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The Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis
By
Henry C.K. Liu
Part I: A Currency Union
Not Backed by Political Union
Part II: The Role of
the IMF/ECB/EC Troika
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), along with
European
Central Bank (ECB) and the European Commission (EC), form the so-called
Troika
that holds the key to the resolution of the Greek sovereign debt crisis
and
also sovereign debt problems facing other eurozone member states. The generation and actual release of bailout
funds for European sovereign debts require an agreement among all three
independent supranational entities in the Troika, each responding to
markedly
different mandates and incentives. The rescue funds will be channeled
through
the European Financial Stability
Facility (EFSF), the emergency bailout fund for heavily
indebted
eurozone member state governments in financial distress.
German approval of expanding the EFSF is a critical
hurdle.
On September 29, 2011,
the
German Bundestag (Parliament), by a vote of 523 to 85, with three
abstentions,
approved the expansion of the €440
billion ($600 billion) EFSF.
The
EFSF is a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) created by the 16 member states
that
use the euro as common currency on May 9, 2010 and incorporated in Luxembourg
under Luxembourg’s
law on June 7, 2010, with the objective
of preserving financial
stability of Europe’s monetary union by
providing
temporary financial assistance to eurozone member
states in financial
difficulty. As a SPV, liabilities in EFSF assumed by the eurozone
member states
do not appear on the balance sheet of the treasuries or central banks
of
eurozone member states.
In
order to reach its objective, the EFSF can, with the support and
assistance of
the German Debt Management Office (DMO), issue bonds or other debt
instruments
on the market to raise the funds needed to provide loans to countries
in
financial difficulties. Issues would be backed by guarantees given by
eurozone
member states of up to €440 billion on a pro rata basis, in accordance
with
their share in the paid-up capital of the European Central Bank (ECB).
Germany
is the largest capital contributor by far with €119.39 billion of the
€440
billion; next is France
with €89.65 billion; next is Italy
with €78.78 billion; next is Spain
with €52.35 billion; next is the Netherlands
with €25.14 billion. Greece
contributes €12.39 billion, ahead of Austria
with €12.24, Portugal
with €11.04 billion, Finland
with €7.91 billion, Slovakia
with €4.37
billion and
Slovenia
with €2.07 billion.
The
EFSF is a very lean organization. It will have a maximum staff of about
a dozen
people. The lean structure is possible because the German DMO (front
office)
and the European
Investment Bank (back office) will provide operation support to the
EFSF.
Additionally, the European Commission will ensure consistency between
EFSF
operations and other assistance to euro area Member States.
The
EFSF Chief Executive Officer is Klaus Regling, a former Director
General of the European
Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs who
also
worked at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the German Ministry
of Finance
and has professional experience of working in financial markets.
The
board of the EFSF comprises high level representatives of the 16 euro
area
Member
States i.e. Deputy Ministers or Secretaries of State or director
generals of
national treasuries. The European Commission and the European Central
Bank
(ECB) each have observers on the EFSF board. The EFSF board is headed
by the
Chairman of the EU’s Economic and Financial Committee.
There
is no specific statutory requirement for accountability to the European
Parliament. However, the EFSF will have a close relationship with the
relevant
committees.
IMF
Funding for the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM)
The
EFSF is part of a wider safety net to preserve financial stability
within Europe.
The full financial resource of the EFSF would be combined with loans of
up to
€60 billion coming from the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism
(EFSM),
i.e. funds raised by the European Commission and guaranteed by the EU
budget,
and up to €250 billion from the International Monetary Fund for a
financial
safety net up to €750 billion, inclusive of its own €440 billion.
The
EFSF would provide loans by issuing bonds or other debt instruments
guaranteed
by eurozone member states. In the Greek package eurozone member states
have
provided bilateral loans which are pooled by the European Commission
and then
paid out in tranches to the Greek government. Together with financial
aid from
the IMF the support for Greece reached
€110 billion.
EFSF Framework Agreement
All
eurozone member states have signed the EFSF Framework Agreement that
makes the
special purpose vehicle operational. Furthermore,
the EFSF has received 13 commitment confirmations from among the 17
eurozone
member states. Excluding Greece,
such confirmations represent 94.9 % of the total guarantee commitments
(minimum
necessary 90 %). Therefore, according to the Framework Agreement, the
obligation of eurozone member states to issue guarantees entered into
force on August 4, 2010.
The
EFSF, a Special Purpose Vehicle, is not a preferred creditor. Unlike
the IMF,
the EFSF will have the same pari passu
standing as any other claim on the borrowing country. This is because
private
investors would be reluctant to provide loans to the country concerned
if there
were too many preferred creditors.
EFSF
bonds will be eligible for ECB repo facilities. In case of issuance, EFSF bonds would
be eligible as collateral
to the
ECB. All three major credit
rating
agencies (CRAs) have assigned to date the best possible credit rating – Standard & Poor’s “AAA”; Moody’s
“Aaa”;
Fitch Ratings “AAA” - to the EFSF. According
to the CRAs, the long-term issuer rating as well as the top rating for EFSF’s possible future individual
debt issues
reflect the strong shareholder support and
credit enhancements such as an over-guarantee of the amount borrowed by
120 % and cash buffer which will
be deducted from
the cash amount remitted to a borrower from
each loan. The rating outlook was qualified as stable.
Any
downgrade of a member state would not affect EFSF or necessarily lead
to a
downgrade of EFSF securities, as various credit enhancements are used
under the
Framework Agreement which constitutes the EFSF.
The EFSF
will not default if one of its member states defaults, because the
credit
enhancement mechanisms under the Framework Agreement are designed to
avoid such
an eventuality. Should a member state defaults on its payments,
guarantees
would be called in from the guarantors, and payments could be made from
the
cash buffer. If a guarantor did not live up to its obligations,
guarantees from
others could be called in to cover the shortfall.
