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Mark-to-Market
vs Mark-to-Model
By
Henry C.K. Liu
Part of this article appeared in AToL
on June 24, 2009
Excerpts of this article appeared on the website of New Deal 2.0 a project
of the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute.
The central issue over capital adequacy related to
risk
exposure centers around the controversy of asset values mark-to-model
against
that mark-to-market. Basel II was instituted because marked-to-model
value
was considered inoperative, devoid of reality. Thus marked-to-market
value was
required at the close of each trading day. Yet mark-to-market is
generally
recognized as the detonator of the current credit crisis. Now, the
Fed’s stress
tests for banks have switched back to mark-to-model to calculate the
capital
adequacy of banks.
The differential between the two values in a market
failure
can amount to more than the total to cause the asset to become “toxic”
because of the
interconnectedness of structured finance instruments. In other words, a
bank
exposed to counter-party default on one single credit instrument can
affect the mark-to-market value of all other credit instruments in its
possession
and
also those held by other institutions, even those with no direct
counter-party exposure.
Mark-to-market, sometimes known as fair
value
accounting, refers to the
accounting standards of determining the value of a position held
in a
financial instrument based on the current fair market price for the
instrument or similar instruments. Fair value accounting has been a
part of US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) since the
early 1990s. The use of fair value measurements has
increased steadily over the past decade, primarily in response to
investor demand for relevant and timely financial statements that will
aid in making better informed decisions. Fair market value in a failed
market (where there are no buyers at any price) can be zero, but could
also recover to fair market value when the market starts functioning
normally again.
The seeming innocuous rise in default rate of the
riskier
unbundled tranches of an inverted credit pyramid can affect the credit
ratings
of the upper “safe” tranches to cause the whole credit superstructure
to
crumble much like the way the dead weight of falling upper floors of
the
collapsing World Trade Towers in lower Manhattan caused the collapse of
the
lower floors in an unstoppable cascade of mounting structural failures.
Mark-to-market is real while
mark-to-model has meaning only if the model reflects reality. Often
while models are operative over the long term, the market can cause the
model to fail at any one specific point for any number of reasons. As
Keynes famously said: "the market can stay irrational longer than
market participants can stay liquid."
Mark-to-market reporting has
caused many banks to appear undercapitalized, or even to fail from
illiquidity. The point is that if mark-to-model was considered
inadequate for informing investors on the true financial health of a
holder of financial instruments and only mark-to-market is truly
reliable and meaningful, then the bank stress tests by reverting to
mark-to-model do not yield reliable information on the capital
adequacy of the tested banks. Indeed, several largest banks challenged
the model use by the Fed and negotiated lower capital requirements.
Other critic complained that the Fed model were too optimistic to be
useful in a real worst case situation and that even banks that have
passed the Fed's stress tests will require Fed bailout if reality
should render the Fed model inoperative. Thus the stress tests were a
meaningless exercise because at the end of the day, the positive tested
banks will need government bailout anyway.
Credit Default Swaps (CDS)
The banking system in recent decades has morphed into
one
that is inherently risk-infested on account of its precarious
dependence on
unimpaired counterparty credibility. The shadow banking system has
deviously
evaded the reserve requirements of the traditional regulated banking
regime and
institutions and has promoted a chain-letter-like inverted pyramid
scheme of
escalating leverage, based in many cases on nonexistent reserve
cushion. This
was revealed by the AIG collapse in 2008 caused by its insurance on
financial
derivatives known as credit default swaps (CDS).
AIG Financial Products (AIGFP), based in London
where the regulatory regime was less restrictive, took advantage of AIG
statue
categorization as an insurance company and therefore not subject to the
same
burdensome rules on capital reserves as banks. AIG would not need to
set aside
anything but a tiny sliver of capital if it would insure the
super-senior risk
tranches of CDOs in its holdings. Nor was the insurer likely to face
hard
questions from its own regulators because AIGFS had largely fallen
through the
interagency cracks of oversight. It was regulated by the US Office for
Thrift
Supervision, whose staff had inadequate expertise in the field of
cutting-edge
structured finance products.
AIGFP insured bank-held super-senior risk CDOs in the
broad
CDS market. AIG would earn a relatively trifle fee for providing this
coverage
– just 0.02 cents for each dollar insured per year. For the buyer of
such
insurance, the cost is insignificant for the critical benefit,
particularly in
the financial advantage associated with a good credit rating, which the
buyer
receives not because the instruments are “safe” but only that the risk
was
insured by AIGFP. For AIG, with 0.02 cents multiplied a few hundred
billion
times, it adds up to an appreciable income stream, particularly if no
reserves
are required to cover the supposedly non-existent risk. Regulators were
told by
the banks that a way had been found to remove all credit risk from
their CDO
deals.
