 billion ($24 billion in 2004 dollar or
$145 billion
in relative share of GDP), and the UK contributed $1.3 billion.
Exchange
rates could fluctuate 1% on either side of a par value with the dollar.
The
fund was designed to provide members with a cushion of credit to give
them the
confidence to abandon exchange and trade controls while keeping their
exchange
rate stable in relation to the dollars. It did not deal with how the
transition
from war through reconstruction to recovery was to be achieved, but
certainly
not by cross-border finance. The IMF was specifically not to lend for
relief or
reconstruction arising from the war. Article XIV allowed members to
keep exchange
controls for three to five years, after which they had to report
annually on
why controls still remained. This left open the absolute deadline for
abandoning exchange controls or trade restrictions, and in fact they
were not
abandoned for current account purposes until 1958. The UK
only abandoned its final controls on cross-border capital flows in 1979.
In addition, the US/White plan contemplated the forbiddance of exchange
rate
intervention, an important feature for the US, whereas the
British/Keynes plan
did not put much emphasis on limits on exchange rate intervention and
even
advocated the use of capital controls for the weaker economies, of
which
Britain expected to become one in the course of the war. Britain
imposed exchange control soon after the war began and kept it for four
decades
until the new Conservative government abolished exchange control in
1979.
The pre-1979 controls on direct investment restricted sterling-financed
foreign
investment except where it had a positive effect on the balance of
payments.
With respect to portfolio investment, the controls stipulated that
purchase by UK
residents of foreign exchange to invest overseas could be made only
from the
sale of existing foreign securities or from foreign currency
borrowing. A
third element of the controls restricted the holding by UK
residents of foreign currency deposits as well as sterling lending to
overseas
residents. Cross-border flow of funds was not considered as desirable
or
necessary for domestic economic growth, if not an outright threat.
China not a Currency
Manipulator
The Treasury’s Report on International Economic and Exchange
Rate Policy, required by law to examine whether any US trading partners
are
manipulating their currencies to gain unfair trade advantage, has
determined in
its 2006 findings that China does not so manipulate its currency.
Still, congressional
and media allegations persist that China’s continued resistance to US
calls to allow
its currency to rise in order to reduce trade imbalances with the US
has distorting
effects on global markets and detrimental effects on US companies and
workers. Such
allegations are misplaced, not supported by either fact or theory. The
distortions
have been created by US trade and monetary policies and their effects
on the exchange
value of the dollar, rather than by China which has pegged its RMB yuan
to the
dollar at 8.28 yuan to a dollar within a narrow band of 0.03% for a
decade, from
1995-2005, at times above and at other times below market trends.
On July 21, 2005,
after repeated pronouncements that no revaluation was economically
justifiable
or even being officially considered, China
announced a surprise 2% appreciation of its currency, putting it at
8.11 yuan
to the dollar. It also announced that the yuan would henceforth be
pegged with
the same narrow range to a basket of foreign currencies that includes
the
dollar, the euro, the yen and others likely to reflect China’s
trade relationships with the rest of the world. The components and
weight of
different currencies within the basket are not disclosed to the market.
China
appears to be following Singapore’s
managed-float model, keeping both weights and effective bands
confidential to
allow maximum flexibility within a narrow range tied to a reference peg
to the
dollar. Many saw it as an obvious diplomatic move to appease misguided US
pressure.
Manipulation involves willful, proactive volatile changes to
profit from temporary technical market trends against market
fundamentals. A
stable exchange rate cannot be labeled as manipulative any more than a
driver traveling
at constant legal speed for long periods apace with the police car next
to it
can suddenly be accused of speeding merely because the police car slows
down
from loss of power.
Senator Dodd cites anonymous “credible analysts” who allegedly
identify the undervaluation of the RMB by 15 to 40 percent as “a very
significant cause” of the loss of jobs in the US
to outsourcing. By extension, in order for the US
to cure its trade problems that its own permissive monetary and
anti-labor policies
have created, China
must revalue its currency upward by up to 40%, not because the market
demands
it, but because the US
needs it to reduce its trade deficits.
What the US
is
doing is asking China
to pay for its own policy errors.
But the Dodd Committee needs to understand that such a cure
would be worse than the malady, as it will cause dollar inflation to
skyrocket
in the import-dependant US
economy, bringing dollar interest rates up with it, and pushing the
debt-infested
goldilocks US
economy into sharp recession. After all, China
alone, at substantial cost to its own economy, kept the yuan’s peg to
the
dollar all through the decade-long Asian financial crisis that began in
July
1997, when all other Asian currencies devalued in quick order in a
frenzied
rush to the bottom.
At both the House Ways and Means Committee
and the Senate
Finance Committee February 6 hearings on the Bush Administration’s $2.9
trillion fiscal 2008 budget, Paulson again asserted that the US has
reached a
“crossover” point in its trade with China, with exports to China rising
at a
faster rate than imports from China. China trade has remained a
sensitive topic
with Congressional members who, face with pressured from constituents
over jobs
lost to outsourcing overseas, are pushing Paulson for action to force
China to
revalue its currency. Yet the only sustainable way to increase US
export to China
is to raise Chinese wages to increase Chinese consumer demand, not by
forcing China
to revalue its currency upward. Currency revaluation will only produce
monetary
instability that will cause deflation in the Chinese domestic market,
thus
dampening demand for imports from the US.