If
several countries ask for assistance simultaneously, the volume of the EFSF, together with
the European Financial
Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM)
and the IMF, is large enough to provide
temporary liquidity assistance to several member states of the euro
area
simultaneously.
The EFSM
is an emergency funding program
reliant upon funds raised on the financial markets and guaranteed by
the
European Commission using the budget of the European Union as
collateral. It
runs under the supervision of the Commission and aims at preserving
financial
stability in Europe by providing financial assistance to member states
of the
European Union in financial difficulty.
The Commission
fund, backed by all 27 European Union member states, has the authority
to raise
up to €60 billion. A separate entity, the EFSF is authorized to borrow
up to
€440 billion. The
EFSM is rated
AAA by Fitch, Moody’s, and Stadard & Poor’s.
The EFSF provides loans to member states in financial
difficulties. But it could be agreed with a member state that receives
funds to
use them partially for financial support to banks in accordance with
the agreed
country program.
If there is no financial operation by the EFSF, it
would
close down after three years, on June 30, 2013.
If there is a financial
operation then, the EFSF would exist until its last obligation has been
fully
repaid.
EFSF Funding
EFSF funding will be done by the German DMO
(Bundesrepublik
Deutschland – Finanzagentur GmbH), Europe’s
benchmark issuer with a funding volume of € 275 billion in 2011. The
German Finance
Agency is a service provider for and controlled by the German Federal
Ministry
of Finance, managing the German Federal Government’s issuance
activities, debt
and liquidity, but with the EFSF, the
Special Purpose Vehicle of the as the
issuer.
The funding strategy is still under discussion
and will be decided soon. Funding instruments shall
however have in general the same
profile as the related loans to the country in difficulty.
The funding strategy will be closely coordinated
between
EFSF and EFSM under each country program which will be agreed upfront
by
finance ministers. While it is accepted that the EFSM will be in the
market
first, both mechanisms could raise money at the same time
Unlike the EFSM which only issues debt in euro, the
EFSF
does not have any currency limitation for its funding activities.
However, it
is expected that the majority of funds would be raised in euro.
There has been a clear political decision by finance
ministers
not to access financial markets until a euro member has submitted a
request for
support. There will be no pre-funding by the EFSF.
The EFSF is not expected to reduce liquidity for other
borrowers in the market by driving up net funding demand in the
eurozone. If
the EFSF borrows, the country that receives the funds will borrow less,
thus
leaving no impact on aggregate liquidity, provided an efficient market
continues to operate, which is a big provision. Recent experience has
shown
that sudden market volatility exacerbates market disequilibrium and
reduces
market efficiency.
Funds raised by the EFSF will be released as loans to
qualified eurozone member states that requested financial support.
However the
cash buffer, which is retained by the EFSF, will be invested in top
rated
liquid assets. Some asset-liability management will therefore be
necessary and
will be conducted by the German Debt Management Office.
EFSF Lending
Conditions
EFSF can only lend after a support request is made by
a
eurozone member state that has negotiated a country program with the
European
Commission and the IMF and after such a program has been accepted by
the
eurozone finance ministers and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has
been
signed. EFSF loans would only be granted when the borrowing country is
unable
to borrow on markets at acceptable rates.
It will take three to four weeks to draw up a support
program including sending experts from the Commission, the IMF and the
ECB to
the applying country. After eurozone finance ministers have approved
the
country program, the EFSF would need several business working days to
raise the
necessary funds and disburse the loan. The process may hamper emergence
needs
in avoiding a sovereign default.
Any financial assistance to a country in financial
need
would be linked to very strict policy conditions which would be set out
in a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the country in need and the
European
Commission. Decisions about the maximum amount of a loan, its price and
duration,
and the number of installments to be disbursed would have to be taken
by the
finance ministers of the 16 eurozone member states unanimously.
The loan disbursements and the country program could
be
interrupted until the review of the country program and the MoU is
renegotiated. In such cases the conditionality still exists.
Competition Among
Eurozone Member States for EFSF Rescue Funds
Competition from eurozone member states with sovereign
debt
difficulties are beginning to surface. The first shot was fired by Ireland
on October 5, when press reports headlined a statement by Irish Deputy
Prime
Minister Eamon Gilmore saying that Ireland
will capitalize on any moves by euro-zone governments to use the EFSF
to shore
up their banks. “We just want to make sure that if any additional
measures
develop to deal with the crisis that they work to Ireland’s
benefit,” Mr. Gilmore reportedly said.
The possibility of widespread recapitalization of
euro-zone
banks was pulled into focus as fears of a default by Greece
intensified in October. In France, Autorite
Des Marches Financiers (AMF), the market regulator, released a
statement
on October 5 that 15 to 20 banks in Europe needed additional capital,
although
no French ones was in that group “at this stage”. It was reported the
same day
that BNP Paribas was attempting to raise capital funds in Qatar.
France’s
banks are heavily exposed to Greek government debt and would have to
write off
substantial losses in the event of a sovereign default. Shares in BNP,
Société
Générale and Crédit Agricole, have fallen by more
than 5% over the past three
months as Europe’s sovereign debt crisis
intensified.
Their shares rallied yesterday on speculation that the French
government will
take steps to bolster their capital and might seek to raise funds from
the
EFSF.
Portugal,
Italy
and Spain
can also be expected to make similar demands on the EFSF in a wave of
political
contagion. A Greek sovereign default is now considered increasingly
likely.
Citibank warned on the same day as the Irish statement that “we now
expect a
substantial and probably coercive debt restructuring of the Greek
sovereign by
the end of 2012 at the latest and likely much sooner.” Citibank’s
European
economics team warned the same day that lower global growth and
Greece’s
inability to comply with the terms of its bailout, combined with
increasing
opposition in key countries such as Germany to further bailouts, made a
default
likely by the spring of 2012 or even December this year. “In order to
reduce
the debt-to-GDP levels from 80% to 60% by 2012, it would require debt
haircuts
(ex-IMF) of 67 %, (54%) in Greece,
53% in Portugal
and 34% in Ireland,”
the Citibank team added.
