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Money
Markets and Commodity Markets
By
Henry C.K. Liu
Part I: Money
Markets - Integrity Deficit Has Its Price
This article appeared in AToL
on August 19, 2009
In a global financial
architecture of national fiat
currencies, the role of a reserve currency in international trade is to
keep
all trading nations monetarily honest. This is done by requiring each
and every
currency issuer to adopt monetary policies that will protect and
maintain the
exchange value of their separate fiat currencies to the reserve
currency. Thus
for the exchange rate regime to work, it is imperative for the reserve
currency
itself to hold constant purchasing power.
The purchasing power of a fiat currency is dependent
on the monetary
and fiscal discipline of the issuing government and the balance of
payments
discipline of the underlying economy. Thus the issuer of a reserve
currency
cannot itself violate the laws of monetary integrity to finance
recurring fiscal
and trade deficits and expects to keep the reserve status for its fiat
currency.
This is the primary reason why the dollar has been having increasing
difficulty
with keeping its role as the prime reserve currency for international
trade as
established by the Bretton Woods regime of 1944, which has been defunct
since
1971 when President Nixon de-pegged the dollar from gold fixed at $35
per ounce.
The Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange
rates established
in 1944 was based on the dollar pegged to gold as a reserve currency in
an
international trade regime that disallowed free flow of funds across
national
borders outside of transactions between central banks.
Since 1971 when President Nixon suspended
the dollar’s
linkage to gold, acceptance of the fiat dollar as the preferred
reserved
currency for international trade has been essentially and increasingly
anchored
on US
geopolitical power rather than on sound monetary, fiscal and trade
principles.
After the Cold War, with the end of
hostility between
capitalism and socialism, the global geopolitical order has been
increasingly
shaped by geo-economics that reflects the fluctuating strength of
interconnected
national economies. As the US
economy declines from persistent loss of monetary, fiscal and balance
of
payment discipline, the ability of the US
to hold on the dollar’s status as a reserve currency for international
trade is
directly affected.
The superpower status of the US
is also being increasingly eroded by the recent precipitous decline of
its
super economy since mid 2007 both in relative terms and in absolute
terms. Still,
the size of the US
economy remains the largest in the world, a fact that underlines the
residual strength
of the dollar, not to mention the unfair advantage of dollar hegemony.
But the secular
decline of the dollar cannot go on indefinitely without causing fatal
harm to even
the world’s largest economy. The official declarative slogan that “a
strong dollar
is in the US
national interest” is being modified by developing events to a
normative warning
of “a strong dollar is needed to protect the US
national interest.” The famous announcement to the world by former
Treasury Secretary
James Baker III during the 1985 Plaza Accord negotiations that “the
dollar is
our currency but your problem” is no longer operative. The weakening
dollar has
reverted to being fundamentally a US
problem.
The Nature of Supply and Demand
The global market mechanism is
mediated through a price
structure denominated in a designated reserve currency acceptable to
all
trading nations. Textbook economics of market fundamentalism asserts
that market
prices are determined by supply and demand. Theoretically, the law of
marginal
utility states that price in a free market at any moment in time is set
by the
point at which the moving supply and demand curves intersect, driven by
the
quest for marginal utility on th epart of all market participants. The
theory of
marginal
utility is anchored with the calculus of disaggregated arbitrage on
changing
supply and demand relationships.
But in addition to supply of and demand for
commodities, price
when denominated in money is also determined by the supply of and
demand for
money. A controversy exists relating to whether money is a commodity, a
medium
of exchange, a store of value or a unit of deferred payment with
something of specific
prescribed value. The fact is that money can be all of the above
mentioned, but
in varying degrees, depending of the legal-political regime. Since
1913, supply
of money in the US
monetary system has been controlled by the Federal Reserve, the central
bank,
through the commercial banking systems that it regulates. Supply of
money is
imposed on the economy, not determined by market forces. Instead, the
supply of
money drives market forces.
Money Creation and Financialization of the
Economy
With “financialization” of the economy,
money markets have
grown beyond the regulated banking system to usurp the otherwise
exclusive
authority of central banks to control the supply and thus the price of
money in
relation to demand. Money now can be created by market participants who
are
incentivized solely by the quest for speculative profit in volatile
markets. Stability
spells depression for speculators who thrive on volatility.
With global financial deregulation, money
is no longer only created
by central banks to facilitate the financial needs of a healthy economy
by
maintaining market stability. Central
banks are constantly at war with speculative traders in a losing
struggle to
maintain currency and money market stability.
Volatility in markets, particularly involving foreign
exchange and interest rates, gave rise to the need by market
participants for
financial derivatives to hedge against market risks. In time,
derivatives have
morphed from hedging instruments against risk into profit centers of
speculation. A new financial sector known as structured finance has
grown
rapidly and extensively. Money creation through the excess issuance of
money by
either central banks and through excess issuance of debt by structured
financiers can cause dilapidating impacts on an economy. And it did in
systemic
dimensions in the summer of 2007.
Manipulation of Supply and Demand
Within commodities markets, with free
supply of money, the
cost of which declines in proportion to its abundance, both supply and
demand
are no longer merely endogenous (within the system) components of the
market
economy. Both supply and demand are
highly vulnerable to exogenous (external) purposeful manipulation by
five major
groups of market participants.
Four of the five groups: end-users,
source-producers,
traders and speculators depend on ready access to money at affordable
prices to
make profit. They create money by extending credit to each other for
the
purpose
of making profit. The fifth group, currency issuers, mainly central
banks, are
not profit motivated but have the power to control both the supply and
price of
money to implement national policy regardless of profitability. Together, the five groups of market
participants created a new capitalism in which capital is replaced by
debt.
While market power is seldom equally distributed among
market participants, a fact that renders the idea of a free market an
oxymoron,
any one of these five groups of market participants can manipulate
separately
or jointly unregulated markets for unfair advantage through
sub-optimization. With
globalization, these groups can also manipulate prices through
regulatory arbitrage
in unevenly regulated markets around world.
The Anti-labor Bias of Free Trade
Since trade globalization endorses the free
cross-border
movement of capital while it restricts free cross-border movement of
workers, the
structural anti-labor pitfall is blatantly obvious. In disconnected
labor
markets under trade globalization, demand for workers internationally
is
determined by cross-border wage arbitrage while demand for workers
domestically
is governed by uneven market power between capital and labor as
dictated by traditional
market conditions generated from capitalist ideological fixations.
Capital can cross national
borders to where cost and wages
are lowest but workers cannot go where wages are highest because of
immigration
restrictions. The net effect is global wage stagnation in the midst of
spectacular multinational corporate profits that results in global
overcapacity. To the chagrin of supply-siders, supply outraced demand
even when
demand was held up with a debt bubble.
The Manipulation of Prices
End-users can manipulate short-term prices
by drawing on inventory
to affect demand temporarily or manipulate long-term prices by using
substitutes to affect demand permanently. Source-producers can
manipulate short-term
prices by reducing production rate or manipulate inventory levels
temporarily to
affect supply. They can also manipulate long-term prices through
below-threshold pricing to deny profitable development of competing
substitutes.