Paulson defends the
Yen and criticizes the Yuan
Testifying before the all powerful House Ways and Means
Committee, Paulson defended the recent fall of the Japanese yen against
the
euro, claiming the US Treasury saw no evidence that Japanese
authorities have
intervened in currency markets since 2004 to manipulate the value of
the yen. European officials have been
unhappy about
the weak yen because it makes EU exports more expensive and less
competitive in
Japan
and in
Asian markets where the yen is a significant benchmark. “Some people
might not
like where it’s trading, but it’s my job to support and fight for free
competitive markets, and I believe that the yen is trading in a
competitive
marketplace based upon underlying economic fundamentals,” Paulson said.
The fact remains that the exchange rates of a currency is fundamentally
affected by the interest rate set by its central bank. Whether such
intervention is manipulation is a matter of perspective.
European ministers, particularly German Finance Minister
Peer Steinbrueck, are of the opinion that the Japanese yen is
undervalued as a
result of Japanese monetary policy and want the problem discussed at
the next G7
gathering on February 9. The mismatch between EU and Japanese monetary
policies
is caused by Germany’s
historical phobia on inflation, thus preventing euro interest rates to
reach
parity with near-zero yen interest rates. Low yen interest rate is
beneficial
to the EU and US
economies, allowing carry trade, a financial manipulation to borrow low
interest
currencies, such as the Japanese yen, to lend in high interest
currencies, such
as the dollar and the euro, to provide funds to finance investment the
high
interest economy, such as the EU and the US.
The trade-off from capital account surplus is payments imbalance from
trade.
A Currency Peg is not
immune to Market Forces
A currency peg with another currency is a unilateral regime.
It does not require permission from the government of the pegged
currency. A currency peg is not sacred or
inviolable,
nor is it a free lunch for the economy that adopts it. Any currency peg
can
broken by the market if the government that adopts it is unwilling or
unable to
bear the cost of sustaining it, as has happened to many currencies
around the
world, including the British pound’s peg to the German deutschmark
which was broken
by hedge fund speculator George Soros in 1992 with a spectacular profit
of over
$2 billion in a matter of days, draining the exchange reserves of the
Bank of
England and precipitating a collapse of Europe’s Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM).
The ERM was a multilateral fixed-exchange-rate regime
adopted in March 1979 as part of the European Monetary System (EMS), to
reduce
exchange rate volatility and to achieve monetary stability in Europe,
in preparation for the Economic and Monetary Union and the introduction
of a
single currency, the euro, on January
1, 1999. The ERM was established by the then European
Community to
keep member countries’ exchange rates within specific bands in relation
to one
another. The purpose of the ERM was to stabilize exchange rates,
control
inflation rates through a link with the strong and stable deutschmark,
and to nurture
intra-Europe trade. It was also designed to enhance European world
trade in
competition with the US,
creating a so-called United States of Europe and as a stepping stone to
a
single-currency regime in Europe.
Britain
joined the ERM in October 1990 at a fixed parity of 2.95 deutschmarks
to the
pound, an over-valued rate intended to put pressure upon the British
economy to
reduce inflation rather than institutionalizing international
competitiveness.
British pride might have played a role in insisting on a strong pound.
This
chosen rate, or any fixed rate required by ERM membership, proved
misguided,
because it tried to benefit from the effect of a single currency for
separate
economies without the reality of a single currency within an integrated
economy.
During the 23 months of ERM membership,
from October 1990 to
September 1992, Britain
suffered its worst recession in six decades, with the gross domestic
product
(GDP) shrinking by 3.86%, unemployment rose more than a third, by 1.2
million
to 2.85 million. The total price of ERM fixed exchange rate for the United
Kingdom had been estimated to be as
high as
13.3% of 1992 GDP. The number of residential mortgages with negative
equity
tripled, reaching a peak of 1.25 million, and company insolvency rose
above
25,000 a year.
The British government of John Major sought to balance
political and macroeconomic considerations, only to fail in its effort
to
support the unsupportable to prevent a devaluation of a freely traded
pound by
market forces. If the UK
had not lost some ₤8.2 billion defending the pound's unsustainable
exchange
rate, it could have avoided budget deficits, tax hikes, cuts in public
spending, and the unpopular value-added tax on fuel. Spending on the
National
Health Service could have been more than doubled for 12 months.
Withdrawing from the ERM released the UK
economy from persistent deflation and provided the foundation for the
non-inflationary growth subsequently experienced. It enabled monetary
policy to
be freed from the sole task of maintaining the exchange rate, thus
contributing
to economic expansion by a combination of rational monetary measures.
While ERM
countries were compelled to maintain relatively high real interest
rates to
prevent their currencies from falling outside the permitted bands, Britain
enjoyed the freedom to benefit from lower rates.
Hong Kong, with its freely
convertible currency pegged to the dollar, faced the same problems for
a whole
decade after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. After a decade-long
recession, Hong Kong’s economy finally
recovered with direct subsidy from China.