Irish Minister for Finance Michael Noonan offered a
more
positive view of Ireland’s
prospects at the World Bank/IMF annual meetings in Washington
on September 23-25, telling IMF officials and international bankers
that Ireland
“has a plan, is on target, and is actually surpassing some goals.” Mr
Noonan
pointed out that Bank of Ireland raised €1.7 billion in risk equity in
the
summer, and that Irish banks broke their reliance on the Central Bank
by
raising €4.5 billion in term financing on the markets, using
residential
mortgage-backed securities as collateral. He also highlighted
statistics released
on September 15 showing that Irish GDP grew 1.6% in the second quarter
of 2011.
The funds raised by Bank of Ireland are particularly significant, Mr.
Noonan
reportedly said. “It’s really positive that the € 1.7 billion came from
private
sector investment, because people took out their own cash and invested
it. We
want to get that across, as well as the fact that our banks are
actually
accessing money markets.” Bank of Ireland shareholders invested €600
million,
and five large North American investment funds invested €1.123 million
in risk
equity, without State guarantees.
EFSF Credit Rating
The EFSF has received the best possible credit rating
off
all major rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s “AAA”; Moody’s “Aaa”;
Fitch
Ratings “AAA”). This was achieved through credit enhancements foreseen
in the
agreement between the participants (framework agreement): an
over-guarantee of
120 per cent on each bond, an up-front cash reserve which equals the
net
present value of the margin of the EFSF loan, a loan specific cash
buffer.
Together these credit enhancements ensure that all
loans
provided by the EFSF are backed by guarantees of the highest quality
and
sufficient liquid resource buffers. The available liquidity will be
invested in
securities of the best quality.
The extent to which such credit enhancements affect
the
maximum lending capacity depends on a number of variables, and cannot
be
exactly calculated up front. The structure of guarantors, interest
rates,
maturities and other loan conditions will determine the lending
capacity.
Further options of credit enhancement, which could expand the margin of
available lending, are currently discussed and could be specified for
individual loans. Calculations of lending capacity and specific credit
enhancements will be fully transparent to investors and markets once a
country
program is concluded and loan terms and conditions for each country
will be
defined.
Eurozone member states will provide guarantees for
EFSF
issuances up to a total of
€ 440 billion allocated pro rata according to their
participation in the capital of the ECB. The available amounts under
the EFSF
will be complemented by those of the European Financial Stability
Mechanism (€
60 billion) and of the IMF. They are sufficient to deal with possible
needs.
The Framework Agreement does not contain any maturity
limitations for the loans nor for the funding instruments. However, in
line
with the experience under the Greek program, loans and bonds are
envisaged to
have an average maturity of three to five years.
The blueprint for EFSF support - although not binding
- is
the financial aid package to
Greece where, for variable-rate loans, the basis is
three-month Euribor, while fixed rate loans are based upon the rates
corresponding to swap rates for the relevant maturities. In addition
there is a
charge of 300 basis points for maturities up to three years and an
extra 100
basis points per year for loans longer than three years. A one time
service fee
of 50 basis points is charged to cover operational costs.
There is no binding agreement with member states
outside the
eurozone. However two non-eurozone member states, Poland
and Sweden,
have indicated that they are prepared to consider contributing
additional
financial resources on a voluntary basis, in parallel to the EFSF.
For member states outside the eurozone, other European
Union
support mechanisms exist. For member states that are not members of the
eurozone, there is the Balance of Payments facility. For countries
outside the
EU, there is the Macro-Financial Assistance program. Furthermore, the
EFSM
could support all European Union member states.
The concept of precautionary credit lines does not fit
with
the approach of the EFSF. Eurozone finance ministers decided that the
EFSF will
only provide financial support if a eurozone member is unable to access
markets.
Greece
has its own rescue package. Therefore it is not envisaged that Greece
could expect support by the EFSF.
Leveraging Up EFSF to
Help Eurozone Deleverage
European officials are reportedly working on a scheme
to
build a Special Purpose Vehicle that would lever up existing EFSF funds
8 to 1
to buy up European sovereign debt and then use the sovereign debt as
collateral
to issue bonds.
The scheme relies on the private sector to lend to the
EFSF
in times when the private sector is least likely to be lending and
banks are in
distress. Private sector loan will require higher yield that ECB
financing, or
EFSF’s own triple-A bond market funding, to push up funding costs for
the
leveraged EFSF, which will be passed on to countries being rescued. The
EFSF is
an off-balance-sheet Special Purpose Vehicle, with no recourse beyond
the
guarantees that the euro-zone countries pledge to it. When the size of
the
EFSF’s bond and loan portfolios exceeds those guarantees, creditor
exposure
will jump exponentially. The ECB, as the parent of the SPV, would have
the same
problem, too, if it financed a leveraged EFSF. But losses on the ECB’s
own
balance sheet are ultimately the responsibility of the euro-zone
nations. The
size of a privately leveraged EFSF will be smaller than an
ECB-leveraged EFSF,
the feasibility for which is remote at best.
The German Bundestag enabling vote in September 15
also
agreed to grant the EFSF new powers, including the authority to issue
liquidity
loans to eurozone member states in sovereign debt difficulties. This
was
considered by eurozone government officials as the most important step
in a
tortuous process that has unsettled financial markets and raised doubts
about
the ability of eurozone governments to resolve the expanding sovereign
debt
crisis and curb its contagion.
The palliative effectiveness of this key event in
German
domestic politics on the market will be tested in a matter of weeks, if
not
months, should a Greek sovereign debt default become the unhappy
outcome as
anticipated by many market participants.