Traders can manipulate prices by market
timing and speculators
can manipulate prices by hoarding or flooding the market. Cartels can
be formed
in unregulated markets by agreement among market participating groups
to create
monopolies with unfair market power. Currency issuers can manipulate
exchange
rates by central bank adjustment of monetary policy measures such as
interest
rate policies to manage quantitative easing or tightening. Money market
participants can manipulate prices by interest rate arbitrage.
Thus free markets require
sophisticated, complex and dynamic
regulations to restrict the ability of market participants to
manipulate prices
through monopolistic practices, rendering highly problematic the
literal
meaning of an unregulated free market. Totally free markets tend to end
in
market failures. This is particularly true in money markets as finance
is
infinitely more pliant that physical goods.
Market Fundamentalism
Market fundamentalism is the belief that
the optimum common
interest is only achievable through a free market equilibrium created
by the effect
of countless individual decisions of all market participants each
freely
seeking to maximize his/her own private gain and that such market
equilibrium
should not be distorted by any collective measures in the name of the
common
good.
Yet market participants seldom act with equal
information or
full understanding of the effects of their actions. Market
fundamentalism is a
theory that suggests the right path to a watering hole can best be
found by
blind men pulling at different directions for uncoordinated reasons.
The
fundamental problem with market fundamentalism is the ability of market
participants to maximize advantage by externalizing cost or penalties
outside
of the market onto the real economy. Free markets require regulation to
remain
free.
Increasingly, it has become obvious that
what is good for
Goldman Sachs, a highly profitable global investment bank headquartered
in New York, is not
necessarily good for the US
or for that matter the world. Thousands of Goldman Sachs do not add up
to a healthy
world economy, solid evidence that market fundamentalism does not work.
Price Stability
Generally, end-users desire low and stable
prices; source producers
desire sustainably high and stable prices. Both end users and source
producers
want stable markets. Traders desire price volatility to profit by
buying low
and selling high. Speculators desire cyclical price divergence and
convergence so
that they can go long on technical price depressions or go short on
price
bubbles. Speculators also perform a role of reducing risk exposure for
other
market participants by betting on uncertain outcomes. Each group of
market
participants separately plays a needed role to keep markets functioning
with
winners and losers. Ideally, a regulated market aims at producing only
winners
with no losers, or at least more winners than losers.
Yet many modern large industrial
enterprises are vertically
integrated, so that they are simultaneously end-users, producers,
traders and
speculators. These large, vertically
integrated enterprises are forced to seek optimum resolution of
conflicting
price objectives in commodities and financial markets. Large financial
institutions are all globalized to the degree that their profitability
is
increasingly derived from predatory manipulation to exploit weak points
in all
national economies through under-regulated financial markets.
Evolution of Money Markets
Until the late 1950s, a
currency’s money market was based only
in the issuing nation’s financial center: US dollars in New
York, sterling in London,
yen in Tokyo, Swiss francs
in Zurich,
etc. The Bretton Woods monetary regime of fixed exchange rates built
around a
gold-backed dollar did not consider unrestricted cross-border flow of
funds
desirable or necessary for facilitating international trade.
At the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union
became
concerned that its dollar deposits in New York
needed for arms-related procurement might be frozen by a hostile US
government, as happened to the funds held in the US
by the People’s Republic of China
after the Korean War broke out. The USSR
opened dollar accounts with European banks as a remedy.
The Impact of Regulation Q
In 1963, the US
introduced the populist Regulation Q, which for subsequent decades
imposed
limits and ceilings on bank and savings-and-loan (S&L) interest
rates.
Regulation Q created incentives for US banks to do business outside the
reach
of US
law in
quest of high interest rates, and London
came to dominate this offshore dollar business.
Bank accounts in London
are subject
only to British laws so US sanctions, restrictions and taxes cannot
apply to
the dollars deposited in them. British law on international finance is
well
developed on account of the financial hegemony of the British
Empire
after the fall of Napoleon. In time, banks in London,
often branches of US banks, started actively trading deposits in other
currencies besides dollars as well, as it became possible for them to
accept
deposit in one currency in one country and lend in another currency in
another
country profitably.
Up to the current financial crisis that broke out in mid 2007,
financial
regulation had become increasingly lighter, so money could and still
can be
moved to and from London
with
little cost; therefore the price of London
money generally tracks very closely that of domestic money in many
countries.
But there have been differences between domestic and London
interest rates. These differences have had different causes at
different times:
monetary policy, tax laws, bank regulations, the possibility that a
country
might introduce exchange controls, and the differences between the
creditworthiness of the banks in London
and those in the domestic market. The London
money and foreign-exchange markets are dominant for trading currencies,
raising
capital and selling debt.
In 1971, the US
detached the dollar from gold and made it a fiat currency based on the
strength
and large size of the US
economy, which allowed the dollar to continue to perform the role of
the world’s
key reserve currency for international trade. This was the beginning of
dollar
hegemony.
When Regulation Q was phased out by 1986, US banks were allowed to pay
interest
on checking account - the NOW accounts, to lure depositors back from
interest-paying
money markets. The traditional interest-rate advantage of S&L
associations
over commercial banks was removed, to provide a “level playing field”
with
commercial banks, forcing them to take the same risk as commercial
banks to
survive.
Congress also lifted restrictions on S&L
commercial
lending, beyond traditional home mortgages, which promptly got the
whole
S&L industry into bad-debt troubles that would soon required an
unprecedented government tax money bailout of depositors in a S&L
crisis.
But the real-estate developers who made billions with S&L loans
were
allowed to walk away with their profits, leaving S&L banks with
foreclosed
properties with market values way below the values of their mortgages.
State
usury laws were unilaterally suspended by an act of Congress in a
flagrant
intrusion on state rights.
A political coalition of powerful converging interests was evident.
Virulently
high inflation had damaged the financial position of the holders of
money,
including small savers, created by a period of benign low inflation
earlier, so
that even progressives felt something has to be done to protect the
propertied
middle class, the anchor of political democracy by virtue of their
opposition
to economic democracy. The solution was to export inflation to
low-labor-cost
economies in newly industrialized countries (NICs) around the world,
taming US
domestic inflation by outsourcing employment overseas and exorcising
the
domestic inflation devil that came in the form of escalating US wages.
The Rise of Neo-liberalism
Neo-liberalism, as summarized by
Susan
George in her paper: A Short
History of Neo-liberalism: Twenty Years of Elite Economics and Emerging
Opportunities for Structural Change (delivered at Conference on
Economic
Sovereignty in a Globalizing World, Bangkok, 24-26 March 1999), is a belief that the
market
mechanism should be allowed to direct the fate of human beings. The
economy
should dictate its rules to society, not the other way around.
Neo-liberalism
is a movement in support of free market economics, globalized
deregulated free-trade and anti-welfare reform. The German term
Ordoliberalism
(German neo-liberalsim), originally coined by German economist Alexander Rüstow (1885-1963), stands
for the need for the state to ensure that the free market produces
results close
to its theoretical resource allocation potential, not the US
neo-liberal
advocacy of no government intervention in markets. Rustow was the
theoretical
father of “social markets”, a doctrine that influenced the successful
economic
policies of Ludwig Wilhelm Erhard
(1897–1977) Minister of Economics under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer
after 1949.