Its economy is now again booming from the ran-away liquidity effects of
the
dollar debt bubble created by the Greenspan Fed’s permissive monetary
policy of
low interest rates but will face another crisis when the U
economy faces the inevitable consequence. Waiting for an improved
economy
before de-pegging is like waiting for death to cure an infection, or
one more
high before cold turkey, a sure path to death by overdose.
The appropriate exchange rate of currencies at any
particular time is that which enables their economies to combine full
employment of productive resources, including labor, with a
simultaneous
balance-of-payment equilibrium. An excessively high exchange rate
causes trade
deficits and domestic unemployment, while a low one generates an
excessive
buildup of foreign-currency reserves and stimulates domestic
inflationary
pressures that lead to a bubble economy. Thus every nation with a
freely
convertible currency must retain the ability to adjust the external
values of
its currency in this unregulated global financial market and an
international
financial architecture based on dollar hegemony. To be fixated on a
fixed
exchange rate within rigid limits is to court economic disaster in the
current
international finance architecture of freely convertible currencies. This is the lesson why China
resist full convertibility of the RMB.
The ERM was a transitional regime whose problems were
finally removed once the EU moved toward a single currency in the form
of the
euro. Still, the anti-inflation bias of the European Central Bank
continues to
create conflict with monetary policy needs of national economies within
euroland. The current dispute surrounding the exchange rate of the yen
to the
euro is the result of interest rate disparity between the two
currencies, ictated by separate domestic monetary needs, not by market
fundamenatls.
In a fast-changing economic environment of unregulated
global markets, the value of the exchange rate that facilitates full
employment
and a foreign trade balance will frequently fluctuate. Speculative
volatility
must be countered and the exchange rate managed by the national bank to
prevent
disruption in the domestic economy and in external trade. However, this
does
not imply fixed, unchangeable bands as under the ERM. The optimum
strategy for
cooperation between national central banks on exchange rates requires a
combination of maximum short-term stability with maximum long-term
flexibility,
the opposite of the effects of fixed exchange rates.
Since, under ERM, Britain's
interest rate was pegged to that of Germany
through the fixed exchange rate, reduction in interest rates was not
available
to deal with increasing unemployment and declining growth in the UK.
The fact that Britain
had no control over interest rates, coupled with the questionable
independence
of the Bundesbank, Germany's
central bank, was an important factor in the final decision to withdraw
the
pound from the ERM fixed-exchange-rate regime.
The reunification of Germany cracked open the structural
flaw in the Exchange Rate Mechanism because massive capital injection
from West
to East Germany had produced inflationary pressure in the newly unified
in
German economy, leading to preemptive increases of interest rates by
the
Bundesbank. At the same time, other economies in Europe,
especially that in Britain,
were in recession and not prepared for interest-rate hikes dictated by Germany.
This interest-rate disparity magnified the overvaluation of the pound
in the
early 1990s.
Along with the European Currency Unit
(ECU, the forerunner
of the euro), the ERM was one of the foundation stones of economic and
monetary
union in Europe. It gave currencies a central
exchange
rate against the ECU, which in turn gave them central cross-rates
against one
another. It was hoped that the mechanism would help stabilize exchange
rates,
encourage trade within Europe and control
inflation. The
ERM gave national currencies an upper and lower limit on either side of
this
central rate within which they could fluctuate.
In 1992, the ERM was torn apart when a number of currencies
could not keep within these limits without collapsing their economies.
On
Wednesday, September 16, a culmination of factors led Britain
to pull out of the ERM and to let the pound float according to market
forces.
Black Wednesday became the day on which George Soros, hedge-fund titan,
broke
the Bank of England, pocketing US$1 billion of profit in one day and
more than
$2 billion eventually. The British pound was forced to leave the ERM
after the
Bank of England spent $40 billion in an unsuccessful effort to defend
the
currency's fixed value against speculative attack. The Italian lira
also left
and the Spanish peseta was devaluated.
In order to curb German inflation, an increase in German
interest rates was necessary, but if the Bundesbank were completely
independent
of German political-economic interests as a dominant regional central
bank, it
would not have adopted this policy, as there were cries from all over Europe
for a decrease in interest rates. By adopting tight monetary policies
in
response to domestic inflationary pressures that followed German
reunification
in 1990, German short-term interest rates, which had been rising since
1988,
continued to rise, reaching nearly 10 percent by the summer of 1992.
So, at a
time when Britain
needed a counter-cyclical reduction in interest rates, the Bundesbank
sent the
interest rate upwards, plunging Britain
deeper into recession through the ERM. This kind of cyclical conflict
is likely
to surface regularly between China,
the US,
Japan
and the EU once the Chinese yuan is freely convertible.
This was the fundamental problem with the ERM—fixed exchange
rates conflicted with the interest-rate levels needed by different
economic
conditions in separate member economies. The British interest rate
pegged to
that set by the Bundesbank was crippling the British economy because
the UK
was in a recession and required low interest rates.
Today, the foreign exchange value of the Japanese yen has
been pushed down by low yen interest rates which the Bank of Japan has
been
forced to maintain to keep the Japanese economy from falling into
deeper
recession.