IMF/ECB/US Troika
Reopened Talks with Greece
Officials of the Troika of IMF, ECB and UC reopened
stalled
talks in Athens
immediately after
news of the German Bundestag September 15 enabling vote. The talks
centered on
the progress of the government of Greece
in pushing through an austere fiscal budget target that would be
required
before EFSF could release the next €8
billion tranche as part of the €110
billion on-going recuse program.
If an agreement
is not reached by the Troika in these talks, the needed €8 billion
payment will
be delayed, leaving the Greek government with no cash in October to
meet its
obligations on pension, civil servant salaries, and interest payments.
Further,
it may cause a renegotiation on the second €109 billion rescue package
already
committed by the EFSF in July, 2011.
German
legislators have made clear that should there be an unexpected wider
financing
gap in Greek sovereign debt payments, it cannot be filled with more
public
money, especially from German taxpayers. Private creditors would have
to take a
bigger writedown (known in workout circles as a haircut) in the value
of
distressed Greek sovereign debts they hold, and suffer bigger financial
loss at
the time when European banks are not in good financial shape.
In Greece, where
social instability has been turning violent in recent months over
proposed
government austerity measures, a new government proposal in September
to cut an
additional 30,000 public sector jobs within two months to help reduce
the
mounting fiscal deficit was met with fierce opposition in an emergency
cabinet
meeting.
The German Bundestag enabling vote on expanding the
EFSF
also represented a narrow but significant political victory for
Chancellor
Angela Merkel, as fewer lawmakers (15) than expected from her own
coalition
broke away to join the opposition vote. The majority included votes
from both
major opposition parties: the Social Democrats and members of the Green
Party.
Several eurozone member state governments are quietly
calling for a review of the harsh terms of the July 21 package with
international banks on rollover and buyback of Greek sovereign debt. Greece received a three-year, €110 billion
rescue in 2010 from the European Union and International Monetary Fund
that
anticipated the country returning to financial markets in 2011. With
its
10-year bond yielding about 18%, financing in the markets proved
unrealistic
and the EU was forced to draw up a second rescue package to fully fund
Greece
for three years
There is also the question of whether an expanded EFSF
with
new bond issuing powers can be fully operational by October, in time to
deal
with a possible Greek sovereign default or even debt rescheduling. Also, some analysts are questioning even with
the expanded EFSF borrowing capacity of €440
billion, it would not be large enough or felxible enough to counter a
new wave of contagion and speculative attacks in financial markets.
German Domestic
Politics turning towards Economic Nationalism
Germany
has the largest national economy in the eurozone and is the only
eurozone
member state with the financial resources and fiscal space to pull
fellow
eurozone member states out of pending sovereign default. The German
government
of Chancellor Merkel is doing its best to move the unpopular rescue
plan for Greece
through the convoluted German political process, but many analysts are
of the
opinion that Germany,
given the limits of its domestic political dynamics, could offer only
temporary
relief rather than anything approaching a permanent structural
solution.
Chancellor Merkel’s September 15 Pyrrhic victory in
the
Bundestag on the Greek rescue plan merely provided breathing room for
the
crisis. Yet it came only after a politically costly divisive debate
within
Merkel’s own parliamentary bloc. The contentious vote has weakened her
political leadership at a critical moment. Opposition politicians,
citing the
vocal opposition within her own political ranks, suggested that
Chancellor
Merkel had lost full control of her fragile political coalition and
needed to
dissolve the government for a new election.
But in the end, the measure passed without needing
opposition support, giving her the needed “chancellor’s majority”,
which had
been uncertain in recent weeks up to the final moment of the vote. As
it turned
out, Chancellor Merkel received 315 votes within her coalition, four
more than
needed for the chancellor’s majority. The vote allowed Germany
to agree to an increase in its share of the EFSF guarantees to €211 billion ($285 billion), from €123 billion.
Finland Demands Collateral for Loans to Greece
Even with German Bundestag approval, another 6 of the
17
eurozone legislatures still need to ratify the agreement reached in
the July
21 package. A significant hurdle was overcome when Finland
on Wednesday, September 28, voted for the expanded EFSF bailout fund
despite
strong domestic political objections and an unresolved dispute over Finland’s
demand for collateral from Greece
for additional loans.
Finland’s demand
for collateral on new Greek loans left European leaders with a Hobson’s
choice:
accept AAA rated Finland’s terms and risk jeopardizing the rescue plan,
or
reject its demand for collateral to risk the collapse of the pro-euro
Finnish
government to be replaced by Finnish
euro-skeptics.
Luxembourg Prime
Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, who also chairs eurozone finance
meetings,
reportedly said on August 29 he was “confident” an agreement could be
reached
by mid-September, while criticizing the Finnish demand for collateral.
“I don’t
like this mechanism and I don’t like the bilateral arrangements,” he
told the
European Parliament’s economic committee in Brussels.
Collateral
accords would be “fatal” for further bailout aid, said Michael Meister,
the
senior finance and economy spokesman for German Chancellor Angela
Merkel’s
Christian Democrats, said in Berlin on August 30. Eurozone governments
“must
talk to Finland” about its demand for collateral, Meister added.
The collateral
flap reflected the bailout fatigue that had been spreading in the more
fiscally
prudent countries of northern Europe, fueling popular support for
political
parties opposed to aid to the eurozone’s more profligate member states.
National politics has been increasingly at odds with efforts to forge
European
unity, complicating a comprehensive response to the sovereign debt
crisis that
now also threatens Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Italy and even France.
Political
concensus among the eurozone member states is needed to resolve the
issue,
Austria’s Finance Minister Maria Fekter said in Vienna on August 30,
adding:
“It is emerging that the civil servants alone aren’t coming up with a
solution.”