Financial neo-liberalism was
born with the twin midwives of
dollar hegemony and unregulated global financial markets, disguising
economic
neo-imperialism as market fundamentalism. The debasement of the fiat
dollar,
dragging down all other fiat currencies, found expression in the upward
surge
of commodities and equity asset prices, which pushed down global wages
to keep US
inflation low. This pathetic phenomenon of downward economic spiral was
celebrated as economic growth by neo-liberals.
The Emergence of Interbank Deposit Market
Payments in the real economy cause bank balances in the central bank to
rise
and fall. A bank with a balance shortfall will need to borrow funds
from a bank
with an excess, and hence is created an interbank deposit market which
is the
key money market.
This interbank deposit market exists, with maturities from one day to
one year,
in every currency, and in the major currencies it exists both
domestically and
in London. A market
participant, by
choosing to borrow or lend money at any particular maturity, is
implicitly
speculating against the forward rates implied by the spot rates. Banks
lend
money against secured collateral, the rating of which reflects credit
risk,
which in turn affects interest rate. Central banks have fiat control
over
short-term interest rates of the most secured collaterals, generally
rated AAA,
as with US Treasury bills, motivated by monetary ideology and perceived
forward-looking
economic conditions. The euro when first introduced was a legal
construct that
made national currencies in Euroland irrelevant to wholesale financial
markets.
The Evolution of Banking
Banking was not consciously or rationally designed. It evolved as an
institution by meeting the changing needs of stages of evolving
economies that
have later become obsolete. The institution of banking frequently
trails behind
current financial needs of a contemporary economy.
The earliest banks of Middle Age Italy, where the name began from a
bench for
counting money, were finance companies. The Bank of St George at Genoa,
as with other banks founded in imitation of it, was at first only a
finance
company for making loans to and float loans for the governments of the
city-states where it operated. Money is an urgent want of governments
in all
times, and seldom more urgent than it was in the tumultuous Italian
Republics of the
High Middle Ages.
After these banks had been well established as finance companies, they
began to
do what today is referred to as banking business but was originally
never
contemplated.
The great banks of Northern Europe had their
origin in
meeting a want still more curious. The prime business of a bank was to
give
good coin. Adam Smith (1723-1790), the Scottish moral philosopher whose
ideas
so influenced US free market believers, describes it clearly:
“The currency of a
great state,
such as France
or England,
generally consists almost entirely of its own coin. Should this
currency, therefore,
be at any time worn, clipt, or otherwise degraded below its standard
value, the
state by a reformation of its coin can effectually re-establish its
currency.
But the currency of a small state, such as Genoa or Hamburg, can seldom
consist
altogether in its own coin, but must be made up, in a great measure, of
the
coins of all the neighboring states with which its inhabitants have a
continual
intercourse. Such a state, therefore, by reforming its coin, will not
always be
able to reform its currency. If foreign bills of exchange are paid in
this
currency, the uncertain value of any sum, of what is in its own nature
so
uncertain, must render the exchange always very much against such a
state, its
currency being, in all foreign states, necessarily valued even below
what it is
worth.”
Smith was giving an early description of currency
hegemony,
linking great statehood with sound money. It was the opposite of
Greenspan’s
approach of debasing the US
fiat dollar through over-issuance to maintaining the economy of a great
state,
notwithstanding Greenspan’s repeated expression of fidelity to the
ideas of
Adam Smith.
Smith went on to observe that:
“in order to remedy
the
inconvenience to which this disadvantageous exchange must have
subjected their
merchants, such small states, when they began to attend to the interest
of
trade, have frequently enacted that foreign bills of exchange of a
certain
value should be paid not in common currency, but by an order upon, or
by a
transfer in the books of a certain bank, established upon the credit,
and under
the protection of the state, this bank being always obliged to pay, in
good and
true money, exactly according to the standard of the state.”
Thus fixed exchange rates set by
governments are a necessity
for small states to overcome the adverse effects of market forces on
the value
of their currencies.
Before the Bank of Amsterdam, also known as the Wissel Bank, was
founded in
1609, an important date in the history of banking, the great quantity
of
clipped and worn foreign coins, which the extensive trade of Amsterdam
brought
from all parts of Europe, reduced the value of its currency about 9%
below that
of good money fresh from the mint. Such fresh good money no sooner
appeared
than it was melted down or carried away from general circulation, as
prescribed
by Gresham’s Law of bad
money
driving out good. Nobel laureate economist Robert Mundell asserts that
the
correct expression of Gresham’s
Law
is: “Cheap money drives out dear, if they exchange for the same price.”
It is a proposition that defines the relation between paper money and
specie
money based on precious metals. David Hume, writing in 1752, went to
great
pains to demonstrate that the existence of paper credit would mean a
correspondingly lower quantity of gold, and that an increase in paper
credit
would drive out a corresponding quantity of gold. Hume went on to
explain why
some countries had more gold - in proportion to population and wealth -
than
others: it was because there was no credit to displace gold. Paper
money is
essentially an government instrument of sovereign credit, not an
instrument of sovereign
debt, as many monetary economists mistake. Only entities of good credit
can
issue paper money because it is an instrument of credit. Debtors cannot
issue
money; they can only issue IOUs. While IOUs are frequently traded, they
are not
currency. Money issued by sovereign states is sovereign credit, not
sovereign
debt which comes in the form of bonds. Money buys bonds in a
transaction of
credit canceling debt.
Adam Smith developed the same idea in The Wealth of Nations
with the use
of paper money and applauded its use in the nation:
“The substitution of
paper in the
room of gold and silver money, replaces a very expensive instrument of
commerce
with one much less costly, and sometimes equally convenient.
Circulation comes
to be carried on by a new wheel, which it costs less both to erect and
to maintain
than the old one.”
But by accepting the use of
paper money, Smith was not
necessarily advocating debasing money. Smith went on to say that
merchants,
with plenty of currency, could not always find a sufficient quantity of
good
money to pay their bills of exchange; and the value of those bills, in
spite of
several regulations that were made to prevent it, became in a great
measure
uncertain.
To remedy these inconveniences, a bank was established
in
1609 under the guarantee of the City of Amsterdam.
This bank received both foreign coin and the light and worn coin of the
country
at its real intrinsic value in the good standard money of the country,
deducting only so much as was necessary for defraying the expense of
coinage,
and the other necessary expense of management. For the value that
remained,
after this small deduction was made, it gave a credit in its books.
This credit
was called bank money, which, as it represented money exactly according
to the
standard of the mint, was always of the same real value, and
intrinsically
worth more than current money.
It was at the same time
enacted that all bills drawn upon or
negotiated at Amsterdam of the value of 600 guilders and upward should
be paid
in bank money, which at once took away all uncertainty in the value of
those
bills. Every merchant, in consequence of this regulation, was obliged
to keep
an account with the bank in order to pay his foreign bills of exchange,
which
necessarily occasioned a certain demand for bank money.