The Pro and Con of
Full Convertibility
The key distinction between the Japanese yen and the Chinese
yuan is the degree of convertibility. EU officials point to low yen
interest
rates as the cause of the yen being undervalued and the US
points to the limited convertibility of the yuan as the cause of its
being undervalued.
It is true that the RMB’s limited convertibility allows China
to resist market assaults on its currency. Yet for an economy engaged
in
international trade, the fact that its currency is not freely
convertible is
not a free ride, as many experienced traders, including former Goldman
Sachs
chairman and current Treasury Secretary Paulson, have repeatedly
pointed out to
Chinese officials. Such currency control incurs a substantial economic
cost and
can only be sustained if the country in question can afford that cost
to
preserve monetary stability.
For economies where the currencies are freely convertible,
the cost can be massive attacks on their currencies by speculators,
such as
hedge funds, that would quickly drain the government’s foreign exchange
reserves and cause a collapse in the economy’s debt market. For
economies that
practice exchange and capital control, the penalty would be a drain in
foreign
reserves and a reduction in trade in the case of a deficit. In the case
of a
trade surplus, the penalty would be a drain of domestic currency
capital into
growing foreign exchange reserves.
For a limited convertibility currency, the cost of a fixed
exchange rate is absorbed internally within the domestic economy. On
the other
hand, a freely-convertible currency with a fixed exchange rate is
mixing
gasoline with fire as the British pound demonstrated in 1992. Yet a
freely
convertible currency with a low interest rate policy designed to
stimulate the
domestic economy will enhance a nation’s foreign trade competitiveness.
For the
case of US-China trade, a freely convertible RMB with a low interest
policy
will exacerbate US-China trade imbalance further against the US,
not moderate it in the long run.
In that sense, to say that a currency not freely convertible
and tied to a fixed exchange rate pegged to the dollar is unresponsive
to
market forces, let alone market manipulation, betrays a lack of
understanding
of how international trade is financed and intermediated in the global
economy.
Currency pegs are not immune to market forces; they only transmit the
effects
of market forces through difference economic channels. All governments
participate
in money markets to carry out monetary policy, buying and selling
government
securities to implement their interest rate policies, and in currency
markets
to sustain the desired levels of exchange rate. Nowadays
most central banks are not even
dominant market participants, having been edged out of center stage by
hedge
funds as major players that regularly move markets with notional values
in
hundreds of trillions of dollars.
US is the Head of the
Currency Manipulation Snake
Fundamentally, a currency peg is merely a different path to
the same monetary objective as the setting of the Fed Funds rate, with
the Fed
Open Market Committee buying and selling government securities to
maintain an
announced interest rate target. As the dollar is the key reserve
currency in
world trade and finance, the US,
through its interest rate policy, is the de facto head of global
exchange rate
manipulation snake and the Fed chairman the chief wizard of exchange
rate
manipulation.
For decades, beginning with a collapse of budgetary and
monetary discipline during the Vietnam War, the US had been
manipulating the
exchange rate of the dollar downwards, a fact obscured in the last
decade by the
emergence of dollar hegemony, a regime introduced by Clinton
Administration
Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin to finance the US trade deficit with
its
capital account surplus to deliver borrowed prosperity to the US
through a
global debt bubble fed by the US Federal Reserve’s dollar printing
frenzy.
Thus it is irony bordering on disingenuousness when Federal
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, in China as part of the US-China
Strategic
Economic Dialogue delegation led by Secretary Paulson, voiced concern
for the allegedly
undesirable distortions that result from an “effective subsidy that an
undervalued currency provides for Chinese firms that focus on
exporting.” For
decades, the real market distortion has come from the Fed’s interest
rate
policy, liquidity bias and inflation targeting. By law, the Fed is
obliged to
support the Treasury’s strong dollar policy in defiance of market
forces as a
matter of national security. And a strong dollar policy is a professed
example
of currency manipulation.
Dollar interest rates have been lower than euro interest
rates and higher than yen interest rates because of differing economic
conditions and national phobia regarding inflation at home. The US
Treasury,
while maintaining a strong dollar policy, has indicated that the dollar
should
be freer to find its own level. Since most Asian currencies except the
Japanese
yen are pegged to the dollar, the only currencies affected by a fall in
the
dollar will be the yen, the euro and currencies linked to it, British
sterling
and the Swiss franc, causing a technical movement away from the dollar
until
the US brings its twin deficits under control. Until then the yen and
the euro
will bear the brunt of the weakening of the dollar, but not evenly,
with the
yen falling against the euro while rising against the dollar.
The High Cost of
Bringing the US Twin Deficits Down
If history is any guide, the US,
being an ever resilient nation, will eventually get its twin deficits
under
control, albeit the cost this time will far exceed the blood-letting of
the
Volcker victory over dollar inflation in the1979-80.
In 1982, impacted by the Federal Reserve
under Paul Volcker raising dollar interest rates sharply in 1979-80 to
over 20%
to fight run-away inflation in the US, Mexico was put in a position of
not
being able to meet its obligations to service $80 billion in
dollar-denominated
short-term debt obligations to foreign, mostly US, banks out of a GDP
of $106
billion.