As an example, an investor buys a CDS
contract from a
triple-A-rated
Bank to insure against the eventuality of a counterparty defaulting, by
making regular insurance
payments to the bank for the protection. If the counterparty defaults
on its commitment anytime during the duration of the contract by
missing an agreed interest payment or failed to repay the principle at
maturity, the investor will
be assured to receive a one-off payment of the insured amount from the
bank whose credit rating is triple-A and the CDS contract is
terminated. If the investor actually holds the debt from the
counterparty, the CDS contract works as a hedge against counterparty
default.. But investors can also buy CDS contracts
on debts they do not hold, but as a speculative play, to bet against
the
solvency of one side of the any counterpary relationship in a gamble to
make money if it fails, or to
hedge investments in other parties whose fortunes are expected to be
similar to those of target party.
If a counterparty defaults, one of two things can
happen:
1) the insured investor delivers a defaulted asset
to the insurer Bank
for a payment at par value. This is known as physical settlement,
or
2) the insuring Bank pays the investor the difference
between the par
value
and the market price of a specified debt obligation after recovery
to cover the loss. This is known as cash settlement.
The spread of a CDS is the annual amount the
protection buyer
must pay the protection seller over the length of the contract,
expressed as a percentage of the notional value. For example, if the
CDS spread of counterparty risk is 100 basis points (1%), then an
investor buying $100 million
worth of protection from the insuring Bank must pay the bank $1 million
per year.
These payments continue until either the CDS contract expires or the
target counterparty defaults, at which point the insuring bank pays the
insured of outstanding value owed by of the counterparty.
All things being equal, at any given time, if the
maturity of two
credit default swaps is the same, then the CDS associated with a
particular counterparty with a higher CDS spread is
considered more
likely
to default by the market, since a higher fee is being charged to
protect against this happening. However, factors such as liquidity and
estimated loss given default can impact the comparison. When spread
skyrocket during a market seizure, insurers can fail because they
are
not required to adjust regular income statements to show balance
sheet
volatility. This was what happened to AIG which provided no reserves
for its CDS contracts.
Systemic Risk and Credit Rating
There were two dimensions to the cause of the current
credit crisis. The first was that unit risk was not eliminated, merely
transferred to a larger pool to make it invisible statistically. The
second,
and more ominous, was that regulatory risks were defined by credit
ratings, and
the two fed on each other inversely. As credit rating rose, risk
exposure fell
to create an under-pricing of risk. But as risk exposure rose, credit
rating
fell to exacerbate further rise of risk exposure in a chain reaction
that
detonated a debt explosion of atomic dimension.
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the
Federal
Reserve jointly allowed banks with credit default swaps (CDS) insurance
to keep super-senior
risk
assets on their books without adding capital because the risk was
insured.
Normally, if the banks held the super-senior risk on their books, they
would
need to post capital at 8% of the liability. But capital could be
reduced to one-fifth the
normal
amount (20% of 8%, meaning $160 for every $10,000 of risk on the books)
if
banks could prove to the regulators that the risk of default on the
super-senior portion of the deals was truly negligible, and if the
securities
being issued via a collateral debt obligation (CDO) structure carried a
Triple-A credit rating from a “nationally recognized credit rating
agency”,
such as Standard and Poor’s rating on AIG.
With CDS insurance, banks then could cut the normal
$800
million capital for every $10 billion of corporate loans on their books
to just
$160 million, meaning banks with CDS insurance can loan up to five
times more
on the same capital. The CDS-insured CDO deals could then bypass
international
banking rules on capital. To correct
this bypass is a key reason why the government wanted to conduct stress
tests
on banks in 2009 to see if banks need to raise new capital in a
Downward Loss
Given Default.
CDS contracts are generally subject to mark-to-market
accounting that introduces regular periodic income statements to show
balance
sheet volatility that would not be present in a regulated insurance
contract.
Further, the buyer of a CDS does not even need to own the underlying
security
or other form of credit exposure. In fact, the buyer does not even have
to
suffer an actual loss from the default event, only a virtual loss would
suffice
for collection of the insured notional amount. So, at 0.02 cents to a
dollar (1
to 10,000 odd), speculators could place bets to collect astronomical
payouts in
billions with affordable losses. A $10,000 bet on a CDS default could
stand to
win $100,000,000 within a year. That was exactly what many hedge funds
did
because they could recoup all their lost bets even if they only won
once in
10,000 years. As it
turns out, many only had to wait a a couple
of years before winning a huge windfall. But until AIG was bailed out
by the Fed, these hedge funds were not sure they could collect their
winnings.
May
25, 2009
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