The Bretton Woods Regime for Financing International
Trade
On this simple principle, the Bretton Woods regime set out in 1944 a
gold-backed
dollar as the reserve currency for postwar international trade. Since
then, the
central bank of every trading nation has been obliged to keep a dollar
reserve
account with the US Federal Reserve to support the value of its
currency, even
when the dollar was taken off the gold standard in 1971.
Henceforth, sovereign states were deprived of their
sovereign prerogative to employ sovereign credit for development of
their
national economy and had to depend on trade to earn foreign exchange
denominated in dollars as capital. And as international trade favors
the strong
market participant with superior market power, particularly the
monetary
hegemon, post-Cold War global trade morphed into a new form of economic
imperialism through which the strong advanced economies exploit the
weak
underdeveloped economies. This is accomplished by denying sovereign
governments
their right to deploy sovereign credit for national development and
forced them
to depend of foreign capital denominated in the fiat currency of the
monetary
hegemon.
An important function of early banks, which modern banks have retained,
is the
function of remitting money to facilitate trade. A customer brings
money to the
bank to meet a payment obligation at a great distance, and the bank,
having a
connection with other banks at that location, causes the destination
bank to
pay by debiting the account of the originating bank. The instant and
regular
remittance of money is an early necessity of growing trade. By
providing these
services, banks gained the credit rating that over time enabled them to
make
profits as deposit banks.
Being trusted for one purpose, banks came to be trusted for another
purpose
quite different, ultimately far more important, as depository and
intermediary
of money and credit. But these services only affect customers. The real
function deposit banks perform is the supply of paper-money circulation
to the
economy. Up to 1830 in England,
the main profit of banks was derived from circulation, and for many
years after
that deposits were treated as very minor matters, and the whole of
so-called
banking discussion turned on questions of circulation.
Today, circulation is handled electronically as virtual money instead
of paper
money. Banks are in fact a retail network for the central banks for
circulating
the money central banks issue. The US Federal Reserve, with its
unlimited power
to create money as a lender of last resort, is owned by its member
banks, not
by the people of the United States.
This arrangement is the key obstacle to economic/financial democracy in
the US.
The Fed and the Value of Money
The Federal Reserve, though not part of the US
government, and not collectively owned by the people but by member
commercial
banks, enjoys a monopoly on the creation of money backed by the full
faith and
credit of the nation. The Fed has meta-constitutional power to fix the
value of
money, through the setting of short-term interest rates and its control
of the
money supply not to facilitate market needs but to direct the economy
through
its control of the money market. The Fed sets and adjusts the minimum
rate of
discount from time to time that all banks must accept.
Since the beginning of the financial market turmoil in
August
2007, the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet has doubled in size and has
changed
in composition from normal times. Total assets of the Federal Reserve
have
increased significantly from $869 billion on August 8, 2007 to $2.24 trillion by the
end of 2008.
More importantly, much of this increased assets in the Fed’s balance
sheet are
toxic with no ready buyers in the market. Thus the Fed expanded its
balance
sheet to keep markets from functioning, despite the tedious claim that
it acted
to keep markets functioning. The Fed has injected some $1.4 trillion
into the financial
market, about 10% of 2008 GDP, to bail out the distressed banks by
buying the
toxic assets that was worth less than 10 cents on the dollar. It in
effect
insulated banks from market forces.
Neo-liberal economists view money as a commodity, and only a commodity.
Why
then is its value fixed by fiat and not the way in which the values of
all
other commodities are fixed, by supply and demand in the market? The
answer is
that the issuing of money as a legal tender is a government monopoly
that gives
government pricing power over money. This makes money more than a
commodity.
Money is in fact a political instrument with financial dimensions.
But the Fed, by its own definition of being
politically
independent, is not part of the government or even the democratic
political
process. The Fed, owned by its member banks, is a living example of a
political
institution with monopolistic monetary powers captured by a financial
oligarchy. While the Fed claims that its monetary-policy measures are
designed
to sustain the health of the whole economy, it sees the maintenance of
the health
of the economy’s financial heart, the banks in the Federal Reserve
System, as its
paramount policy objective.
Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment and Balanced Growth
To rein in the political independence of the Fed, the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act was
signed into law by President Jimmy Carter on October 27, 1978, known generally
as the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act,
named
for its liberal sponsors, Senator Hubert Humphrey and Representative
Augustus
Hawkins. The Act was allowed to expire in 2000. The Act required the
Federal
Open Market Committee to report to Congress on the economy and monetary
policy
twice a year.
Humphrey-Hawkins explicitly instructs the executive
branch
of the government to strive toward four mandated policy goals: full
employment,
economic growth, price stability, and a twin balance of trade and
fiscal budget.
By explicitly setting requirements and goals for the executive ranch to
attain,
the Act is markedly stronger than its predecessor, the post-WWII Full
Employment Act of 1946. Yet the 1946 Full Employment Act focused on
full employment
as a primary national economic goal, while Humphrey-Hawkins, by
specifying four
competing and conflicting goals, reduced full employment to just a
component factor
of economic policy.
Government Responsibility for Full Employment
In a dynamic modern economy in which employment has
replaced
livelihood as a means of economic survival for the average individual,
employment is a systemic political issue the responsibility for
providing which
lies with the institutions that operate the economy, not on individuals
with
livelihoods as in the static economy of the past. In the past, a baker
or a
blacksmith would inherit his trade from his father in a communal
economy
organized on cooperative principles. In the modern economy, workers are
employed in piecemeal jobs defined by the division of labor in support
of assembly
lines in factories in a society organized on competitive principles.
Only a small number of individuals are self-employed
in a
modern economy. Jobs are provided for workers by the economic system
regulated
by government. Unemployment then is the result of dysfunctional
economic policy,
and not the personal fault of the unemployed. Once full employment is
reduced
from a prime policy priority to merely one factor among many in
connected
government policy objectives, failed statehood will follow. In the
modern
economy, unemployment is a political problem with economic dimensions.
Government Mandate to Regulate Private Enterprise
Humphrey-Hawkins explicitly states that the federal
government will rely primarily on private enterprise to achieve the
four goals
of full employment, growth, price stability, and balance of trade and
budget.
Implicitly, private enterprise must be regulated so that corporate
profit is
structurally aligned with the achievement of the four policy goals. The
private
sector cannot be allowed to prosper with counterproductive activities
that
negate the four policy goals and treat social costs as externalities to
business. In welfare economics, an externality is a socio-economic cost
created
by one actor, the payment for which is imposed on others.
Humphrey-Hawkins also instructs the executive branch
to strive
towards a balanced budget over an economic cycle; maintain trade
balance to
avoid surpluses or deficits; mandates the Board of Governors of the
Federal
Reserve to establish a monetary policy that maintains long-term growth
with price
stability; and instructs the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
to
transmit a mandatory Policy Report to Congress twice a year on its
monetary
policy; requires the President to set numerical goals for the economy
of the
next fiscal year in the Economic Report of the President and to suggest
policies
that will achieve these goals; and requires the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve
to connect the monetary policy with the Presidential economic policy.