Volcker’s triumph over domestic inflation was bought with
the destabilization of the international financial system, where US
banks had acted like loan sharks in the Third World
with
Fed approval a decade earlier to recycle petro-dollars. History will
repeat
itself before the end of the first decade of the 21st
century.
Pushing the Chinese yuan upward would accelerate and exacerbate the
historical
replay.
On the eve of the meeting of the Group of Seven (G7: the US,
Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Britain and Canada) on February 10 in
Essen,
Germany, the dollar traded at 121.6 yen and 0.7689 euro (or $1.30 to a
euro). While
120 yen to the dollar is where the US
likes to see the yen stay, $1.30 to a euro put Europe
in
a severe exchange rate disadvantage. The Chinese RMB yuan traded on the
same
day at 7.75 to the dollar, down 6.4% from 8.28 on July 21, 2005 when China
discontinued the yuan/dollar peg, while the Hong Kong
dollar is still pegged at 7.81 to the dollar. If the RMB yuan continues
to rise
against the Hong Kong dollar, it will force the
Hong Kong dollar to de-peg
from the US dollar to align with the RMB or
face very unhappy consequences.
There is visible evidence that the volatility in exchange
rates among major currencies has been caused by hedge fund arbitrage.
Contrary
to rationalization offered by apologists of the positive role of hedge
funds in
stabilizing and enhancing efficiency in the market, hedge funds have
repeatedly
shown themselves as a destabilizing and volatility-generating force
that
threaten the global financial system. In this context of the obvious
dangers of
unregulated currency markets, it is hypercritical for the world’s rich
nations to
urge China
to
loosen state control of its exchange rate and to move toward full
currency
convertibility.
The G7 powers also addressed the recent slide in the Japanese
yen by urging financial markets to take account of Japan’s
strengthening
economy in an attempt to convince currency speculators of the need for
caution
on carry trades where investors borrow massively in low-yield
currencies such
as the yen to invest elsewhere for bigger returns, something that is
compounding recent yen weakness. G7 guidance to markets on the
ultra-sensitive
matter of exchange rates was almost identical to what they said an
earlier
meeting in September 2006 in Singapore that failed to stem a slide in
the yen.
G7 governments are the equivalent of permissive parent warning the
youngsters
on the danger of drugs while they themselves indulge in alcohol abuse
with
their addictive fixation on the fantasy merits of market fundamentalism.
US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson dismissed the EU’s complaints
on the yen, saying the Chinese yuan rather than the Japanese yen was
the
problem because the Chinese currency was controlled by the Chinese
authorities
and remained too weak, whereas Japan's
yen was set in freely trading currency markets. He did not address the
issue of
low yen interest rates set by the Bank of Japan which causes the yen to
fall in
the open market and provides profit opportunities for carry trade.
Foreign
exchange was a hot topic at the latest G7 meeting in Germany.
China
was
referenced in the final communiqué: “In emerging economies with
large and
growing current account surpluses, especially China,
it is desirable that their effective exchange rates move so that
necessary
adjustments will occur.” In 2006, China’s
annual trade surplus grew almost 75% to $177.5 billion, while GDP grew
10.7%,
or the fastest rate in 11 years, as foreign reserves exceeded $1
trillion.
Bloomberg reports the yuan fell by the most in a month (approx. 0.12%
to
7.756/$1) following China’s
central bank governor’s statement at the G7 meeting that the pace of
its
currency gains is “appropriate”.
The G7 also discussed potential risks from the burgeoning
hedge fund industry, which is less regulated than banks and other
financial
institutions and geometrically higher leveraged. Loosely regulated
hedge funds
have become a powerful market force, initially catering to the risk
appetite of
the ultra-rich to profit from risk management needs of business but
concern is
mounting about their widespread proliferation to attract individuals
and
institutional investors who are attracted by the promised profit but
not truly
qualified to assume such risks. Instead of spreading risk throughout
the
financial system to prevent concentrated effects of singular defaults,
hedge
funds as an industry have become a prominent risk factor itself in
catastrophic
systemic failure.
Increasing links between hedge funds and commercial banks
are also problematic, with banks lending to both sides of the same bet,
profiting
from handsome fees irrespective of the direction of the market but
assuming
exposure to counterparty risks in the event of default. Big money
center banks
are heavily trading credit derivatives that bet on the risk of bonds or
loans default.
Many investment banks have become de facto hedge funds with proprietary
trading
constituting the bulk of their profit.
Hedge Funds are the
real Currency Manipulators
Hedge fund assets
have doubled globally to more than $1.4 trillion in the last five years
betting
on notional values in the hundreds of trillion.
The Bank of International Settlement (BIS)
reports that the volumes
outstanding of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives expanded at a brisk
pace in
the first half of 2006. OTC contracts are traded directly between
counterparties outside of exchanges which guarantee settlements for
their
members. Notional amounts of all types of OTC contracts stood at $370
trillion
at the end of June, 24% higher than six months before. Growth was particularly strong in the
credit segment, where the
notional amounts of outstanding credit default swaps (CDS) increased by
46%.