EU leaders
initially agreed to the demand for collateral protection by Finnish
Prime
Minister Jyrki Tapani Katainen,
who was chosen on July 22, to head a new Finnish government
coalition of
6 of the 8 political parties, two months after his party, the National
Coalition Party won parliamentary elections, and only one day after the July 21 European summit in Brussels that hashed out the 159
billion-euro
($231 billion) rescue for Greece. The
Finnish National Coalition Party is center-right, strongly pro-European
and is
a member of the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), the largest
party
represented in each of the institutions of the European Union (EU), and
also
the largest in the Council of Europe.
Spanish and
Italian bond yields surged on July18, 2011, putting market pressure on
European
officials to address the sovereign debt crisis quickly. Spain and
Greece sold €6.08
billion ($8.6 billion) of bills on July 19. The Treasury in Madrid said
it sold
€3.79 billion of 12-month bills at an average yield of 3.702%, compared
with
2.695% the last time the securities were sold on June 14. The yield on
10-year
German government bonds, the region’s benchmark, increased six basis
points to 2.71%.
EU Summit
Statement
The July 21 EU
summit in Brussels issued a statement of obligatory rhetoric reaffirming the leaders’ commitment to the
euro and “to do whatever is needed to ensure the financial stability of
the
euro area as a whole and its member states,” admitting that the the initial bailout to
Greece, with its high interest rates and short payment period, was
impossible for
Greece to cover. The statement
then called for lengthening
the maturity of future EFSF loans to Greece to the maximum extent
possible from
the current 7.5 years to a minimum of 15 years and up to 30 years with
a grace
period of 10 years. “We will provide EFSF loans at lending rates
equivalent to
those of the Balance of Payments facility (currently approx. 3.5%),
close to,
without going below the EFSF funding cost,” the statement added.
Political leaders
at the EU summit acknowledged that Greece’s is “an exceptional and
unique
solution”. Between the lines is a message that the second bailout of
Greece is
in fact designed to reduce the cost of saving Italy and Spain,
admitting that decisions
taken at the just-ended EU summit were not part of a well-worked,
long-term,
system-wide strategy, but constituted yet another ad hoc measure, just
like all
the previous measures that have proven to be failures. The press was
calling
the approach “kicking the can down the road” without knowing where it
should
end up.
Then upsetting
news of the details of a collateral deal Finland negotiated with Greece
emerged
in August, triggering a backlash and demands for similar treatment from
other
eurozone creditor nations, including Austria and the Netherlands,
threatening
to delay or torpedo the Greek recuse plan.
Far from
resolving the debt crisis, contagion continued after the July 21 EU
summit .
The ECB began buying Spanish and Italian bonds to help bring down
yields that
reached euro-era records. Divisions over the collateral matter
contributed to a
further market slump for Greek bonds with the yield on the country’s
two-year
notes topping 45% in August.
Understandably, leading politicians in Slovakia
were highly critical of the terms of the rescue agreement for Greece,
with a division in the governing coalition in the Slovak capital of Bratislava
over whether to help Greece,
with a 2010 nominal per capita GDP of €20,400,
which is much richer than Slovakia,
with only €12,100. Why should
a poor country spend its tax money to help a rich country with no
fiscal
discipline?
S&P Downgrade of Italy
Sovereign Debt
As a sign of the seriousness of the sovereign debt
problem,
Italy, with the third-largest economy in the eurozone after those of
Germany
and France, had to pay a sharply higher rates when she went to the
credit
market on Thursday, September 29, for its first sovereign debt auction
of €7.9 billion since the September 19
Standard & Poor’s downgrade of its unsolicited
long- and short-term sovereign credit ratings from A+ to A, with an outlook negative.
S&P in a
statement said the downgrade “reflects its view of Italy’s weakening
economic
growth prospects and its view that Italy’s fragile governing coalition
and
policy differences within parliament will likely continue to limit the
government's ability to respond decisively to the challenging domestic
and
external macroeconomic environment.”
The S&P
statement went on:
Under our recently updated
sovereign ratings criteria, the
"political" and "debt" scores were the primary contributors
to the downgrade. The scores relating to the other elements of our
methodology--economic structure, external, and monetary--did not
contribute to
the downgrade.
More subdued external
demand,
government austerity measures, and upward
pressure on funding costs in both the public and private sectors will,
in our
opinion, likely result in weaker growth for the Italian economy
compared with our
May 2011 base-case expectations, when we revised the outlook to
negative.
We believe the
reduced
pace of Italy's economic activity to date will make
the government’s revised fiscal targets difficult to achieve.
Furthermore, what
we view as the Italian government’s tentative policy response to recent
market
pressures suggests continuing future political uncertainty about the
means of
addressing Italy’s economic challenges. (Emphasis by S&P)
The political uncertainty concern identified by
S&P
applies to all eurozone member state governments.
EFSF Expansion Falls Short of Escalating Needs
Under the anxious watch of nervous investors, the
torturously meandering approval process for sovereign debt rescue has
revealed
even more political fissures, decision-making layers and complex
geopolitical
dynamics in Europe that adds up to a worrisome
inability
or weak political will to react quickly and decisively to fast-moving
financial
market volatility. Analysts are already reportedly suggesting that the
expanded
EFSF, even if it receives final political approval in time, will in all
likelihood be too small to defend against speculative attacks on deeply
indebted eurozone sovereign governments, particularly as the political
delays
have been enlarging the size of the needed rescue by the week. What was
adequate in July is no long sufficient for September as the financial
crisis
spins rapidly further out of control.
No Long-term Solution
Further, long-term structural solutions are nowhere
insight,
as European politicians, including German Chancellor Merkel, have been
forced
by domestic politics to resist calls for converging fiscal union for
eurozone
member states, or the issuance of common sovereign debt referred to as
euro
bonds, backed by the full faith and credit of the eurozone as a fiscal
union.