Humphrey-Hawkins sets specific numerical goals for the
executive branch to
attain, mandating that within five years, by 1983, unemployment rates
should be
less than 3% for persons aged 20 and over and less than 4% for persons
aged 16 and
over. In August 2009, the national unemployment rate reached 9.4%.
Unemployment
of people ages 16 to 19 was a seasonally adjusted 23.8% in July after
hitting a
quarter-century high of 24% in June 2009.
Humphrey-Hawkins mandates inflation rates to be less
than 4%, and within ten
years after the legislation became law, by 1988, inflation rates should
be 0%, a
goal never reached except in recession years. More than a year after
the
financial crisis broke out in August 2007, the inflation rate through
2008 was
3.8% before disinflation hit in 2009 to bring the inflation rate down
to a
negative -2.1%. Humphrey-Hawkins also
allows Congress to revise these goals as time progresses.
If private enterprise fails to achieve these
employment goals, Humphrey-Hawkins
expressly allows the government to create a “reservoir of public
employment.”
These jobs are required to be in the lower ranges of skill and pay so
as to not
draw the workforce away from the private sector.
In the same spirit,
a way to
achieve full employment with price and currency stability has been
proposed in
a Public Service Employment (PSE) Program at the University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) under Professor
Randall Wray. PSE programs have
been proposed to several governments. (Please see A full employment
program for
Hong Kong by Wray and Liu - March 30, 2002.)
How the Fed Controls Short-term Interest rate
In normal times, there is usually not enough money in the money markets
to
discount all the bills outstanding without taking money from the Fed.
As soon
as the Fed Funds rate target is fixed, market participants who have
bills to
discount try to discount these bills cheaper than the Fed Funds rate.
But they
seldom can get them discounted cheaper, for if they did everyone would
leave
the Fed, and the outer market would have more bills than it could
handle and
the rate would rise to the rate set by the Fed. Thus the Fed Funds rate
is
always a target toward which the Fed will use its own funds to maintain.
In practice, when the Fed finds this process happening, and sees its
market share
shrinking, it lowers the Fed Funds rate target, so as to secure a
reasonable
portion of the money market for itself, and to keep a fair part of its
deposits
employed. At Dutch auctions, an upset or maximum price is fixed by the
seller,
and he comes down in his bidding until he finds a buyer. The value of
money is
fixed in the money market in much the same way, only that the upset
price is
not that of all sellers, but that of one very important seller, the
Fed, some
part of whose supply is essential to set the market rate.
The notion that the Fed has control over the money market, and can fix
the rate
of discount as it deems necessary, has survived from before 1844, when
the Bank
of England could issue as many notes as it liked.
But even then the notion was a
misconception. A bank with a
monopoly of note issue has great sudden temporary power in the money
market,
but no permanent power, as it can affect the rate of discount at any
particular
moment, but it cannot affect the average rate. And the reason is that
any
momentary fall in money, caused by fiat action of such a bank, of
itself tends
to create an immediate and equal rise, so that upon an average the
value is not
altered. Also the amount of outstanding long-term debt is always
infinitely
greater than short-term debt, making it difficult for short-term
interest rates
to dictate long-term rates. This is the root cause of what Greenspan
calls the
interest-rate conundrum.
Money of Constant Value
Money of constant value allows its owners, or by banks that did not pay
an
interest for it, to hold it idle without penalty. The positive effect
would be
that the value of money might not fall. Money would, in market
parlance, be
"well held". The holders would be under no pressure to employ all of
it, waiting to employ part at a high rate. The negative effect is that
money
will be underemployed and cause to economy to stagnate. Thus the three
conditions that compel money to be constantly fully employed are taxes,
interest payments and mild inflation which forces holders of money to
seek
returns above inflation rate. Tax reduction, low interest rates and
deflation
are conditions that destabilized money markets by retarding money
circulation.
The Economic function of Taxes, Fair Profit and
Equitable
Wages
Taxes are not levied to finance government expenditure, but to keep the
population financially productive. Similarly, interest on money is not
to
reward the holders of money, but to keep the borrowers working for it.
Prosperity is produced by work, not profits. Return on capital without
work is
mere speculative profit.
This is the key misunderstanding on the part of market
capitalists who insist that profit is necessary for job creation and
therefore
government must adopt policies that induce maximum profit for the good
of the
economy. While this is true to a limited extent, excess profit that
comes from
depressed wages is economically counterproductive.
Operationally, excess profit can only come from wage
deficits.
Excess profit leads to overcapacity as it drains off needed wages to
sustain consumer
demand to soak up the increased productivity created by investment
attracted by
high return on capital. Cyclical overinvestment produces overcapacity.
It is
the basic cause of the business cycle.
The Need for Equitable Wages
To moderate the adverse effects of the business cycle,
the
curse of overcapacity must be curbed by limiting corporate profit by
returning excess
profit above the rate of inflation and reasonable return on capital to
workers
in the form of higher wages. Incentives must be structured to encourage
management to raise wages to limit excess corporate profit or face
punitive
corporate income tax penalties. This
point is largely missed in the on-going debate on executive
compensation and corporate
income tax rate by market capitalists who misleadingly present high
executive
pay and low corporate income tax rate as indispensable to economic
growth.
Making Money Work
Money is economically productive only if it is not
free. In
the money market, money is held by those who must pay interest on it,
such as
money-market fund managers, and such entities must employ all the money
in its
care to avoid insolvency. Such entities do not so much care at what
rate of
interest they employ the money they manage: they can reduce the
interest dividend
they pay investors in proportion to that which they can make from
lending, but
they must pay something. They must also always avoid losing capital,
known as
breaking the buck, as each unit of investment is generally structured
as $1.00.
The fluctuations in the value of money are therefore
more
directly responsive to market conditions than fluctuations in the value
of most
other commodities. At times, there is a high demand to borrow money,
and at
times high pressure to lend money, and so the price of money is forced
up and
down every day.
Role of the Fed
The role of the Fed is to moderate such fluctuations
by
quantitative easing and tightening to keep the price of money in line
with the need
of the economy. Market considerations define the responsibility thrust
on the
Fed and other central banks. The Fed cannot control the long-term price
of
money, but it can fully control its spot price at any one time. It
cannot
change the average value of money over time, but it can determine the
deviations from the average at any one time.
If the Fed badly manages its responsibility as a
market
stabilizer, the rate of interest will at one time be excessively low,
and at
another time excessively high. The economy will experience pernicious
booms and
busts. This has been the case through most of the history of central
bank performance
since it establishment in 1913. But if the Fed manages well, the rate
of
interest will not deviate much from the average rate, at least in
theory. As
far as anything can remain steady, the value of money will then be
steady, and
in consequence, trade probably will be steady too, or at least a
principal
cause of periodic cyclical disturbance will have been withdrawn from
it.
This is the view of Milton Friedman, who coined the slogans "money
matters" and “inflation is everywhere and anywhere a monetary
phenomenon.”
Friedman advocated a fixed expansion of M1 at 3% long-term to moderate
the
runaway business cycle over-stimulated by Keynesian deficit-financing
measures.