Rapid growth was also recorded in other market segments. Open positions
in
interest rate derivatives rose by 24%, while those in foreign exchange
(FX)
contracts expanded by 22%. Equity and commodity contracts grew at 17%
and 18%,
respectively. Gross market values, which measure the cost of replacing
all
existing contracts and thus represent a better measure of market risk
at a
given point in time than notional amounts, increased by 3% to $10
trillion at
the end of June 2006.
The pace of trading on the international derivatives
exchanges also quickened in the first quarter of 2006. Combined
turnover
measured in notional amounts of interest rate, equity index and
currency
contracts increased by one quarter to $429 trillion between January and
March
2006. The combined notional value of all contracts comes to almost $800
trillion. Notional values are not the amount at risk, only the amount
on which
risk is calculated. But with a notional value of $800 trillion, a 1%
shift in
value will translate into a profit or loss of $8 trillion, 5.7 times
the $1.4
trillion asset value of all hedge funds, or 61% of 2006 US GDP.
The derivative market has been described as a financial
weapon of mass destruction. It makes the Chinese currency exchange rate
issue
seem like a small harmless firecracker.
US-China Trade Imbalance
The Senate Banking Committee also mistook the yuan/dollar peg as a
significant
contributor to record US
trade deficits which was over $750 billion for 2006. On the surface,
nearly
one-third of that deficit, over $230 billion, consists of the US
bilateral trade deficit with China.
For China,
its
global trade surplus was $250 billion, about 9% of its GDP. US
global merchandise trade and current account deficits rose to $850-875
billion
in 2006, amounting to 7% cent of GDP and rising $100 billion annually
over the
past four years.
Yet when China’s trade surplus with the US is viewed in the
context of global trade data, leaving out oil, the collective trade
surpluses
of the oil-exporting countries having become larger than China’s
surplus, Germany,
Japan and the rest of non-China Asia have been the large trade surplus
components as shares of the US trade deficit. In contrast, until two
years ago,
China’s
trade
surplus was minor. US
trade imbalances come more from Germany
and Japan
and
less from China.
Yet US
diplomatic pressure on China
to revalue the yuan further continues. This pressure from the US
is motivated by the misguided conventional assumption that a lower
exchange
rate of the dollar will reduce the US
trade deficit, despite clear historical data showing that past
revaluations of
the Japanese yen and the German mark had not reduced US
trade deficits with these major trade partners in the long run. All
such
revaluations did was to lower the domestic cost in local-currency terms
more
than raise the dollar price of Japanese and German exports. The net
effect was
deflation in Japan
and Germany,
with inflation in the US
while the US
trade deficit continued.
While China has become the largest nominal surplus nation in
the global trading system, having surpassed Japan, its foreign exchange
reserves of over $1 trillion is an enormous drain of wealth from the
yuan
economy into the dollar economy, leaving China with the world’s largest
poor population
and a large growing economy with a capital shortage. Even
if China should stop building up its
dollar reserves, it only means some other country will add dollar
reserves to
make up the difference as long as dollar hegemony allow the US to
finance its
trade deficit with its capital account surplus. Under dollar hegemony,
dollar
reserves are created by US
twin deficits, independent of which foreign country holds them. The
solution is
for the US to stop printing fiat dollars to fund its deficits, for as
long as
the Federal Reserve continue its permissive monetary policy, the twin
deficits
will continue to expand.
Wage Disparity and Trade
Balance
Even a substantial increase in the exchange value of the
Chinese currency will not reduce US-China trade imbalances if Chinese
wages do
not converge with US wages. China
has recently let the RMB rise marginally against the dollar while the
dollar
has fallen against virtually all other currencies, particularly the
Japanese
yen and the euro. The US has been trying to compensate its structural
loss of
competitiveness in manufacturing by forcing the dollar to fall against
all
other currencies, but the Chinese yuan’s peg to the dollar stands in
the way of
this easy way out.
In fact, the yuan/dollar peg has a supportive effect on the US
strong dollar policy. US policy makers should realize that the
yuan/dollar peg
performs a positive function of forcing the US
economy to restructure toward real productive revival, rather than the
meaningless path of exchange rate manipulation. US
loss of competitiveness is not caused by its currency being overvalued.
It is
the opposite: the loss of competitiveness is reflected in the fall of
the
dollar.
The dollar’s fall is not caused by the yuan being pegged to it. It is
caused by the US
seeking productivity gains by having low-wage workers overseas doing
the
producing. Thus increased US
global competitiveness is causing the loss of US
domestic competitiveness in world trade.
While cross-border wage arbitrage causes the US
to lose jobs, it institutionalizes underemployment in China,
keeping Chinese wages too low to support more imports from the US.
It takes the export of millions of pairs of shoes to the US
to pay for one Boeing airliner. US furniture manufacturers complain
about low
price Chinese imports, yet there are no Chinese aircraft manufacturers
to
complain about the high price US airliners. That is the true imbalance
in
US-China trade.
In 2004, China’s
global trade surplus was only 8% of US
trade deficit, the same as little Netherlands.