Many eurozone governments simply cannot politically survive years of
open-ended
fiscal austerity in a recession that could run a whole decade. Without
a fiscal
union, the sovereign debt crisis of the eurozone cannot be solved
fundamentally.
German Resistance
German protesters are labeling the EFSF derisively as
“Europe Finance Suicide Fund”, because of public concern on limitless
exposure Germany
faces in covering Greece’s
mounting distressed sovereign debt and later other eurozone member
states with
bigger sovereign debt problems. There is widespread worry among German
taxpayers that Germany
is being asked to throw good money after bad, and that Greece
cannot be saved in its current fiscal shape and trying to save it will
only
drag Germany
down into a bottomless financial abyss.
German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble tried
to assure
concerned Bundestag members as well as the anxious public during a
debate that
a positive vote on expanding EFSF did not represent a blank check, and
that any
additional funds would still have to be approved by the Bundestag and
that
oversight monitoring will be required and not up for debate. While such
categorical assurance helped secure the Bundestag vote, it did not sit
well for
financial markets as investors know the sum approved so far will not be
enough
by a long shot to bail Greece out of its sovereign debt hole, let alone
the
other sovereign debtor states in the eurozone.
Klaus-Peter Willsch, a member of Chancellor Merkel’s
Christian
Democrats who in the end voted with the Chancellor, nevertheless
complained:
“We have to borrow the money from our children and grandchildren — as
we don’t
have it.”
German Leadership
Wavering
While the vote finally passed in the Bundestag,
Merkel’s
government has been politically weakened by it. Without a reliable
majority to
push though unpopular legislation going forward, the chancellor could
be
reduced to a toothless and ineffective figurehead. Unlike in the US,
where a similar legislative victory would be hailed as a bipartisan
success
story, in the German parliamentary system, power rests on the
Chancellor’s
ability to hold together the members of the coalition that make up the
majority. Political parties in Germany
have much more control over their members. Candidates are nominated by
the
party rather than competing in primary elections. Without strong and
decisive
political leadership from Germany,
the European sovereign debt crisis will quickly turn into a chaotic
quagmire in
the market that will lead to a global financial disaster in short
order.
Democracy against Global
Market Capitalism
The irony is that the democratic form of government in
Europe
is serving as the grave digger of global market capitalism, the
ideological
claim of the symbiotic link between political democracy and market
capitalism
notwithstanding. The same scene had been played by the liberal
democratic/capitalistic market economy Weimar
Republic in
1933, a fact that few
Germans will ever forget.
New IMF Leader
Tackles Old Problem
Two weeks earlier, the annual meeting of the
International
Monetary Fund and World Bank in Washington on September 17-18 featured
a new IMF
head in the person of highly respected Christine Lagarde of France, and
a year-old
challenge of how to stem a sovereign debt crisis that threatens to
spread
through Europe and beyond in the event of a intergovernmental political
impasse.
Christine Lagarde, a former Minister of Finance for
France
and a former director of the IMF, where her leadership position of the IMF is not quite three months-old, and
she is already facing a boisterous debate over whether the IMF can
stage-manage
a seemingly inevitable Greek sovereign
debt default to prevent it from turning into an eurozone-wide
and global
financial crisis that will put the last nail in the coffin for any hope
of a
quick recovery for the global economy.
At a news conference on Thursday, September 15, IMF
head
Largarde skirted any specifics but complained that the financial
markets, which
had been falling, were ignoring “bold” efforts by EMU members to deal
with the Greek
sovereign debt crisis, adding that the multi-government process needed
“collective momentum”.
Still, a growing number of market analysts are
expressing
doubt on whether Greece
will ever be able to pay back all its huge sovereign debt. Even if the
fundamentals of the Greek sovereign debt situation provide for an
arguable
scenario that the Greek economy can ultimately repay its sovereign
debt, the
market has passed the stage of concern for fundamentals to the stage of
exposure hydraulics in which each creditor sees each exit by another
creditor
as an increase in the remaining credit exposure and potential loss for
those
creditors still holding Greek sovereign debt. Creditor exposure
hydraulics will
generate a negative “collective momentum” for mass exit to cause a
global
credit market failure.
World Stock Markets
in Bear Market Mode
Bloomberg reported that global stocks officially
entered secular
bear market territory the week ending September 16, as the benchmark MSCI All-Country World Index of 45
nations fell more than 20% since July 22 into bear market mode for the
first
time in more than two years, after the worsening European sovereign
debt crisis
and heightened threat of a US double-dip recession erased more than $10
trillion from market value of equities since May, 2011. The index
tumbled 4.5%
to a 13-month low of 277.38.
The MSCI World
Index of shares in developed nations led the fall into bear market
mode,
plunging 4.2%. The index fell after Standard & Poor’s cut the US
sovereign
credit rating following a Congressional standoff over raising the
nation’s
legal borrowing limit, as speculation that Greece will default
intensified, and
troublesome news of Chinese inflation accelerating to a three-year
high. The
slump pushed the price-earnings ratio for the index down to 11.4, the
lowest
since March 2009 and 46% less than the 16-year average.
The Standard
& Poor’s 500 Index extended its drop since its peak on April 29 to
17%. As
one of the most commonly followed equity indices, it is considered a
bellwether
for the American economy, and is included in the Index of Leading
Indicators.
Many mutual funds, exchange-traded funds (ETF), and other funds such as
pension
funds, are designed to track the performance of the S&P 500 index
The gauge
has retreated even as analysts raise projections for 2011 corporate
profit to a
record $99.34 a share this year from $98.73 on April 29. The market
seems to
know that corporate profits are from Fed quantitative easing money, not
from
economic vitality.