But economies can develop
imbalances from monetary causes
independent of inflation, as the US
economy has from dollar hegemony. Greenspan’s solution was to keep a
steady
expansion of the money supply to neutralize the imbalances with
painless debt,
thus postponing the day of reckoning by accepting a bigger future crash
that
requires a bigger cleanup. That day of reckoning came in mid July 2007
in the
form of a global melt down of an unsustainable two-decade long serial
bubble
released by Greenspan after he took over the Fed in 1987.
Prices and the State of Credit
The rise in prices, also known as inflation, is the quickest way to
improve the
general state of credit. The fall in prices, known as deflation, is the
quickest way to cause a deterioration of the general state of credit.
For this
reason, central banks fear deflation more than they fear inflation.
Prices in
general are mostly determined by wholesale transactions, which are
commonly not
cash transactions, but bill transactions. Years of improving credit, if
there
be no disturbing causes, are years of rising prices, and years of
decaying
credit are years of falling prices. Deflation is the deadly enemy of
outstanding debt. In the current debt-infested economy, deflation is a
real
killer.
In the United States, when house prices had generally tripled in less
than a
decade up to 2007, it is evidence that the value of the dollar has
declined by
a factor of three in the same time period. But official inflation had
not gone
up 300%. US
average annual inflation rate between 1997 and 2007 had been between a
low of
1.59% (2002) and a high of 3.39% (2005). The average inflation for the
decade
was less than 3.5% per year, yielding a price increase of less than
35%. Some
265% of housing price rise was the effect of the debt bubble.
Consumer prices had not increased by the same amount
as
housing prices because of outsourcing of manufacturing to low-wage
economies
overseas, which also acted as a depressant on domestic wages. Real
estate
prices affect prices of all other assets types, including equity
assets. The
stock market generally rises with inflation but shoots ahead of it.
Thus a
housing bubble quickly expands to include a stock market bubble.
Imbalances in the economy can appear if wages and
earnings do
not rise proportionately to prices. A homeowner whose house increased
300% in
market price while his income rose only 30% had not become richer. He
had
become a victim of uneven inflation. He might enjoy a one-time joyride
with
cash-out financing with a new home equity mortgage, but his income
could not
sustain the new mortgage payments if interest rates rose, or if house
prices
fall, and he would lose his home. And interest rates will rise if his
income
increases, because that is how the Fed defines inflation. Thus when his
income
rises, the interest payment on his mortgage will rise and the market
price of
his home will fall, giving him an incentive to walk away from a big
mortgage in
which he has little equity tie-up. This can become a systemic problem
for the
mortgage-backed security sector. And it did in mid 2007.
Primary Dealers
In every financial market, there will always be banks or securities
dealers
who, by attending to one class of securities or a segment of the credit
market,
come to be particularly well acquainted with that class. The Fed
recognizes
them as primary dealers who may trade directly with it. Such firms are
required
to make bids or offers when the Fed conducts open market operations,
provide
market information to the Fed’s open market trading desk, and
participate
actively in US Treasury security auctions. They consult with both the
Treasury
and the Fed about funding the government budget and trade deficits and
implementing monetary policy. Because of their special knowledge of
government
debt markets, many former employees of primary dealers work at the
Treasury as
well as former Treasury officials work for primary dealers. The Fed has
a
policy to avoid similar revolving door relationship. Still, an incest
culture
unavoidably develops among members of this exclusive fraternity of
financial
high priesthood.
The list of primary dealers is composed of US (7),
British
(3), Japanese (3), Swiss (2), French (1), Canadian (1) and German (1)
banks and
firms. Primary dealers as a group purchase the vast majority of the US
Treasury
securities sold at auction, and resell them to the public around the
world.
Their activities extend well beyond the Treasury market to the foreign
exchange
market, accounting for 73% of foreign exchange trading volume, making
them as a
group the most influential and powerful non-governmental institutions
in world
financial markets.
China,
now the biggest purchaser of US Treasury security, has no primary
dealer
recognized by the Fed even though as of 2009 China
has the three largest banks in the world, measured by market
capitalization,
and four of the top ten.
Fed Bailouts of Primary Dealers
The primary dealers form a worldwide network that
distributes new U.S.
government debt. In response to the subprime mortgage crisis and to the
collapse of Bear Stearns, the Fed on March 19, 2008 set up the Primary Dealers
Credit Facility (PDCF) to allow
primary dealers to borrow at the Fed’s discount window collateralized
by toxic
assets. It was deemed imperative that the primary dealer network must
not be
allowed to collapse.
PDCF is an overnight loan facility that will provide
funding
to primary dealers in exchange for any tri-party-eligible collateral
and is
intended to foster the functioning of financial markets more generally.
Eligible
participants include primary dealers participating through their
clearing
banks.
PDCF loans will settle on
the same business day and will mature the following business day. The
rate paid
on the loan will be the same as the primary credit rate at the New York
Fed. In
addition, primary dealers will be subject to a frequency-based fee
after they
exceed 45 days of use. The frequency-based fee will be based on an
escalating
scale and communicated to the primary dealers in advance.
The rate of the loan is the primary credit rate at the
New York Fed which
was 0.50% on August 15, 2009 when the Fed Funds target was 0 to 0.25%.
Eligible
collateral will include all collateral eligible in tri-party repurchase
arrangements
with the major clearing banks as of September 12, 2008. A primary dealer will be
allowed to borrow up to the
margin-adjusted collateral they can deliver to the Federal Reserve’s
account at
the clearing banks. All loans are made for the duration of one day. New
loans
can be taken out each day. Loans to primary dealers made under the PDCF
are
made with recourse beyond the collateral to the primary dealer entity
itself.
The earlier Term Auction Facility program (TAF),
instituted on December 11,
2007 offers term funding to depository institutions via a bi-weekly
auction,
for fixed amounts of credit. The Term Securities Lending Facility
(TSLF),
instituted on March 11, 2008, as liquidity in the global markets came
to a
halt, expanded the types of acceptable collateral: student loans, car
loans,
home equity loans and credit card debt, as long as it was highly rated.
TSLF is
an auction for a fixed amount of lending of Treasury general collateral
in
exchange for Open Market Operation (OMO)-eligible and investment grade
corporate securities, municipal securities, mortgage-backed securities,
and
asset-backed securities.
PDCF loans made to primary dealers increase the total
supply
of reserves in the banking system, in much the same way that Discount
Window loans
do. To offset this increase, the Desk will utilize a number of tools,
including, but not necessarily limited to, outright sales of Treasury
securities, reverse repurchase agreements, redemptions of Treasury
securities
and changes in the sizes of conventional RP transactions.
This differs from discount window lending to
depository
institutions in a number of ways. Currently, the primary credit
facility offers
overnight as well as term funding for up to 90 calendar days at the
primary
credit rate secured by discount window collateral to eligible
depository
institutions. The PDCF, by contrast, is an overnight facility that will
be
available to primary dealers (rather than depository institutions).