The whole Euroland global surplus was 27% of the US
deficit that year, and the combined global surplus of Japan
and the rest of non-China Asia was an even
larger share
of US
deficit. Yet
China
alone
stays in the cross-hair of US trade deficit complaint because of the
large bilateral
surplus reported monthly by the US Commerce
Department. In the global
supply chain, Germany,
Japan
and the
rest of non-China Asia are the surplus giants.
This
point was insightfully made by Albert Keidel, Senior Associate at
Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace (www.CarnegieEndowment.org/Keidel),
in his testimony before the Senate Banking Committee.
Bilateral imbalance between the US
and China
does
not itself inform on the real global trade balance picture. China
processes and re-packages large volumes of goods from other countries
for final
shipment to the US.
The Chinese export sector is largely a re-export sector with labor and
environment as main factor inputs. The US
has bilateral trade surpluses with many countries, such as the Netherlands
and Singapore.
Keidel
points out that the conventional view is that these countries with
trade
deficits with the US
do not contribute to the US
trade deficit. But these countries have large global trade surpluses,
much of
which are with China, sending the bulk of its manufactured components
as exports
to China, for finishing and packaging there, before having them shipped
to US
market from a Chinese port, such as Hong Kong or Shanghai.
So China
is only the intermediary point for many non-China economies’ exports to
the US
that have deficits with the US
and surpluses with China.
Further, the Chinese export sector is driven by foreign investment
which
regularly repatriates earnings even before they reach China.
The cost of production by these companies are registered as US
deficit with China,
but the profit is not registered as a US
trade surplus because only capital, not goods, is exported.
The voice of free trade, economist C. Fred Bergsten of the
Peterson Institute of International Economics, asserts that such global
imbalances are unsustainable for both international financial and US
domestic
political reasons. On the international side, the United
States must now attract about $8
billion of
capital from the rest of the world every working day to finance US
current account deficit and US investment outflows in plants that
produce the
import to the US.
Bergsten told the Senate Committee that even a modest reduction of this
inflow,
let alone its cessation or a sell off from the $14 trillion of dollar
claims on
the US
now held
by foreigners, could initiate a precipitous decline in the dollar.
Notwithstanding
that this simplistic view is not shared by the Federal Reserve or the
Treasury,
logic shows that dollar assets can only be sold for dollars, which must
then be
reinvested in other dollar asset, thus poses no threat to the value of
the
dollar. When dollars are sold for other currencies, it merely changes
the
ownership of the dollars, which no reduction in the dollar money
supply. Further,
Bergsten and his fellow free traders want the dollar to fall. So where
is the
problem?
NBER declares Chinese
Yuan not undervalue
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working
Paper No. 12850 issued in January 2007 reports that relying upon
conventional
statistical methods of inference and a framework built around the
relationship
between relative price and relative output levels, once sampling
uncertainty
and serial correlation are accounted for, there is little statistical
evidence
that the RMB is undervalued.
NBER is a prestigious and highly respected
private, nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization where Simon
Kuznets’
pioneering work on national income accounting, Wesley Mitchell’s
influential
study of the business cycle, and Milton Friedman’s research on the
demand for
money and the determinants of consumer spending were among the early
studies
done. Sixteen of the 31 US Nobel Prize winners in Economics and six of
the past
Chairmen of the President's Council of Economic Advisers have been
researchers
at the NBER. The more than 600 professors of economics and business now
teaching at universities around the country who are NBER researchers
are the
leading scholars in their fields.
Rising Chinese
Currency will lead to US Inflation
Especially under the present circumstances of nearly zero structural
unemployment (below 6%) and near full capacity utilization in the US, a
rise in
import prices caused by a fall of the dollar will sharply increase US
inflation
and thus interest rates, severely affecting the equity and housing
markets and
potentially triggering a recession. Inflation is caused by excess
liquidity
released by the US
central bank, not by the Chinese currency. The same counterproductive
effect
will come from the Graham-Schumer threat to levy 27.5% tariffs on goods
imported in from China,
it the Chinese yuan is not revalued upward by 25%.
The most effective way to reduce the US
trade deficit is to reduce US
demand by curbing excess dollar liquidity, not by pushing down the
dollar. Notwithstanding
Bergsten’s assertion that “the global imbalances probably represent the
single
largest current threat to the continued growth and stability of the US
and world economies,” the real threat is a collapse of the dollar debt
bubble,
not a sell off of the dollar or dollar assets by foreigners.
Wave of Neo-Populism
In a wave of neo-populism, free trade is currently under
review in US political debate for the uneven effect it has on the US
domestic economy. Increasing numbers of industries are seeking
government
protection from imports and subsidies for exports, threatening the
basic thrust
of US
free trade
policy.
The post WWII open global trading system had been first reversed by the
Nixon Administration which imposed surcharges on imports and took the
dollar
off gold to achieve a cumulative devaluation of more than 20% in 1971,
and by
the Reagan Administration driving the dollar further down by more than
50%
against the Japanese yen within two years and a smaller fall against
the German
mark via the Plaza Accord in 1985, with over $10 billion of central
bank
intervention in the market. The yen rose from 360 to the dollar in 1971
to top
out at less than 80 to the dollar in April 1995. The result for Japan
was a bubble in its equity and real estate markets in the late 1980s
that
collapsed in 1991 with deflation and a zero interest liquidity trap.