The 15 national
stock gauges with the biggest losses since the MSCI All-Country World
peaked on
May 2 are for European countries. Greece’s ASE Index has lost 42%,
Italy’s FTSE
MIB Index has plunged 40% and Hungary’s Budapest Stock Exchange Index
has
retreated 38%. The Euro Stoxx 50 Index has
tumbled
28% since July 22 as Greece edged closer to defaulting on its sovereign
debt
and the cost of insuring western European countries’ loans rose to new
record
levels.
The MSCI Emerging
Markets Index has also retreated 27% since its 2011 high on May 2. The
MSCI
Asia Pacific Index has fallen 19.7% since its 2011 high on the same
date.
China’s Shanghai Composite Index has tumbled 23% since its peak in
November,
and Japan’s Topix has slumped 25% since April 2010.
The
20% decline in global equities in 2011 ended the bull market driven by
government quantitative easing money that began in March 2009. The MSCI
All-Country World Index climbed as much as 107% during the liquidity
rally. The
measure avoided a bear market in 2010, when it fell 16% between April
15 and
July 5.
A bear market is a prolonged period of falling prices.
A
bear market in stocks is usually brought on by the anticipated of
declining
economic activity and a bear market in bonds is caused by rising
interest
rates. Technically, a bear market is defined by traders as a 20% or
greater
decline in value for a major stock market index from its last high. A secular bear market is a decline in the major stock
averages of at least 40% - and considerably more in secondary stocks -
where
the decline lasts at least three to five years during which each
rebound fails
to reach the previous high. The fall is then followed by a long
hangover that
drags on for a number of years as the excesses are purged.
A “bear” is a trader who believes the trend of
stock prices
is down and trades with that trend by selling his stocks to buy back
later at a
lower price or by selling short. A “bear spread” is a strategy in the
options
market designed to take advantage of a fall in the price of a security
or
commodity. This is done by buying a put of short maturity and a put of
long
maturity in order to profit from the difference between the two puts as
prices
fell. A bear trap is a situation that confronts short sellers when a
bear
market reverses itself into a bull market. Anticipating further
declines, the
bearish trader continues to sell, and then is forced to buy at higher
prices to
cover.
The
MSCI All-Country World Index rebounded after Federal Reserve Chairman
Ben S.
Bernanke hinted, at the Fed’s annual meeting on August 27, 2010, in
Jackson
Hole, Wyoming, a $600 billion quantitative easing in bond purchases
meant to
prevent deflation and stimulate growth.
In the previous bear
market, the
Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 38% from January 14,
2000 (11,723) to October 9,
2002
(7286.27). The NASDAQ dropped even further, falling 78% from March 10,
2000 (5048.62) to October 9
2002 (1114.11). Financial stocks posted the biggest
losses in that bear
market. Financial stocks are leading declines again in late summer and
early
fall of 2011 amid growing concern that European banks will have to
write down
their holdings of government debt. At this writing (early october),
banks,
brokerages and insurers in the MSCI All-Country World Index have
collectively
lost 31% since May 2.
By early
October, Société Générale SA
of Paris has retreated 66% since May
2, the second-biggest loss among financial stocks in the MSCI
All-Country
Index, behind Athens-based EFG Eurobank Ergasias, the shares of which
fell from
52 week high at €5.26 to 52
week low at €0.88 in 2011. EFG Eurobank
Ergasias
is third largest bank in Greece, with more than 300 branches throughout
the
country.
EFG
Eurobank Ergasias
EFG
Eurobank Ergasias, a European banking group headquartered in
Athens that
operates in 10 countries mostly in eastern Europe, with total assets of
€81.9
billion, employing more than 20,000 people and offers its products and
services
through its network of 1,600 branches, business centers and points of
sale, as
well as through alternative distribution channels. In 2006, EFG
Eurobank Ergasias acquired 100% of
Nacionalna štedionica – banka in Serbia, 70% of Tekfenbank in Turkey,
99.3% of
Universal Bank in Ukraine, 74.3% of DZI Bank in Bulgaria. In 2008, with
gross
revenue of €3.277 billion ($4.456
billion), it could not pay one single cent of dividend. It is forcasted
to have
gross revenue of €2.567 billion in 2012, yet with a projected loss of
1.74
cents euro per share. Most of the loss was from debt writedowns.
Pursuant to Laws 3723/2008, 3756/2009 and 3844/2010,
banks
participating in the Greek Economy Liquidity Support Program were
prohibited by
the Greek Government from declaring a cash dividend to the ordinary
shareholders for the years 2008 and 2009. In view of this and in the
context of
current economic conditions, the Directors do not consider that the
distribution of a dividend for 2010 would be appropriate. In June 2010,
and
following the Annual General Meeting’s approval, the 10% preference
dividend
for 2009, amounting to €59 million, was paid to the Hellenic
Republic
At year-end 2010, EFG Group, through merger and
acquisition,
had total consolidated shareholders’ equity of €6.7 billion, total
assets of
€104 billion and over 25,000 employees in more than 40 countries
worldwide. Listed
on the Athens Exchange, Eurobank EFG has a diverse shareholder base,
including
over 210,000 private and institutional investors.
Eurozone
Banks Hit by Market Restreat
UniCredit
SpA, based in Milan, has retreated 62%. Banks in Europe hold €98.2 billion
($132 billion) of Greek sovereign debt, €317
billion euros of Italian sovereign debt and about €280 billion euros of Spanish sovereign debt.
Financial
companies whose shares are in the MSCI All-Country World Index sank 77%
during
the bear market in 2008 as government bailouts rescued the biggest U.S.
banks
from collapse after Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., once the nation’s
fourth-biggest securities firm, was forced to file the nation’s largest
bankruptcy in September 2008 when an arranged takeover by Brtish bank
Barclays
failed to receive regulatory approval from London.