Similar to loans made to depository institutions via
the
Discount Window, information on PDCF borrowing will be made available
each
Thursday, generally at 4:30 p.m., on Federal Reserve Statistical
Release H.4.1
- Factors Affecting Reserve Balances of Depository Institutions and
Condition
Statement of Federal Reserve Banks. The H.4.1 release will contain the
total
amount of PDCF credit outstanding as of the close of business on the
prior
business day and the average daily amounts for each week. The August 13, 2009 release
shows an
average daily total factors supplying reserve funds to be $2.05
trillion.
PDCF loans are made under Section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act. The PDCF will remain available to primary dealers until February 1, 2010, or longer
if
conditions warrant.
As primary dealers can for the
most part lend much more than
their own capital, they will always be ready to borrow largely from
banks and
other creditors and in the repo market, and to deposit the top-rated
securities
as collateral. They act thus as intermediaries between the borrowing
public and
the less qualified lenders of money in the market. Knowing better than
the non-specialist
lenders which loans are better and which are worse, specialist dealers
borrow
from them, and gain a profit by charging the public more than they pay
to the
lenders.
Many primary dealers and other stockbrokers transact such business on
an
enormous scale. They lend large sums on domestic and foreign bonds or
infrastructure shares or other such securities, and borrow those sums
from
bankers, depositing the securities with the bankers, and generally,
though not
always, giving their guarantee. But with the development of deregulated
capital
and debt markets, banks are increasingly reduced to the role of market
participants rather than intermediaries, by proprietary trading. By far
the
greatest of these new intermediate dealers are the bill-brokers.
Mercantile
bills are a kind of security that only professionals transact. In the
US, they
are called commercial papers, short-term obligations with maturity
ranging from
two to 270 days issued by banks, corporations and other institutional
borrowers
to investors with temporary idle cash. Such instruments are unsecured
and
usually discounted, though some are interest-bearing. (Please see my November 28, 2997 article: The
Commercial Paper Market and Special Investment Vehicles)
Money Markets
In the US,
the
money market is a subsection of the fixed-income market. A bond is one
type of
fixed income security. The difference between the money market and the
bond
market is that the money market specializes in very short-term debt
securities
(debt that matures in less than one year). Money-market investments are
also
called cash investments because of their short maturities. Money-market
securities are in essence IOUs issued by governments, financial
institutions
and large corporations of top credit ratings. These instruments are
very liquid
and considered extraordinarily safe. Because they are extremely
secured,
money-market securities offer significantly lower return than most
other
securities that are more risky.
One other main difference between the money market and the stock market
is that
most money-market securities trade in very high denominations. This
limits the
access of the individual investor. Furthermore, the money market is a
dealer
market, which means that firms buy and sell securities in their own
accounts,
at their own risk. Compare this with the stock market, where a broker
receives
a commission to act as an agent, while the investor takes the risk of
holding
the stock. Another characteristic of a dealer market is the lack of a
central
trading floor or exchange. Deals are transacted over the phone or
through
electronic systems. Individuals gain access to the money market through
money-market mutual funds, or sometimes through money-market bank
accounts.
These accounts and funds pool together the assets of hundreds of
thousands of
investors to buy the money-market securities on their behalf. However,
some
money-market instruments, such as Treasury bills, may be purchased
directly
from the Treasury in denominations of $10,000 or larger. Alternatively,
they
can be acquired through other large financial institutions with direct
access
to these markets.
There are different instruments in the money market, offering different
returns
and different risks. The desire of major corporations to avoid costly
banks borrowing
as much as possible has led to the widespread popularity of commercial
paper.
Commercial paper is an unsecured, short-term loan issued by a
corporation,
typically for financing accounts receivables and inventories. It is
usually
issued at a discount, reflecting current market interest rates.
Maturities on
commercial paper are usually no longer than nine months, with
maturities of one
to two months being the average.
Commercial Paper Market
For the most part, commercial paper is a very safe investment because
the
financial situation of a company can easily be predicted over a few
months.
Furthermore, typically only companies with high credit ratings and
creditworthiness issue commercial paper. Over the past four decades,
there have
only been a handful of cases where corporations have defaulted on their
commercial-paper repayment. Commercial paper is usually issued with
denominations of $100,000 or multiples thereof. Therefore, small
investors can
only invest in commercial paper indirectly through money market funds.
On December 23, 2005,
commercial paper placed directly by GE Capital Corp (GECC) was 4.26% on
30-44
days and 4.56% on 266-270 days, while the Fed Funds rate target was
4.25% and
the discount rate was 5.25%, both effective since December 13. On August 14, 2009, commercial
paper was
0.21% on 30-44 days and 0.27% on 90 to 119 days, while the effective
Fed Funds
Rate was 0.16%. Shares of GE reached a high of $42.12 on October 12, 2007, three
months after the credit
crisis broke out, and fell to a low of $6.69 on March 4, 2009. It
was $13.92 on August 14, 2009,
still less than a third of its peak. GE market capitalization fell from
$447.63
billion at its high in 2007 to $71.09 billion at it low in 2009 and
bounced
back to $147.93 billion on August
14, 2009. Before the collapse
of
the commercial-paper market, GE had become the world’s biggest non-bank
finance
company until the financial crisis of 2007. GE commercial paper is no
longer
listed in the financial press as a bench mark rate.
Rates on AA ranked financial commercial paper due in
90 days
fell to a record low of 0.28% on Jan. 8, 2008, or 21 basis points more
than the
US borrowing rate,
The market for commercial paper backed by assets such
as
auto loans and credit cards was the first to seize up. It fell 37% over
five
months to $772.8 billion, from its peak in August 2007 of $1.22
trillion, as
defaults on subprime home loans began to soar.
After Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. filed for
bankruptcy on September 15,
2008, the broader
commercial paper market froze. The next day, the flagship $62.6 billion
money-market fund of Reserve Management Co. became the second of its
kind to “break
the buck” in market history, or fell below the $1-a-share price paid by
investors, triggering a run that helped freeze global credit markets
and drove
up borrowing costs. Returns on money-market funds have dropped 62%
since then.
Meanwhile, the commercial paper market slumped 20%
over six
weeks as money-market investors fled for safer assets such as
Treasuries. Prime
money-market funds’ holdings of first-tier paper, rated at least P-1 by
Moody’s
Investors Service and A-1 by Standard & Poor’s, fell by 33% from
September
9 to October 7, 2008.
On October
27, 2008, the Fed set up the Commercial Paper Funding
Facility (CPFF),
complementing a separate program for providing liquidity to the
asset-backed
debt market that had begun in September. These programs were intended
to ensure
companies would have access to short-term credit and to ease redemption
concerns at money-market funds. The amount outstanding under the
asset-backed
program peaked at $152.1 billion on October 1, 2008 before plunging to a low of
$14.8 billion as redemption
concerns subsided.
On October
21, 2008, the Fed set up another program, the Money Market
Investor
Funding Facility (MMIFF), to provide liquidity to money-market
investors. The
facility buys commercial paper due in 90 days or less. The short-term
debt
markets had been under considerable strain in recent weeks as money
market
mutual funds and other investors had difficulty selling assets to
satisfy
redemption requests and meet portfolio rebalancing needs. By
facilitating
the sales of money market instruments in the secondary market, the
MMIFF is
designed to improve the liquidity position of money market investors,
thus
increasing their ability to meet any further redemption requests and
their willingness
to invest in money market instruments. Improved money market
conditions
enhance the ability of banks and other financial intermediaries to
accommodate
the credit needs of businesses and households.