But there
was no obvious reduction in Japan’s
trade surplus as a share of its stagnant GDP.
The Plaza Accord was openly government manipulation against
market forces to correct the high exchange value of the dollar buoyant
by
Volcker’s victory over US
inflation fought with high dollar interest rates that landed the US
economy in deep recession by 1985. Yet coordinated multi-government
manipulation
of currency markets to push down the dollar did not achieve the primary
US
objective of alleviating its trade deficit with Japan.
This was because the trade imbalance was the result of the structural
terms of
trade rather than international monetary mismatch. The recessionary
effects of
the strengthened yen in Japan’s
export-dependent economy created a justification for the expansionary
monetary
policies that led to the Japanese asset bubble of the late 1980s. The
decline overshoot
of the dollar required the Louvre Accord of 1987 to try in vain to stop
it
which promptly brought about the 1987 crash in the US
equity market that started the newly installed Fed Chairman Greenspan
on his
way to the greatest joy ride in Fed-supported debt financing.
With deep-seated anxieties over globalization surfacing in
US political dialogue as the 2008 presidential election approaches, and
the impasse
at the Doha Round halting further trade liberalization around the
world, the distressed
global trade system can only be saved by restructuring the injurious
terms of
trade to provide a level playing field between global labor and global
capital.
To restore global imbalance, the US
needs to restore monetary and fiscal discipline and cease feeding its
insatiable debt appetite with fiat currency. There is much noise from
many
quarters that the US
must reduce its fiscal deficit. Yet the
problem
is not just the fiscal deficit per se, but that the deficit comes from
spending
on the wrong things, such as war and tax cuts for the rich, that does
not add
to constructive economic expansion, instead of “on important national
priorities, such as infrastructure, health care, schools, and targeted
tax
relief for threatened businesses and struggling working families,” as
Senator
Dodd laments.
China needs to wean itself
from Export Addiction
On the other side, China
needs to stop neglecting domestic development merely to support export
growth and
to wean itself from the enslavement of dollar hegemony freedom from
which will
allow China
to
utilize sovereign credit instead of foreign capital denominated in
dollars to
finance much needed and currently under-funded domestic construction
and
economic development. With a limited convertibility currency and a
shift from
export dependency, Chinacan
finance with sovereign credit full employment with rising wages through
government
domestic spending on infrastructure, health care, pensions, education,
environmental restoration and other growth inducing undertakings. Such
sovereign
credit can be serviced and amortized by rising tax revenue from
high-growth
economic expansion. China has no need for currency flexibility unless
it opens
up to freely flowing cross-border short-term capital, commonly known as
“hot money” which not even the IMF, the World Bank, or the US Treasury
is
recommending for China.
If China
revalues the yuan upward by 25%, its export-dominated GDP will shrink
by 25% or
more in local currency terms, as will the local currency value of its
vast
foreign reserves holdings. China’s
2006 gross domestic product (GDP) totaled 20.9407 trillion yuan or
US$2.7
trillion in 2006 at current exchange rates of 7.76 yuan to a dollar. A
25% rise
in the exchange rate of the yuan will reduce China’s
export-dominated 2006 GDP to 15.706 trillion yuan. At current exchange
rate,
the purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP is $10 trillion, about 4 times
official
exchange rate. With the new exchange rate, the PPP GDP would be $7.5
trillion,
all of it due to exchange rate induced deflation, with domestic asset
value
falling by 25%, creating a serious deflation problem. Urban residents
in China
still earned only 11,759 yuan ($1,515) in per-capita disposable income
in 2006,
up 12.1 percent from the year earlier. With the new exchange rate,
urban per
capita income will fall to 8,819 yuan. Rural residents in China
saw their per-capita income increase by 10.2 percent to 3,587 yuan
($462) which
with the new exchange rate would fall to 2,690 yuan. US
per capita income in 2006 was $43,500, about 28.7 times that of urban
Chinese
and 92.4 times that of rural Chinese.
State Council Development Research
Centre, recently told the press that by 2020, China’s
GDP is projected to reach $4.7 trillion, or $3,200 per capita at
current
exchange rate. This is not an impressive goal by any measure, most
likely
falling behind US
per capita growth, and will be further reduced with periodic rise in
the
exchange value of the Chinese currency.
What is more fundamental is that China does not need foreign
capital or foreign exchange reserves if it shifts its economy from
export-dependency
to accelerate domestic development financed by sovereign credit.
China’s
Customs bureau reported January 2007 import-export data which shows the
nation’s
trade surplus grew 65% year-over-year to $15.9 billion, the fifth
highest
growth rate on record, as exports increased 33% to $86.6 billion, the
fastest
growth rate in 17 months and growth in imports at 27.5% to $70.7
billion, or
double the rate in December. This latest monthly data is not good news
for China
as a larger trade surplus denominated in dollars only mean shipping
more real
wealth from the yuan economy to the dollar economy.
Both China
and the US
need
a level playing field, but for different reasons. |