More than $37
trillion was erased from global equity values in the bear market that
lasted
for 16 months after the MSCI All-Country World Index peaked on Oct. 31,
2007.
The index fell as much as 60% amid the first global recession since
World War
II and more than $2 trillion in losses and writedowns at financial
companies
worldwide after housing prices collapsed.
The current sell off—which pushed markets from China
to Ireland
to Italy
into bear territory—came as fears of a
Greek default escalated and economic data around the
globe hinted
at the likelihood of a worldwide double-dip recession.
The Dow Jones
Industrial Average will be affected by 10% to markets in other
developed
nations. Sixteen of the Dow 30 industrial companies all receive more
than 25%
of their revenues from Europe. The crisis of
2008 showed
that developed economies do not de-couple from each other, not even
from
emerging economies.
The Dow hit its post-crisis bull market high on April
29,
closing at 12,810.54. The benchmark on Friday, September 23, was about
17% off
from that high after its worst week in almost two years.
The MSCI World Index encompasses the equity
performance of
24 developed markets. Following eight 20% pullbacks for the index since
1987,
the measure, on average, goes on to fall another 9%. Technical analysis
shows
that about 80 more days of weakness are ahead with a bottom at the
start of
December 2011. Nineteen of 29 major world markets—both developed and
emerging—are
now in bear markets. China
and Portugal
stock benchmarks ended the week of September 23 down about 23% for the
week. India,
Australia,
Japan
and Taiwan
also
breached the 20% mark as well. France
and Germany were already well into bear market territory
entering the last week of July and down more than 30% by September.
While global
contagion from the euro sovereign debt crisis has began, European
policymakers
are working to project an image of quickening their preparations to
cope with
an escalation of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis as talk of a
possible Greek
default gained momentum on Friday, September 23. Finance ministers from
around
the world have turned up the heat on their eurozone colleagues to do
more to
prevent Greece’s sovereign debt difficulties from infecting other eurozone
governments and
the world economy via contagion.
Following US
example, official strategy of eurozone
member states in Europe now appears to be turning towards
safeguarding the European banking system more than rescuing the greatly
impaired economy of Greece,
as international lenders increasingly lose
patience with Athens consistently missing fiscal and financial reform targets due
to domestic
political and social unrest.
British Finance Minister
George Osborne reportedly said on the sidelines of semiannual policy
discussions in Washington that the eurozone needed to gain control of the sovereign
debt crisis by
the time leaders of the Group of 20 economies meet in Cannes, France
on November 3 and 4, as France
assumes the rotation presidency of G20. That
gave the Greek rescue problem six weeks from mid September to cut
through the
complex network of hurdles.
.
World stock markets,
which had plunged to a 14-month low on fears about the expanding scale
of the eurozone
sovereign debt crisis, steadied after European Central Bank officials
said they
would use more firepower to help the European banking system withstand
financial strains.
Pressure is growing
on European governments for a recapitalization of the region’s banks to
strengthen them in the event of a Greek default. At the same time,
European
policy-makers seemed to be warming to the idea of giving more resources
to EFSF,
the SPV bailout fund, which would be severely tested if Greece
defaulted.
Greek Finance
Minister Evangelos Venizelos was quoted by two newspapers as saying an
orderly
default with a 50% haircut for bondholders was one way to ease his
government’s
cash crunch. Greece’s negotiation position appears to be that if the Troika
pushes Greece into a corner, it may leave Greece
with no option except to default, in which
case Greece would not be worse off than an austere Troika workout, but
the eruozone
will face massive damage, more than what it would cost to bailout Greece
on reasonable terms.
Greece is reportedly in tense talks with the International Monetary
Fund/ECB/EC
Troika to secure an urgently needed next €8 billion installment of
its rescue package to avoid bankruptcy in mid-October.
Greece had
originally expected a review by the country’s debt inspectors from the
Troika
of IMF/ECB/EC, to be completed in September and approve the sixth
installment
of €8 billion of the €110 billion ($149 billion) loan commitment from
EFSF, the
SPV bailout fund.
But inspectors from
the Troika suspended their review in August amid talk of missed targets
and
budget shortfalls by Greece. Venizelos said the Troika would return to
Athens
in the last week of September, and that the disbursment of the next
bailout
tranche of €8 billion would be approved in time as there were several
eurogroup
meetings in early October during which the other eurozone countries
could
approve the payment.
In return for emergency
aid, Greek officials pledged more austerity measures, but Troika
negotiators have
expressed frustration at what they say is Greece’s
slow reform pace. Reports said Venizelos met
new IMF head Largarde on Sunday, September 25, to what one official
characterized as “going over again measures they had agreed to months
before …
with a sense of deja vu.”
While the October
payment from EFSF is still widely expected to be made to Greece,
the next installment due in December is
much less certain. ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet reportedly urged
authorities to take decisive action, saying risks to the financial
system had “increased
considerably.” Three officials of the ECB reportedly suggested the ECB
could
revive its one-year liquidity lines to shore up European banks.
The IMF, which has
been pressing aggressively for an immediate recapitalization of Europe’s banks, estimates
the debt crisis has
increased the banks’ risk exposure by €300 billion. In a sign Europe was coming to terms with the idea of a bank
recapitalization,
The Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF), France’s
financial market regulator, announced that
15 to 20 banks needed extra capital.
The growing talk of
a Greek default met with stiff opposition from German Chancellor Angela
Merkel.
She told a meeting of her political party members that default was not
an
option because it might trigger a domino effect with other struggling
eurozone
economies. “The damage would be impossible to predict,” Merkel warned.
She
meant damage to the euro as a currency, the eurozone economies and
specifically Germany.
“It's not a question
of [financial] ability for the eurozone,” Bank of Canada
Governor Mark Carney pointed out the
obvious. “It is a question of political will,” he added.
October
7, 2011
Next: Globalization
vs National Sovereignty
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