About $220 billion to $230 billion of 90-day
commercial
paper was sold to the Fed above market rates in October 2008 through
the CPFF
matures in the first week of operation. That was as much as 66% of the
$350
billion in debt that the CPFF owns. The Fed has purchased about
one-fifth of
the commercial paper market through the CPFF.
Currency Hegemony
Currency hegemony, which in the current global trade
regime
is essentially dollar hegemony, allows the monetary hegemon to dictate
predatory terms of trade on the entire globalized market economy in the
name of
free trade, at the expense of national economies in both the
commodities and
financial markets. Economic nationalism in the context of a world order
of independent
sovereign states is challenged by global free traders by labeling it as
counterproductive
protectionism. National industrial policies and monetary sovereignty
are
dismissed as unenlightened opposition to Ricardian principle of
comparative
advantage in free trade. (Please see my February 16, 2008 AToL article: The global money and currency markets)
The Comparative Advantage Trap
Comparative
advantage in trade economics refers to the economic optimization
of the
ability of a country to produce a particular good at lower marginal and
opportunity costs than its trading partner can. Comparative advantage
differs
from absolute advantage which refers to the ability of a country to
produce a
particular good at a lower absolute cost than other countries.
Comparative
advantage allows trade to increase economic value for trading parties,
known as
gains from trade, even when one party can produce all goods at lower
cost than its
trading partner.
In 1815, during the Corn Laws debate in England,
Robert Torrens
advanced the concept of comparative advantage in an article: Essay on the External Corn Trade by concluding
that both England and Poland would benefit from trade by importing corn
from Poland
to England even though corn could be produced cheaper in England, if by
doing
so England were to be able to concentrate on manufacturing for export
to Poland. Torrens did not deal with the
problem of the developmental
penalty for Poland
to forego manufacturing in order to produce more corn for export to England.
Thus trade under comparative advantage would support industrialization
in England
to produce higher value-added products at the expense of
industrialization in Poland,
making England
into an industrial power by the middle of the 19th century
to build
the British Empire, while assigning Poland
the fate of an underdeveloped agricultural weakling dependent on
British
markets for its low value-added farm produce. Empire building then was
attributed to British cultural fitness to greatness rather than British
structural advantage through trade.
David Ricardo formalized the term “comparative
advantage” his
1817 book: On the Principles of Political
Economy and Taxation by the example of trade in wine and cloth
between England
and Portugal.
Even
when Portugal was able to produce both wine and cloth at lower cost
than in
England, because the relative costs of producing the two goods
were
different in the two countries, it is cheaper still for Portugal to
produce
excess wine, and trade that for English cloth. Conversely England
would benefit from this trade because its cost for producing cloth
remained
unchanged but it can now import wine at a lower price. The conclusion
drawn is
that each country can gain by specializing in the good that it has
comparative
advantage in and trading that good for the other.
The negative effect of comparative advantage from
trade that
Ricardo did not elaborate is that a country that exploits comparative
advantage
in trade to focus on advanced technological gains will achieve absolute
advantage in the long term. Cloth production was beginning to be
mechanized in England
in the 1800s and investment in cloth production eventually led to the
industrial revolution in England
and allowed England
to develop a societal culture of the industrial age.
Thus national industrial policy is necessary to
protect
countries from falling into the developmental trap of comparative
advantage in
trade, trading long-term economic development for short-term trade
benefits. Comparative
advantage in free trade favors the more advanced economy to widen the
gap in
development. In early 19th century, England
was emerging as the most technological economy in the world, and
British
national opinion adopted free trade to perpetuate its advanced status.
Comparative advantage was a short-term accounting trick to lure the
less
advanced economies into free trade with England.
Friedrich List (1789-1846), as expounded in his Das
Nationale System der Politischen Oekonomie (1841), translated as The
National System of Political Economy, that
once a nation (or a bloc of nations) falls
behind developmentally
in the trade arena, it cannot catch up through free trade alone without
government intervention.
List’s German Historical School is distinctly different in outlook from
the
British classical economics of David Ricardo and James Mill. List
argues that
economic behavior that gives credence to laws of economics is
contingent with its
historical, social and institutional context. When a nation is forced
to adopt
the national opinion of another nation with different historical
conditions as
natural laws of international economics, it will always be the victim
of such alien,
unnatural laws.
Such views have been validated by the experience of
the
trade relation between Britain
and her colonies within the British Empire. The
American
Revolution was fought over economic dominance by Britain,
the freedom and democracy issues were merely rhetorical dressing. The
founding
father of the United States
had first in mind forming a constitutional republic with a king rather
than a
president. The issues were again visible in post-WWII Japan
and Germany,
which had to pay the price of being client states of the US
in exchange for trickled-down prosperity through free trade.
For the socialist camp, trading with the capitalist camp during the
Cold War was
the strategic error that caused it to expose itself unprotected to a
predatory capitalist
game it could not win and that it would lose from the outset and never
catch
up. The dissolution of socialist USSR
was rooted in Soviet decision to engage in trade with the capitalist
West to
earn dollars to finance the Soviet arms race with the US.
In that sense, neo-liberals are on target in claiming
that
free trade promotes capitalistic democracy, but they are dishonest in
claiming
that free trade is a win-win game for all participants or that
capitalist
democracy is suitable or workable for all nations. Even Wal-mart is
dropping
its commercial DSMS (data based management system) of
one-size-fits-all, to
accommodate local differences in cultural and social idiosyncrasies in
consumer
choices. Is the choice of produce is acknowledged to be governed by
local
preferences in order to optimize profit, can the choice of political
system be
expected to governed by one-size-fits-all model to produce world peace?
Superpower cultural imperialism is the key defect in US
foreign policy.
International free trade is only good for the
financial
hegemon, as domestic free trade is good for the monopolist. Socialism
works
only if development is not preempted by external trade. The World Trade
Organization and the IMF are regimes designed to favor the capitalist
hegemon
by keeping the weaker economies at a structural disadvantage with rules
that
would make it impossible for them to overcome their weaknesses. The
current
anti-WTO and anti-IMF movements around the world are early signs of a
grassroots awakening to this truism.
The myth of comparative advantage aside, international
trade
is necessary because most nations do not produce all basic commodities
that
every economy needs. This is because the location of basic commodities
has been
fixed by nature prior to the emergence of the nation state. After the
age of
imperialism, when quest for basic commodities can no longer be
accomplished
through military conquest at low cost, international trade is then
driven by
the need of all modern economies for basic commodities. Thus
international
trade is not driven by comparative advantage. It is driven by
competition for
basic commodities. Modern geopolitics is shaped by the uneven location
of basic
commodities left by nature around the globe. Neo-imperialism then
replaces old
fashion imperialism by substituting military conquest with predatory
trade to
exploit the less advanced economies.
August 17, 2009
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